


FUNDAMENTALS OF ECHELONS ABOVE DIVISION COMBAT OPERATIONS

STAFF PLANNING BOOK



FEBRUARY 1997

U.S. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

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FUNDAMENTALS OF ECHELONS ABOVE DIVISION COMBAT OPERATIONS
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CHANGE ALL REFERENCE FROM ACADEMIC YEAR 98 TO ACADEMIC YEAR 99. THE
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FUNDAMENTALS OF ECHELONS ABOVE DIVISION COMBAT OPERATIONSChapter 1. General Situation and X (US) Corps Troop List

1. GENERAL SITUATION

a. *References.* Map sheets, Joint Operations Graphic (JOG) Series 1501, Germany, 1:250.000

b. *Word of caution.* Don't fight the scenario. It is intended to be a vehicle to study the employment of forces in a forward-deployed, mature theater. This is the same European theater. scenario, enemy force (the Krasnovians). and X (US) Corps introduced in M/S320A. *Reinforcing and Forward Deployed Operations.*

c. *Background.* Following a period of disorder, turmoil, and worsening economic and political conditions among several of the Eastern European republics (formerly of the Soviet Union), hard-line forces, mostly led by former KGB and Soviet military officers, seized power in the spring of 19 . They established the new state of Krasnovia the following year. The military leadership established a dictatorship committed to restoring the power, prestige, and position of the former Warsaw Pact. These Krasnovian leaders began promoting a new Socialist Pact Alliance among the peoples of Eastern Europe. They designated the Communist and Socialist parties as the only authorized political parties in Krasnovia, and the Socialist Pact nations consolidated and reorganized the military forces of the former Soviet Union republics as the new Krasnovian Army. The Krasnovian military leaders began planning an offensive campaign to seize the former East German territory and reestablish a defensive line along the former inner-German border (IGB). At the conclusion of this campaign, they will forcibly incorporate the former East Germany into the Socialist Pact Alliance with Krasnovia.

According to the Krasnovian campaign plan, an objective line will initially be seized from the North Sea south to Berlin, Dresden, and Prague. The subsequent objective line will generally follow the former IGB south and include the international boundary, between Germany and the Czech Republic. The Krasnovians plan to attack with two strategic echelons, each composed of two fronts with two to three armies.

The Krasnovian theater of military operations (TVD) commander plans to use the 1 and 2 Krasnovian Fronts as the first strategic echelon. The 1 Krasnovian Front will conduct the main attack in the north, with the 2 Krasnovian Front conducting a supporting attack. The second strategic echelon will follow 20 to 30 days behind the first strategic echelon's attack. Figure 1-1 depicts the two echelons. Chapter 4 to this staff planning book has the Krasnovian order of battle for the first strategic echelon.






Figure 1-1. Krasnovian TVD strategic echelons.

Sketch map Staff Planning Book (SPB)-a shows the general disposition of the Krasnovian TVD and the concept of operation for the campaign.



Sketch map SPB-a. General disposition of the Krasnovian T&D and the concept of operation for the campaign.



NATO member states agreed to resist Krasnovian aggression. The Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), authorized his principal regional commander facing the Krasnovian threat, the Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Central Europe (CINCENT), to execute Allied Forces, Central Europe (AFCENT) Contingency Plan 30101 (CHESHIRE CAT). AFCENT is a joint headquarters. The land component is Land Forces, Central Europe (LANDCENT), and the air component is Air Forces, Central Europe (AIRCENT). Figure 1-2 reviews the strategic and operational command and control structure for NATO.





Figure 1-2 NATO military structure (selected elements).

The European allies abrogated the CFE (Conventional Forces, Europe) Treaty (which limited the number of military forces stationed in Europe) and on 17 July (M-day) began to mobilize in Europe and reinforce from the continental United States (CONUS). In early August German Territorial Forces rapidly repositioned themselves along the German-Polish border to be ready for the remainder of NATO's forces to mobilize. As you may recall from M/S320A, LANDCENT developed a contingency operation plan (COP), CRASHING FIST, to support the AFCENT plan for defense of NATO (CHESHIRE CAT). Here is a brief summary of the three phases of LANDCENT (COP) CRASHING FIST. This plan is chapter 5 of this staff planning book.

Sketch map SPB-C illustrates friendly force dispositions for Phase I, Preconflict Preparation and Transition to War, of LANDCENT COP CRASHING FIST. Phase I started with the Krasnovian violation of the CFE Treaty (T-day, 17 July 19) and ended when actual hostilities began on D-day (16 Aug 19). This phase provided time for a buildup of NATO forces and initiation of the operational deception plan. The deception story was that NATO's defenses in the north were unprepared and that the counterattack forces were establishing defenses along the IGB. This deception built on NATO's inability to station or position forces in the five land-states of the former East Germany under the terms of the four plus two Treaty. Initially on T-day, NATO forces were far to the west.



Sketch map SPB-c Friendly force dispositions for Phase 1 (Preconflict Preparation and Transition to War).


During phase I, LANDCENT activated the II Allied Army Group (AAG) to command existing fighting forces. As you can see, at the start of phase I, II AAG had three corps in peacetime locations generally along the former IGB. Additionally, LANDCENT had available two corps that rapidly mobilized farther to the west. When the Krasnovians violated the four plus 2 Treaty, the German government transferred authority of the two German Territorial Forces' divisions to NATO control. LANDCENT established I AAG to command additional forces as they become available for employment.

The X (US) Corps is the central corps of the three astride the old IGB. This is the unit in which you will plan a tactical operation during phase III of the LANDCENT plan. In phase I of the operation, the X (US) Corps consists of one German and two US divisions, an armored cavalry regiment (ACR), and a separate Canadian mechanized brigade.

Phase II, Deployment and Initial Defense, of CRASHING FIST began with the outbreak of hostilities on 16 Aug 19 although some movement of forces occurred during phase I. Sketch map SPB-d illustrates force dispositions as Krasnovian forces crossed the German-Polish border. The X (US) and 1st Netherlands (NL) Corps have moved into defensive positions to relieve pressure on the two German divisions delaying. The II

M/S320B

(US) corps armed, established assembly areas beginning 12 Aug 19, and was ready to conduct combat operations by 16 Aug 19_ (M+30; T-day = M-day). The mobilization and deployment from CONUS included the 25th Armd Div, a reinforcing division assigned to 10th Corps (as you recall, you were assigned to this unit in M/S320A).




Force dispositions as Krasnovian forces crossed the German-Polish border

The object of this phase was to set the stage for LANDCENT's counterattack to defeat the Krasnovian operational reserve (37 Guards Tank Army (GTA)) and ultimately defeat the Krasnovian TVD.

LANDCENT phase 111 is a counteroffensive. This phase was planned to begin when the 37 GTA commits to a single course of action and the I AAG has sufficient combat power in the proper location to defeat the 37 GTA. LANDCENT's plan requires careful synchronization and implementation (sketch map SPB-e). If the 37 GTA does not commit in the north or the TVD main effort shifts to the 2 Krasnovian Front, this plan will not work.

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d. Major significant events.

(1) **160430A Aug 19__**. The 2 Krasnovian Front attacked with the 2 GTA in the north and the 16 Tank Army (TA) in the south. This initiated phase II of the LANDCENT operation order (OPORD). As the attack unfolded, the German Territorial Forces effectively delayed the 2 GTA for a period of time; however, the units within German Corps South were unable to establish an effective defensive position. By midday on 19 Aug 19__, elements of 16 TA entered Prague against light resistance.


(2) **190530A Aug 19__**. In the Xth (US) Corps sector, the 4th Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group (CMBG) and the 209th ACR engaged the two first-echelon divisions and delayed their advance for 24 hours. This initiated phase II of X (US) Corps Operation Plan (OPLAN) DEPUTY DAWG (now an OPORD).

(3) **210930A Aug 19__**. After defeating the first-echelon divisions, the 209th ACR and the 4th CMBG withdrew to their respective assembly areas. The 2 GTA commander completed passage of the second-echelon divisions (22 Tank Division (TD) and the 57 Guards Tank Division (GTD)) just east of Leipzig

(4) **211615A Aug 19__**. The corps began its counterattack with the 25th Armd Div's attack. followed an hour later by the 4th Panzer Grenadier (PzGren) Div's attack. This initiated phase III of DEPUTY DAWG.

(5) **220001A Aug 19__**. The II AAG issued a fragmentary order (FRAGO) to reflect the current situation and achieve the operational objectives of the LANDCENT plan.

Sketch map SPB-f shows the situation as of 220001A Aug 19-



Sketch map SPB-f. Situation as of 220001a Aug 19.

2. X (US) CORPS TROOP LIST

NOTE. This troop list is not a task organization. It is a listing of the units that comprise X (US) Corps.
You will task organize the corps in lesson 4.

52d Mech Div (USAREUR)

1st Bde
HHC/1st Bde
1-77 Mech (M2)
1-2 Armor (M1A2)
1-3 Armor (M1A2)
2d Bde
HHC/2d Bde
1-78 Mech (M2)
1-79 Mech (M2)
1-4 Armor (M1A2)
3d Bde
HHC/3d Bde
1-80 Mech (M2)
1-81 Mech (M2)
HHC/ 1-81 Mech
Cos A-D
1-5 Armor (M1A2)
1-25 Armor (M1A2)
HHC/ 1-25 Armor
Cos A-D
52d Avn Bde
HHC/52d Avn Bde
1-52 Atk Hel Bn (AH-64/OH-58)
2-52 Atk Hel Bn (AH-64/OH-58)
Co D. 52d Avn (CAC) (OH-58/EH-60)
Co E. 52d Avn (Aslt) (UH-60)
1-23 Cav
HHT/1-23 Cav
Trps A-C (M3/M1A2)
Trps D&E (OH-58/AH-64)
52d h Mech DIVARTY
HHB/52d DIVARTY
B/20 FA (Tgt Acq)
1-40 FA (155-mm. SP) (1st Bde)
1-41 FA (155-mm. SP) (2d Bde)
1-42 FA (155-mm. SP) (3d Bde)
A/43 FA (MLRS)
1-441 ADA
HHB/1-441 ADA
Btns A-C (BSFV)
Btry D (Avenger)
52d Cml Co
1st-4th Plts (Decon)
5th Plt (Smoke) (Mech)
6th Plt (Recon) (Fox)

52d Mech DINEN Bde
HHC/52d DIVEN Bde
521st Sapper Bn (1st Bde)
522d Sapper Bn (2d Bde)
523d Sapper Bn (3d Bde)
HHC/523d Snapper Bn
Cos A-C
52d MI Bn
HHC/52d MI Bn
Co A (C&J)
Co B (EW)
LRS Det
57d MP Co
1st-3d Plts (DS to bdes)
4th-6th Plts (GS)
52d Sig Bn
Co A (Sig Spt)
Cos B & C (Area Sig)
52d Mech DICSCOM
HHD/52d Mech DISCOM
MMC
52d DASB
95 11th HQ & Sup` Co
9520th Acft Maint Co (AVIM)
9531st Gnd Maint Co
521st FSB (1st Bde)
523d FSB (2d Bde)
513d FSB (3d Bde)
HHD
Co A (Sup)
Co B (Maint)
Co C (Mcd)
524th MSB
HHD
Co A (S&S)
Co B (TMT)
Co C (Lt Maint)
Co D (Hv Maint)
Co F (Med)

54th Mech Div (CONUS)

1st Bde

HHC/1st Bde
3-77 Mech (M2)
3-2 Armor (M1A2)
3-3 Armor Text

2d Bde

HHC/2d Bde
3-78 Mech (M2)
3-79 Mech (M2)
3-4 Armor (M1A2)

3d Bde

HHC/3d Bde
3-80 Mech (M2)
3-81 Mech (M2)
3-5 Armor (M1A2)
3-25 Armor (M1A2)

54th Avn Bde

HHC/54th Avn Bde
154th Atk Hel Bn (AH-64/OH-58)
Co D. 54th Avn (CAC) (OH-58/EH-60)
Co E. 54th Avn (Aslt) (UH-60)
3-23 Cav.

54th Mech DIVARTY

HHB/54th DIVARTY
D/20 FA (Tgt Acq)
3-40 FA (155, SP) (1st Bde)
3-41 FA (155, SP) (2d Bde)
3-42 FA (155, SP) (3d Bde)
C/43 FX (MLRS)

3-441 ADA Bn (BSFV/Avenger)

54th Cml Co

54th Mech DIVEN Bde

HHC/54th DIVEN Bde
541st Sapper Bn (1st Bdc)
542d Sapper Bn (2d Bdc)
543 Sapper Bn (3d Bde)

54th MI Bn

54th MP Co

54th Sig Bn

54th Mech DISCOM

HHD/54th Mech DISCOM
MMC
54th DASB
541st FSB (1st Bde)
542d FSB (2d Bde)
543d FSB (3d Bde)
544th MSB

4 PzGren Div (4th (GE Mech Div)

PzGrenBrig 5 (mech bde)

PzJgKp 50 (AT Co) (15 Jaguar
SPAT w/Tow)
PzAufkIKp 50 (gnd cav trp)
(12 Luchs Recon veh)
PzPiKp 50 (cbt eng co) (4 AVLB/11
APC/12 minelayers)
PzGrenBtl 51 (mech bn)
(53 Marder FV)
PzGrenKp 1/51 (HHC)
PzGrenKp 2/51-5/51 (4 mech cos)
PzGrenKp 6/51 (mortar co)
Pz Gren Btl 52 (mech bn)
(53 Marder FV)
PzBtl 53 (tank bn) (53 Leopard 2 MBT)
PzKp 1/53 (HHC)
PzKp 2/53-5/53 (4 tank cos)
PzBtl 54 (tank bn) (53 Leopard 2 MBT)
PzArtBtl 55 (DS FA bn) (24 155, SP)

PzArtBrrt 1/55 (HHB)

PzArtBtr 2/55-4/55 (3 how btry)

PzGrenBrig 14 (mech bde)

PzJgKp 140 (AT co)
PzAufklkp 140 (gnd cav trp)
PzPiKp 140 (cbt engr co)
PZ Gren Btl 141 (mech bn)

PzGrenBtl 142 (mech bn)

PzBtl 143 (tank bn)

PzBtl 144 (tank bn)

PzArtBtl 145 (DS FA bn)

PzGrenBrig 34 (mech bde)

PzJgKp 340 AT co)
P7AufklKp 340 (gnd cav trp)
P7PiKp 340 (cbt engr co)
PzGrenBtl 341 (mech bn)
PzGrenBtl 342 (mech bn)
PzBtl 343 (tank bn)
PzBtl 344 (tank bn)
PzArtBtl 345 (DS FA bn)

HF1g StF1 4 (avn co) (8 BO1O5 Scout Hels)
 PzAufklBtl 4 (div cav sqdn)
 (31 LUCHS/27 Leopard 2 MBT)
 PzAufklKp 1/4 (HHT)
 PzAufklKp 2/4-4/4 (3 armd cav trps)
 ArtRgt 4 (DIVARTY)
 ArtBtr 430 (HHB)
 ArtBtr 431 (UAV btry) (CL289 UAV)
 PzArtBtl 432 (GSR FA bn) (24 155, SP)
 PzArtBtr 1/432 (HHB)
 ArtAufklBtr 2/432 (.tgt acq bty)
 PzArBtr 3/432-5/432 (3 how btrys)
 RakArtBtl 433 (GS FA bn) (18 MLRS)
 RakArtBtr 1/433 (HHB)
 ArtAufklBtr 2/433 (.tgt acq btry)
 RakArtBtr 3/433-4/433 (2 MLRS btrys)
 PzFlakRgt 4 (div SHORAD ADA regt)
 PzFlakBtr 440 (HHB)
 PzFlakBtl 441 (ADA bn) (21 Gepard
 SP AAA)
 PzFlakBtr 1/44 1-3/441 (3 ADA cos)
 Pr FlakBtl 442 (ADA bn) (21 Gepard
 SP AAA)
 PiBrig 4 (div engr bde)
 PiKp 420 (HHC)
 PiBtl 421 (engr bn) (11 APC/40 engr
 trucks/ 18 minelayers)
 AmphPiBtl 424 (engr fltbrg bn) (300-m
 ABC-AbwBtl 426 (div cml bn)
 12 Fuchs NBC RV)
 ABC -AbwKp 1/426 (HHC)
 ABC-AbwKp 2/426 ('NBC recon co)
 ABC-AbwKp 3/426-5/426 (3 decon/smoke
 cos)
 FJgBtl 412 (div MP bn)
 FJgKp 1/412 (HHC)
 FJgKp 2/412-6/412 (5 MP cos)
 FmBtl 411 (div sig bn)
 FmKP 1/411 (HHC)
 FmKP 2/411 -6/411 (5 sig cos)

4th CMBG (Cdn Mech Bde Gp)

HQ&SIGS SQN N (HHC)
 1 RCR (mech bn) (82 Cdn FV)
 1 RVR (mech bn) (82 Cdn FV)
 3 PPCL1 (mech bn) (82 Cdn FV),
 BHQ (bn HQ)
 A-D Cos (mech cos)
 Cbt Sp Co (CSC)
 Log Co (HQ co)
 RCD (armed bn) (78 Cdn Leopard 1 MBT).
 RHO (bn HO*)
 A-D Sqns (tk cos)
 Recce PL (scout plt)
 Log Co (HQ co)
 1 RCHA (DS FA bn) (40 155-mm SP/5
 MLRS)
 RHQ (bn HQ)
 A-D Btrys (FA btry)
 TA & SP Bty (tgt acq & svc btry)
 AD Bty (RCA) (ADA btry) (8 Gepard/8
 Antiarmor Sqn (AT co) (17 Cdn Tnk Dstry)
 Recce Sqn (gnd cav trp) (25 Cdn CRV)
 CER (cbt engr bn) (8 Cdn CEV/
 29 Cdn ACE/44 APC)
 Svc Bn (FSB)
 BHQ (bn HQ)
 Svc Co
 Tpt Co (trans co)
 sup co
 Maint Co
 Fd Amb (med bn),
 BHQ (bn HQ)
 Svc Co
 Evac Co (amb co)
 Tmt Co (treatment co)

- ¹ 1st Battalion Royal Canadian Regiment
- ² 1st Battalion Royal Vingdeuxieme Regiment.
- ³ 3d Battalion Princess Patricia's Canadian Light.
Infantry.
- ⁴ Royal Canadian Dragoon Regiment.
- ⁵ 1st Regular Royal Canadian Horse Artillery
- ⁶ Royal Canadian Artillery
- ⁷ Field ambulance.

25th Armd Div (CONUS)

1st Bde
 HHC/1st Bde
 2-91 Mech (M2)
 2-10 Armor (M1A2)
 2-11 Armor (M1A2)
 2d Bde
 HHC/2d Bde
 2-92 Mech (M2)
 2-12 Armor (M1A2)
 2-13 Armor (M1A2)
 3d Bde
 HHC/3d Bde
 2-93 Mech (M2)
 2-94 Mech (M2)
 2-14 Armor (M1A2)
 2-15 Armor (M1A2)
 25th Avn Bde
 HHC/25th Avn Bde
 1-25 Atk Hel Bn (AH-64/OH-58)
 2-25 Atk Hel Bn (AH-64/OH-58)
 Co D/25th Avn (CAC) (OH-58/EH-60)
 Co E/25th Avn (Aslt) (UH-60)
 2-22 Cav
 25th Armd DIVARTY
 HHB/25th DIVARTY
 G/20 FA (Tgt Acq)
 2-50 FA (155-mm. SP) (1st Bde)
 2-51 FA (155-mm. SP) (2d Bde)
 2-52 FA (155-mm. SP) (3d Bde)
 C/53 FA (MLRS)
 1-440 ADA Bn (BSFV/Avenger)
 25th Cml Co
 25th Armd DIVEN Bde
 HHC/25th Armd DIVEN Bde
 461st Sapper Bn (1st Bde)
 462d Sapper Bn (2d Bde)
 463d Sapper Bn (3d Bde)
 25th MI Bn
 25th MP Co
 25th Sig Bn
 25th Armd DISCOM
 HHD/25th Armd DISCOM
 MMC
 25th DASB
 25 1st FSB (1st Bde)
 252d FSB (2d Bde)
 253d FSB (3d Bde)
 254th MSB

209th ACR (USAREUR)

RHHT/209th ACR
 1/209 ACS
 Trps A-C (M3/M1A2)
 Co D (M1A1)
 1st How Btry
 2/209th ACS
 Trps E-G (M3/1A2)
 Co H (M1A1)
 2d How Btry
 3/209th ACS
 Trps I, K, & L (MAA2).
 Co M (M1A2)
 3d How Btry
 4/209th ACS (RCAS)
 Trps N-P (AirCav) (OH-58D/AH-64)
 Trps Q-R (Atk-Hel) (AH-64/OH-58D)
 Trp S(Aslt Hel) (UH-60)
 AVUM Trp
 ADA Plt/RHHT/209 th ACR (Avenger)
 209th
 1st Plt (Smoke/Decon) (Mech)
 2d Plt (Recon) (Fox)
 209 th (Engr Co)
 209th M1 Co
 Spt Sqdn/209th ACR
 S&T Trp
 Maint Trp
 Med Trp

10th Avn Bde (Corps)

HHC/10th Avn Bde
 402d Avn Regt (Atk Hel) (AH-64/OH-58)
 1/402d Atk Hel Bn
 2/402d Atk Hel Bn
 3/402d Atk Hel Bn
 403d Avn Regt (Atk Hel) (AH64/OH-58)
 1/403d Atkd-Hel Bn
 2/403d Atk Hel Bn
 3/403d Atk Hel Bn
 404th Avn Regt (Atk Hel) AH-64/OH-58)
 1/404th Atk Hel Bn
 2/404th Atk Hel Bn
 3/404th Atk Hel Bn
 400th Avn Regt
 1/400th Aslt Hel Bn (UH-60)
 2/400th Aslt Hel Bn (UH-60)
 3/400th Aslt Hel Bn (CH-47)
 4/400th Cmd Avn Bn (OH-58/UH-60)
 10th Corps Arty
 HHB/10th Corps Arty
 65th FA Bde
 HHB/65th FA Bde
 2-631 FA (155-mm. SP)
 2-632 FA (155-mm. SP)
 2-661 FA (MLRS)
 66th FA Bde
 HHB/66th FA Bde
 2-633 FA (155-mm. SP)
 2-634 FA (155-mm. SP)
 2-662 FA (MLRS),
 67th FA Bde
 HHB/67th FA Bde
 2-635 FA (155-mm. SP)
 3-636 FA (155~mm. SP)
 2-663 FA (MLRS)
 2-664 FA (MLRS)
 68th FA Bde
 3-606 FA (155-mm. SP)
 2-665 FA (MLRS)
 2-666 FA (MLRS)
 2-667 FA (MLRS)

NOTE: All MLRS bns arc ATACMS capable.

10th ADA Bde

HHB/10th ADA Bde
 1-434 ADA (Avenger)
 HHB/1-434 ADA
 Btrys A-C (Avenger)
 1-435 ADA (Avenger)
 HHB/1-435 ADA
 Btrvs A-C (Avenger)
 1-461-ADA (Patriot)
 HHB/1-461 ADA
 Btrys A-F (Patriot)
 1-500 ADA (Patriot)
 HHB/1-500 ADA
 Btrys A-F (Patriot)

40th Cml Bde

401st Cml Bn
 HHD/401st Cml Bn
 411th Cml Co (Decon)
 421st Cml Co (Smoke Genr) (Mech)
 422d Cml Co (Smoke Genr) (Mech)
 402d Cml Bn
 HHD/402d Cml Bn
 412th Cml Co (Decon)
 413th Cml Co (Decon)
 441st Cml Co Smoke Genr) (Mech)
 442d Cml Co (Smoke Genr) (Mtz)
 443d Cml Co (Smoke Gen) (Mtz)
 403d Cml Bn
 HHD/403d Cml Bn
 414th Cml Co (Decon)
 423d Cml Co (Smoke Genr) (Mech)
 424th Cml Co (Smoke Genr) (Mtz)
 404th Cml Bn
 HHD/404th Cml Bn
 415th Cml Co (Decon)
 416th Cml Co (Decon)
 444th Cml Co (Smoke Genr) (Mech)
 451st Cml Co (Recon) (Fox)

53d Engr Bde (Corps)
HHC/53d En Bde
5001st Engr Topo Co
5050th Engr Fltbrg Co (Ribbon)
5051st Engr Fltbrg Co (Ribbon)
5052d Engr Fltbrg Co (Ribbon)
5053d Engr Fltbrg Co (Ribbon)
5059th Engr Mdm Girder Brg Co
5060th Engr Mdm Girder Brg Co
61st En Gp (Cbt Hvy)
500th Engr Cbt Bn (Corps) (Mech)
501st Engr Cbt Bn (Corps) (Whl)
570th Engr Cbt Bn (Hvy)
571st Engr Cbt Bn (Hvy)
5054th Engr Fltbrg Co (Ribbon)
5080th En Cbt Spt Equip Co
62d Engr Gp (Cbt Hvy)
502d Engr Cbt Bn (Corps) (Mech)
503d Engr Cbt Bn (Corps)
572d Engr Cbt Bn (Hwy)
573d Engr Cbt Bn (Hvy)
5055th Engr Fltbrg Co (Ribbon)
5081st Engr Cbt Spt Equip co
20th MI Bde
HHC/20th MI Bde
200th MI Bn (Aerial Xplt)
210th MI Bn (Tac Xplt)
220th MI Bn (Ops)
250th LRSC
286th UAV Det (Prov)
20th MP Bde
HHC/20th MP Bde
230th MP Bn
HHC/230th MP
270th MP Co
271st MP Co
272d MP Co
231st MP Bn
HHC/231st MP Bn
273d MP Co
274th MP Co
275th MP Co
232d MP Bn
HHC/232d MP Bn
276th MP Co
277th MP Co
278th MP Co
233d MP Bn
HHC/233d MP
279th MP Co
335th MP Gd Co
336th MP Gd Co

70th Sig Bde (MSE)
HHC/70th Sig Bde
700th Sig Bn
Co A (Area Sig)
Cos B & C (Sig Spt)
705th Area Sig Bn
706th Area Sig Bn
707th Area Sig Bn
708th Area Sig Bn
Cos A-C (Area Sig)
Co D (Sig Spt)
730th TACSAT A Co

10th CA Bde
55th CA Bn

200th PSYOP Bn
HHC/200th PSYOP Bn
Co A (Op and Spt)
Cos B-D (Tac)

2d Fin Group
10th Fin Bn
23d Fin Bn
25th Fin Bn
55th Fin Bn
208th Fin Bn
309th Fin Bn

644th Personnel Gp
169th Pers Svc Bn
142d Postal Co
183d Pers Svc Bn
143d Postal Co
184th Pers Svc Bn
144th Postal Co
185th Pers Svc Bn
145th Postal Co
186th Pers Svc Bn
146th Postal Co
187th Pers Svc Bn
159th Postal Co
1493d Repl Co
111th Repl Co
101st Mil Hist Det
140th Army Band
141st Postal co

110th Press Camp HQ

12th PA Tm
 116th Mobile PA Det
 117th Mobile PA Det
 1800th RAOC
 1801st RAOC
 1802d RAOC
 1803d RAOC

10th COSCOM

2005th MMC
 4104th MCC
 788th MCT
 789th MCT
 790th MCT
 791st MCT
 797th ATMCT
 798th ATMCT
 7071st MRT
 7072d MRT
 7073d MRT
 7074th MRT
 7075th MRT

80th Med Bde

826th Med Det Vet Svc (HQ)
 827th Med Bn Log (Fnd)
 82d Med Gp
 84th MASH
 809th CSH
 810th CSH
 84th Med Gp
 85th MASH
 817th CSH
 818th CSH
 819th CSH
 802d ASMB
 8303d Med Co. Holding
 833d Med Bn. Dent Svc
 8259th Med Co. Dent Svc
 8260th Med Co. Dent Svc

825th Med Bn Evac

855th Med CO. Gnd Amb
 856th Med Co. Gnd Amb
 863d Med Co. Air Amb
 864th Med Co. Air Amb
 865th Med Co. Air Amb
 820th Med Co, Cbt Stress Control

NOTE: The following units will be task
 organized during lesson 2.

HHC. 13th CSG
 HHC. 14th CSG
 HHC, 15th CSG
 HHC, 20th CSG

HHD, 13th CSB
 HHD, 14th CSB
 HHD, 90th CSB
 HHD, 91st CSB
 HHD, 129th CSB
 HHD, 138th CSB
 HHD, 198th CSB
 HHD, 190th CSB

HHD, 20th S&S Bn
 HHD, 33d QM Bn (Petr1 Sup)
 HHC, 55th Ord Bn Ammo (DS/GS)
 HHD, 180th TMT Bn
 HHD, 182d TMT Bn
 HHD, 932d Avn Bn (AVIM)

580th Ord Co (DS) (MOADS/PLS)
 581st Ord Co (DS) (MOADS/PLS)

590th Ord Co (Convl) (GS MOADS/PLS)
 591st Ord Co (Convl) (GS MOADS/PLS)
 503d Ord Co (Convl) (GS MOADS/PLS)
 594th Ord Co (Conyl) (GS MOADSIPLS)

220th QM Co (Petr1 Sup)
 221st QM Co (Petr1 Sup)
 229th QM Co (Petr1 Sup)
 260th QM Co (Petr1 Sup)
 238th QM Co (Fld Svcs) (DS)
 291st QM Co (Fld Svcs) (DS)
 292d QM Co (Fld Svcs) (DS)
 293d QM Co (Fld Svcs) (DS)
 294th QM Co (Fld Svcs) (DS)
 208th QM Co (Sup) (DS)
 235th QM Co (Sup), (DS)
 239th QM Co (Sup) (GS)
 251st QM Co (Sup) (DS)
 253d QM Co (Sup) (DS)
 271st QM Co (Sup) (DS)

M/S320B

273d QM Co (Sup) (GS)
290th QM Co (Sup) (GS)
257th QM Hv Mat Sup Co (GS)
258th QM Co (Adrp Sup)
259th QM Co (Adrp Equip Rep & Sup)
298th QM Co (Rep Parts Sup) (GS)
20th Collection Co (MA)

237th Maint Co (DS)
9011th Maint Co (DS)
9012th Maint Co (DS)
9013th Maint Co (DS)
9014th Maint Co (DS)
9015th Maint Co (DS)
9016th Maint Co IDS)
9017th Maint Co (DS)
9018th Maint Co IDS)
9025th Maint Co (DS)
9027th Maint Co (DS)
9028th Maint Co (DS)
9029th Maint Co (DS)
260th Maint Co CDS) (Patriot!
249th Maint Co (DS) (Msl Spt)

700th Avn Co (AVIM)
701st Avn Co (AVIM)
707d Avn Co (AVIM)

733d Trans Co (Lt/Mdm Trk)
734th Trans Co (Lt/Mdm Trk)
735th Trans Co (Lt/Mdm Trk)
759th Trans CO (Lt/Mdm Trk)

721st Trans Co (Mdm Trk POL)
722d Trans Co (Mdm Trk POL)
724th Trans Co (Mdm Trk POL)
725th Trans Co (Mdm Trk POL)

741st Trans Co (Mdm Trk Cntnr/Cgo)
748th Trans Co (Mdm Trk Cntnr/Cgo)

707th Trans Co (Mdm Trk PLS)
709h Trans Co (Mdm Trk PLS)
710th Trans Co (Mdm Trk PLS)
714th Trans Co (Mdm Trk PLS)
746th Trans Co (Mdm Trk PLS)
747th Trans Co (Mdm Trk PLS)

777th Trans Co (Hvy Trk)
778th Trans Co (Hvy Trk)
779th Trans Co (Hvy Trk)

780th Trans Co (Cgo Trf)
781st Trans Co (Cgo Trf)

**Theater Army Units Providing DS to
10th (US) Corps**

714th Trans Rv Bn
7411th Trans Ry Eng Co
7416th Ry Tram Operating Co
7417th Ry Tram Operating Co
7418th Trans Ry Equip Maint Co

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FUNDAMENTALS OF ECHELONS ABOVE DIVISION COMBAT OPERATIONSChapter 2. X (US) Corps Intelligence Estimate 1

NOTE: A series of asterisks indicates that material has been omitted intentionally.

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x (US) corps
GERSFELD (NA6589). GE
05 Jun 19

INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NO. 1

References:

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1. MISSION

On order. X (US) Corps defends in sector to destroy the 2 GTA

2. THE AREA OF OPERATIONS

a. Weather. (For purposes of discussion. winter is defined as December. January, and February, spring as March April, and May; summer as June, July and August; and autumn as September. October. and November.)

(1) Existing situation.

(a) General. Climate in the operational area is primarily maritime in nature but modified at times by drier continental influences. Maritime air masses, more frequent in winter than other air masses, dominate the area of interest from 10 to 20 days a month. often without interruption. There is relatively little regional variation in climate, but terrain features. such as mountains. steep escarpments. and winding river valleys. do affect certain climatic elements to some extent.

(b) Precipitation

1. Mean annual precipitation ranges from 584 to 889 millimeters (23 to 35 inches). Precipitation is abundant in all seasons. and serious droughts are rare. Altitude and exposure to prevailing winds are important factors in the amount of precipitation. Local geographic influences on precipitation are considerable. and all the major mountain ranges are regions of heavier precipitation. Regions shielded from both westerly and southwesterly winds receive smaller amounts of precipitation.

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2. Winter.

* * * * *

Table 4. Precipitation (Inches)

Month	LEIPZIG (396)	FULDA (892)	KLEINER FELDBERG (2622)	DRESDEN (721)	NEUWEID (220)
Aug	2	2	2	2	2
Sep	2	2	2	2	2
Oct	2	2	2	2	2
Nov	2	3	3	2	2
Dec	3	4	4	3	2
Jan	3	4	4	4	3
Feb	4	4	4	4	3
Mar	7	2	3	4	7
Apr	3	5	6	4	3
May	7	8	9	8	7
Jun	8	9	10	9	7

2. Maximum precipitation occurs in summer. with 203 to 304 millimeters (8 to 12 inches) of rain in most locations. Thunderstorms often occur in the afternoon and are occasionally accompanied by hail. They occur more frequently in the southern area of the sector.

4. In spring, precipitation is light. ranging from 25 to 76 millimeters (1 to 3 inches) at most locations. The frequency of showers peaks in April. In May, as summer approaches. the frequency of showers decreases. while their intensity increases.

5. In autumn. due to less solar heating. there is a resultant decrease in convectional shower activity. There is generally a decrease in the amount of precipitation from summer to autumn

(c) Temperature.

1. Temperatures are seldom extreme because of the frequent flow of warmer air from the west or southwest and the lack of any nearby source of extremely hot or cold air.

2. Daily minimum temperatures occur just before sunrise. and maximum temperatures occur 1 to 3 hours after the sun has reached its zenith. Exceptions to this pattern may occur when there is an airmass change during the day. The daily variation is observed in all seasons but is most pronounced in summer and least pronounced in winter.

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4. In summer, mean maximum temperatures range between 18° C (65° F) and 24° C (75° F) over the area. The daily range of temperature is the greatest in this season. Minimum temperatures of 0°C (32°F) have been recorded at all stations. Maximum temperatures of at least 30° C (86° F) occur 1 to 3 days per month at locations below 1,500 feet.

5. Spring and autumn provide a transition in temperatures from winter to summer and from summer to winter. Autumn is slightly warmer than spring with fewer days of freezing temperatures

(d) Relative humidity.

* * * * *

2. During the summer, with its moist northwesterly airflow, the air has a higher moisture content than it does in winter, but because of higher temperatures and longer days, the relative humidity IS lower. It ranges from 65 to 80 percent.

3. Spring, especially during May, has the lowest recorded relative humidity. Autumn has higher humidities than those in summer but not as high as those in winter.

(e) Winds. The low-level airflow over the area is most often westerly in all seasons-southwesterly in winter and northwesterly in summer. Surface winds reflect this flow pattern; however, terrain differences cause many local deviations. Calms are frequent due to the sheltering effect in the valleys. Some valleys, if close to the major axis of windflow, channel the wind, changing its direction and increasing its velocity. There is a daily variation of windspeed in all seasons but it is most pronounced in summer. Windspeeds reach maximums in the afternoon in association with maximum solar heating

* * * * *

2. Windspeeds in summer are not as great as they are during winter. By summer, the low-pressure region around ICELAND has disappeared, while the Atlantic high-pressure system has moved northward with a ridge extending into the European Continent. The result is a more northwesterly circulation of airflow over the area. Gale-force winds are infrequent in summer, and at low elevations, winds above 40 knots are rare. The highest windspeeds are recorded during the afternoon, and calm, light, variable winds are frequent during the night and early morning.

3. Early spring and late autumn like winter, can be quite stormy, but spring generally has the highest windspeeds. Gusty winds from the north accompany shower activity, particularly during April. By late spring, the prevailing wind direction has shifted to west and northwest. During both spring and autumn, winds equal to or greater than 28 knots occur less than 3 days per month.

(f) Fog. Fog is the primary restriction to visibility. Smoke and haze restrict visibility less. Fog has a marked seasonal pattern. Throughout the year, particularly in regions of complex terrain, considerable local

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variation can take place within short distances. In all seasons, visibility is at a minimum just before, at, and a little after sunrise.

1 Most of the fog is radiation fog and as such is at a maximum near sunrise during the winter. The area, with its relatively high latitude, has long nights in late autumn and winter. This provides the necessary, radiational cooling to lower visibilities to less than 4 kilometers. Visibility is reduced below 4 kilometers between 20 and 50 percent of the time at lower elevations and more often in cloud-enshrouded higher elevations.

2 During summer, fog is infrequent and generally confined to hours around sunrise. As a result, visibility is better than it is in winter. There are some departures from this average, notably at mountain locations where peaks may remain cloud-enshrouded and at smoke-producing industrial concentrations. On the whole, however, this is the season of best visibility. Visibility less than 4 kilometers occurs only 2 to 10 percent of the time in summer.

3. During spring, the average occurrence of days with poor visibility is rather low. In March, there is a rapid decrease in the frequency of days having visibility less than 4 kilometers. By the end of this season, days having visibility less than 4 kilometers are experienced only 2 to 5 percent of the time.

Table V. Light Data (14 August 19_ to 21 Sep 19)

<u>Date</u>	<u>BMNT</u>	<u>BMCT</u>	<u>EECT</u>	<u>EENT</u>	<u>Moonrise</u>	<u>Moonset</u>
14 Aug	0324	0413	2014	2102	1041	2044
16 Aug	0326	0415	2009	2057	1313	2130
18 Aug	0332	0420	2005	2052	1526	2243
20 Aug	0337	0424	2000	2047	1700	2334
22 Aug	0341	0428	1956	2042	1759	0140
24 Aug	0345	0431	1951	2037	1837	0402
26 Aug	0350	0435	1947	2032	1906	0635
28 Aug	0354	0438	1940	2027	1937	0851
30 Aug	0358	0442	1938	2021	2020	1127
01 Sep	0403	0445	1933	2016	2125	1402
03 Sep	0404	0447	1928	2011	2334	1602
05 Sep	0410	0452	1924	2005	0111	1714
07 Sep	0414	0456	1919	2000	0406	1757
09 Sep	0417	0459	1914	1955	0653	1831
11 Sep	0421	0503	1909	1950	0934	1908
13 Sep	0425	0506	1904	1945	1205	2002
15 Sep	0428	0509	1859	1940	1410	2127
17 Sep	0432	0513	1855	1935	1534	2327
19 Sep	0436	0518	1848	1928	1624	0035
21 Sep	0439	0519	1845	1925	1659	0257

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4. Autumn, particularly late October and November. is the foggiest part of the year. though not necessarily the period of poorest visibility. Many of the characteristics of winter fog also apply to autumn fog; however. lighter winds permit increased fog from radiational cooling at night. Late autumn shows the greatest daily variation in low visibility experienced any time during the year. with most of the poor visibility occurring within 1 or 2 hours of sunrise.

(2) Effect on enemy courses of action

- (a) Precipitation may hinder cross-country movement.
- (b) Westerly winds may affect threat employment of nonpersistent chemical agents
- (c) Good visibility will not favor threat attack.

(3) Effect on own courses of action

- (a) Precipitation may hinder cross-country movement
- (b) Westerly winds will not affect our use of nuclear, biological. and chemical (NBC) weapons.
- (c) Good visibility will favor our defense

b. Terrain

(1) Existing situation.

(a) General. The X (US) Corps area contains several key terrain features. Major hill masses are the SPESSART, THURIUNGER WALD, TAUNUS, HARZ, ERZEBIRGE. and DECINSKE STENZ mountain areas. The HARZ is in the north. the ERZEBIRGE and DECINSKE STENZ are in the southeast. and the SPESSART Mountains are to the south. The TAUNUS Mountains dominate the corps rear area. The major terrain feature forward of the X (US) Corps is the THURINGER WALD. The primary drainage systems are the FULDA and WERRA Rivers in the west; in the center are the UNSTRUT, MULDE. BODE. and the SAALE Rivers. all feeding into the ELBE. the lower MAIN plain includes the MAIN. KINZIG. NTDDA. and NIDDER Rivers in the south

(b) Movement and maneuver

1. Cross-country movement for tracked vehicles in the X (US) Corps area of operations is generally poor. Dominant rugged. hilly, and mountainous landforms restrict cross-country movement in some areas. Some of the most important of these are the THURINGER WALD Mountains near the MAIN River, the HARZ Mountains to the north. and the rugged hills of the ERZGEBIRGE and DECINSKE STENZ Mountains on the southeastern boundary. Even the few valleys that form the limited natural maneuver corridors in this

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region are dotted in many places with a dense pattern of built-up areas that hinder cross-country maneuver. This is particularly true in the lower MAIN lowland and central plains.

2. The restrictive nature of the terrain is offset by an excellent road system throughout the area of operations. This system includes major autobahns, highways, secondary roads, improved forest and field roads, and unproved trails. Roads capable of supporting mechanized forces exist in even the most restrictive terrain. The road nets in and around the numerous urban areas will permit rapid movement.

3. Seasonal conditions alter the quality of cross-country movement, mainly by changes in soil moisture content. Weather is most favorable for cross-country movement from midspring to late autumn (mid-April through November). Heavy rains cause deep mud for periods of a few hours to a few days in areas of line-grained soils.

* * * * * *

4. Cross-country movement conditions for individual terrain areas are as follows;

(a) FULDA Valley. The FULDA Valley generally hinders cross-country movement. The steep slopes of the valley, combined with dense forests, normally preclude off-road movement of tanks. The valley bottom, which rarely attains a width of 2 kilometers, is generally wet and unsuitable for cross-country movement except during the late summer and autumn. The river is unfordable north of BAD HERSFELD but may be forded at selected sites south of this point.

(b) FULDA-WERRA Hills. In the FULDA-WERRA Hills, off-road movement is limited to scattered smooth valleys and low hills, generally surrounded by forest-covered sandy ridges. These rugged forested ridges constitute obstacles to off-road movement of tanks, but in places, they are smooth and can be crossed using the numerous lanes that normally traverse forested areas. Floodplains along many of the streams are wet and untrafficable except during the late summer and fall. Although most are narrow, the poorly drained floodplains along the WERRA River attain a width of about 3 kilometers. The WERRA is unfordable throughout its course in this sector.

(c) HARZ. In this region of high hills that tower visibly over the surrounding area, there are numerous dams and many pools created by quarries around densely settled CLAUSTHAL-ZELLERFELD; otherwise, the area is sparsely populated. Cross-country movements are almost impossible due to extensive forests and local terrain.

(d) THURINGER WALD. This major mountainous area forward of the X (US) Corps sector significantly hinders rapid movement. The area is heavily forested with steep valleys, narrow winding roads, and numerous defiles and potential chokepoints.

(e) ERZGEBIRGE. Rugged hills in most places make cross-country mobility generally unsuitable. Off-road movement is possible on rolling hills, mainly in the center and northwest areas, but it is

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difficult because of dense forest. Many small tracts in the center can be bypassed: large tracts in the northwest can be penetrated on forest lanes oriented mainly east to west.

(f) DECINSKE STENZ. Movement through this mountainous area is restricted by steep slopes, large heavily forested areas, and a dense concentration of built-up areas

(g) KNULLGEBIRGE. Movement is generally poor but is feasible in the valleys. Forested hills are a severe hindrance. Soils are seasonally muddy.

(1) LOWER MAIN LOWLAND. This area is passable most of the time. Principal hindrances include the unfordable MAIN River, forests, and areas of loose sand. This area is most apt to be unsuitable in late winter and early spring.

(i) ELBE River. This river is the major drainage point for the UNSTRUT, MULDE, BODE, and SAALE Rivers and is not fordable within this sector. This will hinder cross-country movement

(j) SPESSARTS. The eastern two-thirds is unsuitable for off-road movement, except locally, because of steep, forested slopes. In the west, off-road movement is possible, but local hindrances may cause delays. Floodplains along streams are trafficable only during summer. Scattered forests restrict movement, except along forest lanes.

(k) TAUNUS. Generally unsuitable in the steep, rugged and forested hills toward the west. Off-road movement on rolling plains in the center and north is difficult because of large tracts of dense forest. Logging lanes oriented in northeast-southwest and northwest-southeast directions permit limited forest penetration. Numerous narrow floodplains are wet and untrafficable except during summer.

(1) VOGELSBERG. Suitability of this area is limited. Off-road movement is compartmentalized by tracts of dense forest; numerous lanes permit some forest penetration. Deep radial valleys hinder movement. Many floodplains are untrafficable except in summer. The NIDDA River is fordable at only certain locations.

(c) Avenues of approach. Overlay 4-1. Modified Combined Obstacles Overlay (Map. JOG Series 1501, Germany. 1:250,000) Avenues of approach available to the threat that are suitable for cross-country maneuver entering or adjacent to the X (US) Corps sector:

1. Avenue D starts at ZARY (WT1020) to COTTBUS (VT5535) to JUTERBOG (UT7062) to MAGDEBURG (PC8080) where it could divide into two corridors, swinging north into the NORTHAG sector or continuing west to HILDESHEIM. From there, it could swing north to BURGDORF (ND6910), dividing into maneuver corridors, continuing northwest crossing the WESER River north of MINDEN, or continuing west to PADERBORN (MC8330).

2. Avenue E starts at GORLITZ (VS9969), moving west to DRESDEN (VS1555) where it divides into two maneuver corridors and then merges back into Avenue E and continues to LEIPZIG (US2090).

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It then continues west. and crosses the WERRA River just north of the THURINGER WALD Mountains. swinging southwest to GIESSEN (MB8005).

3. Avenue G follows the same route as Avenue E to LEIPZIG where it swings south to PLAUE (TR9999) or continues west as Avenue E. crossing the WERRA River at the same location north of THURINGER WALD. It then swings south to WURZBURG (NA6818) or southeast to BAYREUTH (PS8638) This avenue suffers from significant terrain and urban restrictions that hinder cross-country maneuver.

4. Avenue C starts from the north and follows the same route as Avenue D at LUBBEN (VT2355).

5. Avenues F. H. and J all enter the X (US) Corps sector from locations on the southern boundary.

6. Avenue B starts at BERLIN moving south into sector

7. Avenue A enters X (US) Corps area from the north and also follows the Avenue D route to the objective.

(d) Cover and concealment

1. Numerous forests and built-up areas provide cover from small-arms fire and concealment from aerial and ground observation. Large areas of forests cover most of the hilly and mountainous regions; about half are coniferous. and half are deciduous in some areas. the two are mixed. Urban areas larger than 0.25 square kilometers are moderately. to densely distributed in most of the area. The most densely populated urban areas are the cities of LEIPZIG. DRESDEN. and FRANKFURT AM MAIN Other significant urban areas are KARL-MARX-STADT. HALLE, ERFURT, and KASSEL.

2. The forests are mainly planted in blocks separated by access lanes: interspersed openings are common The coniferous stands. mainly spruce. are up to 80 feet high. regularly spaced up to 10 feet apart. with trunks periodically pruned up to 10 feet from the ground The mature coniferous stands provide year-round concealment from aerial observation and some concealment from ground observation. The deciduous stands, primarily beech are 20 to 100 feet high 6 inches to 3 feet in diameter. and irregularly spaced Concealment from aerial observation is available only when these trees are in leaf from May through September Some concealment from ground observation is available. The coniferous and deciduous stands have numerous trees that dismounted troops can use for cover from small-arms fire

3. The best areas for cover and concealment are within the larger built-up areas. Numerous heavily built masonry and concrete buildings provide cover from flat-trajectory fire and concealment from ground and aerial observation.

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4. Only limited cover and concealment are available in the remainder of the region, which is largely cultivated with small grains, vegetables, hay, and some fruit orchards. Stone walls, farm and rural village buildings, embankments, and concrete railroad and road bridges afford some cover and concealment.

(2) Effects on enemy courses of action. Terrain favors the threat attack using Avenue E. Several major gaps through this built-up area are large enough to accommodate significant military forces. Although initially the terrain canalizes the attacker and favors the defender, once an attacking force breaches the built-up areas, a high-speed advance is likely.

(3) Effects on own courses of action. Terrain favoring our defense of the area is the ELBE Valley. This terrain provides great friendly observation and fields of fire.

c Other Characteristics

(1) Existing situation. Local nationals throughout the area favor friendly military operations. Large numbers of refugees can be expected to pass through friendly lines.

(2) Effect on enemy courses of action. The threat can be expected to insert infiltrators as refugees.

(3) Effect on own courses of action. Refugees can be expected to provide valuable intelligence.

3. ENEMY SITUATION

a Disposition. See map of general situation.

b. Composition. See Krasnovian Order of Battle (Chap 4).

c. Strength. All units within the 2 GTA are between 96 and 98-percent strength in personnel, weapons, and equipment.

d. Recent and Present Significant Activities. Threat mobilization activity provides indications of offensive operations. The basic pattern of exercises resembles what was observed 5 or 10 years ago.

e. Peculiarities and Weaknesses

(1) Personnel. The Krasnovian forces are at 96 to 98 percent of their authorized personnel strength. Morale, esprit health- discipline, and political reliability are fairly high among the 90 percent of the forces made up of ethnic Krasnovians. The remaining 10 percent is interspersed among the units so that any reluctance can be readily overcome.

(2) Intelligence. Krasnovian intelligence organizations continuously conduct major intelligence operations against NATO forces to determine NATO's wartime plans. In the AFCENT region, that effort is thought to focus on the corps' general defense plans. The primary means of collection are signals intelligence and

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agents, Threat doctrine emphasizes the need for accurate and complete all-source intelligence to support the preparation of its own plans. Its planning is only as good as its intelligence.

(3) Operations The threat can be expected to execute its plans in accordance with its offensive doctrine. That doctrine emphasizes surprise and speed. It can be expected that the threat has prepared several offensive plans, each based on different assumptions concerning its own and NATO's degree of mobilization and the state of NATO's defensive preparations.

(4) Logistics. Technical and logistical support throughout the front is combat ready. Support units are in place. The total days of supply for POL, ammunition, and supplies is 21 days contained in materiel support units from front to regiment. The threat's major problem is in moving stocks forward from depots to maneuver units during combat operations.

(5) Civil-military operations. The general populations of POLAND and the CZECH REPUBLIC are openly hostile to Krasnovian troops as a result of previous occupations and/or stationing of Krasnovian troops. However, the native populations of both countries do not have the necessary power to adversely affect the Krasnovian plans, except for the expected partisan activities directed at rear area support units and ground lines of communication.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES

a Enumeration In the event of an attack by the 2 Krasnovian Front, committed forces facing the X (US) Corps would probably be the 2 GTA, consisting of two motorized rifle divisions (MRDs) (BMP-2/T-80), two tank divisions (T-80), and one independent motorized rifle regiment (IMRR), supported by normal division and army artillery and combat support units. The 2 GTA is expected to make the main attack for the 2 Krasnovian Front. The 2 GTA would move quickly into southeastern GERMANY with immediate missions west of the ELBE River and subsequent missions west of THURINGER WALD toward KASSEL, FULDA and COBERG. The 2 GTA would probably attack with two divisions in the first echelon and would not likely make extensive use of forward detachments. The following courses of action represent the capabilities of the 2 GTA:

(1) The army will likely attack with two MRDs in the first echelon, two tank divisions in the second echelon, and the IMRR in reserve. The army's main attack would be on the northern avenue of approach with one MRD followed by a tank division.

(2) The army could attack with three divisions in the first echelon, one tank division either as a second-echelon force or as an operational maneuver group (OMG), and the IMRR in reserve. The army's main attack would be on the northern avenue of approach with two divisions.

(3) Same echelonment as in 4a(1) above but with the army's main attack on the southern avenue of approach.

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(4) Same echelonment as in 4a(2) above but with the army's main attack on the southern avenue of approach with two divisions.

(5) The army could conduct defensive operations in or out of contact with the X (US) Corps at any time or place.

(6) The army could conduct retrograde operations at any time.

(7) The army could employ chemical weapons in three ways:

(a) Using nonpersistent agents mixed with smoke to break through the covering force and establish artillery positions to support the main attack.

(b) Using persistent agents to block X (US) Corps counterattacks if the army fails to achieve mission depths. immediate or subsequent.

(c) Using nonpersistent and persistent agents in combination with smoke to further protect exposed flanks during its offensive operations.

b. Analysis and Discussion.

(1) 2 GTA is considered to be fully combat effective and capable of conducting offensive operations against X (US) Corps as part of a Krasnovian strategic offensive. 2 GTA would likely be the main attack force for the 2 Krasnovian Front. reinforced by the front's combined arms reserve. air assault forces, fixed-wing support. and spetsnaz.

(2) Capabilities 4a(1) or 4a(2) above are considered most likely, for 2 GTA in a Krasnovian attack against NATO. Capability in 4a(7) is also likely in any offensive.

(3) The 2 GTA commander would probably prefer to attack with two MRDs in the first echelon and his exploiting force. two tank divisions. in the second echelon This battlefield structure provides the depth necessary to retain offensive tempo and momentum. and it permits the retention of the IMRR as a valid combined arms reserve.

(4) Either avenue of approach could support the army's main effort and the commitment of a second echelon. The northern avenue is considered more likely as it is more open terrain and would better support the theater main offensive into northern GERMANY.

5. CONCLUSIONS

a. Effects of Intelligence Considerations on Operations. The mission is supportable from the standpoint of military intelligence operations.

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b. Effects of the Area of Operations on Own Courses of Action The most defensible terrain lies along the THURINGER WALD and HARZ Mountains in the X (US) Corps area of operations. The northern avenue of approach into the corps defensive sector is the most dangerous due to the open terrain and excellent lines of communication.

c. Probable Enemy Courses of Action.

(1) In a Krasnovian attack against NATO. 2 GTA would likely make the main attack for the 2 Krasnovian Front in the X (US) Corps sector. The 2 GTA would move quickly into southeastern GERMANY with immediate missions west of the ELBE River and subsequent missions west of the THURINGER WALD toward KASSEL, FULDA, and COBERG. The 2 GTX would likely attack with two divisions in the first echelon, with a main attack in the northern sector, and with a supporting attack in the southern sector.

(2) The IMRR would serve as the army's combined arms reserve force to protect the commitment of second-echelon forces and to reinforce any successful penetrations of enemy defenses.

(3) The attack by 2 GTA would be supported with fixed-wing air and NBC weapons and would likely be reinforced with front-level assets in the form of artillery, air defense, combined arms reserves, air assault, and spectnaz.

d. Enemy Vulnerabilities.

(1) The Polish people are openly hostile to Krasnovian forces and will probably conduct partisan activities to disrupt rear area support and lines of communication.

(2) A prolonged conflict would greatly increase the disaffection and disruptive effects of ethnic minorities within Krasnovian forces.

(3) Krasnovian forces are not well equipped for night fighting. They must rely on massive battlefield illumination to sustain 24-hour operations.

/s/
JOHNSON
G2

Annexes: A-Krasnovian Dispositions (omitted)
B-2 GTA Order of Battle (omitted-see chap 3)
C-2 GTA Strength Assessment
D-Krasnovian Training Status
E-Krasnovian Combat Effectiveness
F-Biographies

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ANNEX C (2 GTA STRENGTH ASSESSMENT) to INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE 1-X (US) Corps

* * * * *

All 2 GTA units are initially organized between 96- and 98-percent strength in personnel, weapons, and equipment.

* * * * *

X (US) Corps Phase 111:

2 GTA forces remaining combat effective in the corps sector after phase 11 are estimated to be two tank divisions of the 2 GTA (consisting of a total of 20 tank and 13 motorized rifle battalions) and an IMRR of the 2 GTA (consisting of three motorized rifle battalions and one tank battalion), which would probably be assigned the mission of the army reserve or army-level forward detachment.

Another possible reinforcing force capable of closing with the X (US) Corps would be elements of the 16 TA, which consists of two motorized rifle and two tank divisions. This army would probably orient to the southwest initially and be located southeast of the X (US) Corps southern boundary. We could expect the possible commitment of only one first or second-echelon division against the X (US) Corps.

Commitment of no more than one division into the X (US) Corps sector from the 1 Krasnovian Front is also possible, based on the final determination of the front boundary.

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ANNEX D (KRASNOVIAN TRAINING STATUS) to INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE 1-X (US) Corps

Individual training for Krasnovian soldiers has been thorough and comprehensive. Recruits receive 1 month requisite basic training on conscription, either in April or October. They hold subsequent multilevel individual training annually. The winter cycle begins in December, where most training is conducted in garrison. The summer cycle begins in June and involves considerable field training. Training is scheduled at least 6 hours each day, 6 days a week. Individual training has emphasized NBC protection. NBC protective masks and clothing are frequently worn for long periods during training. The Krasnovians conduct chemical training with live chemical agents for realism and practice decontamination under actual conditions. Almost all UCOs and officers have attended the appropriate military schools for their rank and experience.

Unit training is also thorough and realistic. Units at battalion level and below conduct extensive training in battle drills and are proficient in executing them. Division-level exercises, conducted through winter and summer training cycles, include tactical live fire supported by artillery and helicopter assets and night training. The Krasnovians consider this realistic and tough training imperative for the mental conditioning necessary for soldiers to cope with battlefield conditions and to perform well in combat. Additionally, to create the proper attitude in the minds of all personnel, unit political officers conduct political training at least 5 hours per week.

Krasnovian training also has its negative aspects, including the stifling of the initiative of young leaders by overbearing and sometimes incompetent supervisors. Only senior leaders (generally division commanders and above) have any recent combat experience from former Soviet Army, operations in Afghanistan during the 1980s. Since the various Krasnovian ethnic groups speak several languages and/or dialects, the army has some difficulty training the non-Russian-speaking conscripts who make up approximately 10 percent of the armed forces. An additional problem exists because the government can divert conscripts to complete economic tasks, such as working on construction projects and planting and harvesting crops. This is not yet a significant weakness in producing well-trained soldiers. The conscript cycle results in a significant 25-percent personnel turnover each April and October as new recruits enter the service and those who have completed their 2-year obligation leave. Despite recent recruiting shortfalls, the Krasnovian Army has filled personnel shortages largely by forces withdrawn from other countries. Despite all this, the Krasnovian Armed Forces are still a professional and well-trained military organization.

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ANNEX E (KRASNOVIAN COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS) to INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE 1-X (US) Corps

The 2 GTA and the 16 TA of the 2 Krasnovian Front in have been determined to be fully combat effective after an analysis of the following factors:

1. Personnel strength is initially between 96 and 98 percent of authorized personnel.
2. Status of weapons and equipment is also between 96 and 98 percent on hand and combat ready.
3. Status of training: See Annex D. Krasnovian Training Status.
4. The NCO and officer corps are highly efficient.
5. Leaders from army to battalion levels are highly efficient and generally combat tested.
6. The units have not been committed to combat heretofore.
7. The traditions and past performance of the 2 GTA and 16 TA since the Great Patriotic War and in recent training exercises have been of the highest standards
8. Present unit commanders, at least at the division level and above, are the best from the Krasnovian command selection and training systems. They all have followed the exclusive command career track with attendant experience and formal training.
9. The geographic area of projected commitment for both armies of the 2 Krasnovian Front is quite similar to that in which they have trained and will present few unexpected problems for rapid maneuver.
10. Morale, esprit, health, discipline, and political reliability are fairly high among the 90 percent of the forces made up of ethnic Russians. The remaining 10 percent is interspersed among the units so that any reluctance can be readily overcome.
11. Technical support and logistic support throughout the front are combat ready. Support units are in place. Materiel support units from front to regiment contain 21 total days of supply for POL, ammunition, and supplies
12. The general populations of POLAND and the CZECH and SLOVAK REPUBLICS are openly hostile to Krasnovian troops as a result of previous occupations and/or stationing of former Soviet troops. However the native populations of both countries can adversely affect Krasnovian plans only with partisan activities directed at rear area support units and ground lines of communication

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ANNEX F (BIOGRAPHIES) to INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE 1-X (US) Corps

1. 2 GUARDS TANK ARMY

The commander of the 2 GTA. Lieutenant General Pavel Sergcyovich Bogdanovskiy, is in his early-to- mid forties. He was born in Gorkiy, Russian Soviet Socialist Republic. His father, who died in 1953, served in the Great Patriotic War, reaching the rank of colonel before his discharge in 1945 as a result of severe war wounds. He received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for his actions during the VISTULA-ODER campaign. At age 15, LTG Bogdanoskiy attended the Moscow Suvorov Military School. After graduation, he entered the Moscow Higher Combined Arms Command School. He was commissioned a motorized rifle lieutenant in 1969.

His initial assignment was to the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany (later named the Western Group of Forces), where he commanded a reconnaissance platoon and later a reconnaissance company. In the Transcaucasus Military District, he served as a reconnaissance officer for a tank regiment and commanded a motorized rifle battalion. He then attended the Frunze Military Academy where he graduated with a gold medal. He was promoted to major about the same time. His research thesis on troop control in the forward detachment was published that same year. He reportedly participated in the seizure of Kabul during the invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 in an unknown capacity.. He served in Afghanistan from 1980 to 1983, first as a regimental commander, then as a division chief of staff, then for over a year as the commander of the 70 Motorized Rifle Brigade operating in the Kandahar region. There are reports that he was forced to give up his command after he was seriously wounded while leading a company-sized air assault. After a lengthy convalescence, he entered the Voroshilov General Staff Academy. After graduation, he was promoted to major general and assumed command of the 3 GTD. After less than 2 years in that assignment, he was appointed chief of staff of the 2 GTA. Shortly after the publication of a lengthy article in which he urged acceleration of "restructuring" and "democratization" in the former Soviet Army, he was promoted to lieutenant general and appointed commander of the 2 GTA.

LTG Bogdanovskiy has been a member of the Communist Party since 1972. He was selected as People's Deputy of the USSR in 1989. A recent interview in *Red Star* revealed that he is a widower with two teenaged sons. His wife died while he was attending the Voroshilov Academy. One son lives with him, and the other is attending a military school.

2. 2 Krasnovian Front

General Vladimir Petrovich Podbielskiy, an ethnic Russian, has been in command of the 2 Krasnovian Front for less than a year. In addition to being the distinguished graduate in his Voroshilov General Staff Academy (1985), he was the first former Soviet officer invited to attend the US Army War College in 1990 after the breakup of the Soviet Union. His assignments include Director of Strategy at the prestigious Frunze Military Academy, commander of the 16 TA, and commander and chief of staff in the 14 TD, Northern Group of Forces. He is in his early forties and has earned the reputation of a brash, audacious commander. He has frequently been known to take risks and exceed the textbook possibilities of merely adhering to established correlations of forces and means. He is a published author of numerous articles on the operational art and mobile armored warfare.

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FUNDAMENTALS OF ECHELONS ABOVE DIVISION COMBAT OPERATIONSChapter 3. Krasnovian Doctrine and Tactics

1. GENERAL

The following material, first introduced in M/S320A, addresses some general guidelines that describe Krasnovian military doctrine and the employment of Krasnovian ground forces. Krasnovian military doctrine is based on the doctrine of the former Soviet Army, mainly because of Krasnovia's Soviet origins. This discussion is broken into four parts. The first two parts cover the offense at operational and tactical levels and the last two parts address defensive operations. The operational-level discussion explains that the Krasnovians, following the teaching of their Soviet predecessors, are a top-down organization that relies on tactical-level activities to ensure the success of the operational plan.

2. OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS-ARMY AND ABOVE (OPERATIONAL EMPHASIS)

Krasnovian military doctrine emphasizes the operational level of war. Operational art is the component of military art that falls between military strategy and tactics. Each of the five services of the Krasnovian Armed Forces has its own operational art. Combined arms operational art prescribes the interaction between the ground forces and other forces, especially aviation. Within the ground forces, operational art refers to the operations of large formations, fronts and armies.

a. The front. Front operations are the major ground component of strategic operations in a continental theater of military operations (TVD). A TVD coordinates the operations of several fronts.

A front is a wartime formation comprising several armies or separate divisions. A front's size and composition vary with the mission it receives within the overall strategic operation. A typical front may have-

- Three to five combined arms armies (CAAs) or tank armies (TAs)
- A tactical air army.
- One or more artillery divisions.
- One or more surface-to-surface missile (SSM) brigades.
- A surface-to-air missile (SAM) brigade.
- An air assault brigade.
- A *spetsnaz* brigade.

If required the front may include airborne and amphibious forces. Other assets support it, including strategic rocket forces, strategic air armies, naval forces, railroad troops, and construction troops.

The front is both an administrative and an operational entity. It incorporates the air and ground forces required for operations in a given area. There is no fixed front organization. The number of armies and separate divisions that might constitute the combat elements of a front vary widely. The front's composition depends on its mission within the context of the overall strategic operation. The combat divisions assigned to a front are further assigned to the armies or placed in a separate (or front combined arms reserve) status. This assignment depends on the nature of the operation and on the combat situation as it develops.

Krasnovian logistics doctrine will organize the combat service support or *rear service* structure of a front to meet logistical support requirements. Front rear services must support all aspects of the front operation, including augmentation of its armies. The front structure includes transport, supply, evacuation repair and medical units. The rear services use road, bridge, and railroad construction units to establish and maintain the lines of communications. Road and rail traffic control units operate these lines of communication.

(1) **Front-level offense**

The intent of a front offensive is to destroy enemy military forces and to achieve operational missions to support strategic political and economic goals. The overriding aim in a Krasnovian front offensive is to delay or prevent the war from turning nuclear. Commanders can accomplish this by the swift, early destruction or neutralization of enemy nuclear weapons by nonnuclear means. Leaders using Krasnovian doctrine expect high rates of advance by attacking ground forces. They also plan to conduct strikes throughout the rear. These actions cripple the enemy's ability to respond effectively to the Krasnovian offensive and to resort to tactical nuclear warfare. The top priority target for Krasnovian weapons would be enemy nuclear delivery systems. A front offensive involves much more than attacks against enemy forward defensive positions. It involves coordinated, repetitive, and intensive strikes throughout the entire depth of enemy field forces. These strikes may include-

- An initial, massive, nonnuclear air operation.
- Surface-to-surface rockets and missiles
- Heliborne and airborne assaults.
- Deep attacks by operational maneuver groups (OMGs)
- Weapons of naval forces.
- Unconventional warfare.
- Radioelectronic combat
- Chemical and nuclear warfare, if necessary.

(2) **Front-level planning**

In planning a front offensive operation a Krasnovian commander always considers those situations in which either side would employ nuclear weapons. Destroying or neutralizing the enemy's nuclear-capable delivery systems is essential. Thus, the front commander plans continuous reconnaissance to accurately target systems with a nuclear capability. Front-level planning (missions, employment of forces, main and supporting attacks, and axes of advance) is essentially the same for both nuclear and nonnuclear operations. The similarities and however in planning the scheme of maneuver and fire support. Normally, conventional operations require successive intermediate operations with a continuous regrouping of forces. Frontal (tactical air armies) aviation has the mission to engage targets deep in the enemy rear area. The artillery has the mission to neutralize the enemy near its forward edge.

(3) **Forms of Operational Maneuver**

Planning at front level must support the conduct of operations deep in the enemy's rear area. Krasnovian military doctrine recognizes two broad categories of operational maneuver: the *broad front multiple axis attack* and the *encirclement* (fig 3-1). Either method can be employed, or even a combination of the two, but encirclement operations are preferred whenever possible. The encirclement requires fewer forces than the broad front multiple axis attack, and surprise only enhances its effectiveness. The broad front multiple axis

operation generally requires either significant surprise or overwhelming forces

The Krasnovians would almost certainly initiate hostilities with an air operation designed primarily to destroy or neutralize enemy air defenses and air forces on the ground and to gain at least local air superiority. This air operation would use practically all fixed-wing assets within the theater for the first 2 to 3 days of the offensive. The ground offensive would probably follow within hours of the initiation of the air operation. After the operational goals of the air operation have been attained, significant fixed-wing assets would then be released to the various fronts in the theater (2 Krasnovian included) to support continuing ground operations.




Figure 3-1 Forms of operational maneuver

The *attack across a broad frontage on multiple axes* lends itself to situations in which the Krasnovians would enjoy a considerable numerical advantage over an enemy. Krasnovian commanders may also use this form of maneuver when they have achieved considerable operational surprise.

The encirclement is a deep flanking maneuver or envelopment on a larger scale (fig 3-2). Fronts and armies conduct encirclement operations extensively. The Krasnovians feel that encirclement operations are the most decisive means of destroying an enemy force. The Soviets used two basic methods of achieving encirclement in World War II. The first method was a double penetration on converging axes which involved two major penetrations by a single front or by neighboring fronts to encircle an enemy force. The second method was a single penetration followed by flanking attacks. This was most useful when a natural obstacle (the sea or a major river) served to block enemy withdrawal.




Figure 3-2 Operational forms of encirclement

(a) Operational offensive concepts

Unlike NATO, the Krasnovians define their offensive (and defensive*) actions more in regard to the enemy situation (for example, attack against a defending enemy) than to time (hasty or deliberate). This is because the enemy situation dictates the employed tactics and operations as well as the time available. The Krasnovians define three basic types of offensive actions.

- If both sides are attacking, advancing, or maneuvering, it is a meeting engagement
- If the Krasnovians are attacking and the other side is defending, it is an attack against a defending enemy.
- If the enemy is retreating and the Krasnovians are attacking, it IS a pursuit

1. *Meeting engagement*

A meeting engagement can occur at any level from company to front. The Krasnovians use two different terms to differentiate the scale of action. A “meeting battle” is tactical action at division level or below. At the operational level, fronts and armies fight a larger scale battle or “meeting engagement.” A meeting engagement has the following characteristics,

- Rapid changes in the situation

- Limited time to organize.
- Combat on a wide frontage to maneuver forces to strike the flanks and rear of the enemy.
- Introduction of forces into the attack from the march in prebattle or battle formations

An operational-level meeting engagement can arise under various circumstances, including the following:

- At the beginning of the war, when operational units are moving forward to meet an attacking enemy or when an attacking force meets an enemy moving forward to occupy initial defensive positions.
- During an offensive, when Krasnovian forces meet an enemy's counteroffensive or advancing reserves.
- When an army functions as an OMG and encounters enemy counterattacks or advancing reserves.

Success in the meeting engagement normally goes to the side that not only achieves some degree of surprise but also seizes and holds the initiative. Krasnovian theorists believe that a smaller force that seizes the initiative may defeat a larger one even though it lacks detailed knowledge of the enemy or elaborate plans of its own. The Krasnovian operational commander employs maneuver extensively. Lead elements (forward detachments and advance guards) try to overcome the enemy force. They may fight a holding action as a last resort. Follow-on forces try to maneuver and strike the enemy force in its flanks or rear. Krasnovian tactics are well suited for this type of action because they are relatively simple and emphasize tactical drills. The meeting engagement concludes with one of the following actions:

- A transition to the pursuit if the enemy withdraws.
- A transition to the defense if the Krasnovians are unable to overcome the enemy force
- 1 A continuation of the march.

2. Attack against a defending enemy

The attack against a defending enemy is the second basic form of offensive action. The Krasnovians further define it in relation to the method used to bring forces into the offensive. Thus, they identify, an attack as either from a position out of direct contact with the enemy (from the march) or from a position in direct contact with the enemy. The enemy situation dictates the operational formation employed and the time available for planning and preparation. Army and front attacks against a defending enemy attempt to exploit gaps, unit boundaries, and other enemy weak points on the most favorable axis.

In an offensive, the zone of advance is the sector assigned to the front or army commander. He conducts offensive operations within this sector. The width of the sector depends on a number of factors including the mission, nuclear threat, correlation of forces, terrain, weather, and enemy disposition. In an attack against a defending enemy, a commander would not distribute his forces evenly across the entire zone of advance but would designate primary (main) and secondary operational axes with the desired correlation of forces to achieve the missions in the designated time.

The Krasnovians would attack on selected strike sectors within the front sectors to create the initial penetrations. They would form rapidly, create the penetrations, and then disperse to avoid vulnerability to nuclear and improved conventional strikes. The goal would then be to maintain a rapid tempo of advance into the depths

of the enemy. Krasnovian commanders could insert forward detachments at the tactical level and OMGs at the operational level early to develop the deep offensive. The Krasnovians could block major withdrawal, supply, and advancing reserve routes by using OMGs, forward detachments, and airborne or air assault forces. They would add the fires of SSMs, artillery, aviation and naval support throughout the depths of the TVD. This would effectively isolate the enemy forces and allow for their subsequent destruction by follow-on Krasnovian forces.

3. *Pursuit.*

The pursuit is the third basic type of offensive action. Its goal is to complete the destruction of an enemy. The Krasnovians use three pursuit techniques: *direct* (frontal), *parallel*, and a *combination* of direct and parallel. The preferred technique is the combination method. Using this technique, a small Krasnovian force pursues the enemy along the enemy's direct withdrawal route, attempting to prevent the enemy from withdrawing in an orderly manner or from occupying favorable defensive positions. At the same time, exploitation forces, moving along parallel routes, try to block the path of the withdrawing enemy. Air assault or airborne forces may also be inserted to block the enemy's withdrawal. Once these forces halt the enemy, the main Krasnovian force attempts to conduct a flanking movement to complete the destruction of the enemy force. Krasnovian commanders plan for a pursuit when they plan their attack. They outline possible enemy withdrawal routes, friendly pursuit routes, and allocate nuclear and other fire support means. Units at regimental level or above initiate pursuit immediately upon discovering the enemy's withdrawal. Only orders of a higher commander can terminate a pursuit. The pursuit ends-

- When the enemy forces are destroyed.
- When pursuing elements outdistance their support and are in danger of being cut off.
- When the enemy successfully establishes a strong defensive position.

After the pursuit ends, the Krasnovian forces regroup and redeploy for the next operation

(h) Characteristics of offensive operations

Krasnovian offensive operations conducted by fronts have several notable characteristics. This section discusses the most important characteristics described in current Krasnovian writings and gained from Soviet experiences in World War II.

1. *Surprise.*

The Krasnovians regard operational surprise as an important principle of operational art. Surprise is one of the most important conditions for the successful achievement of operational missions. Krasnovian operational-level forces achieve surprise by conducting actions the enemy does not expect. This forces the enemy to conduct combat operations at a disadvantage.

Surprise results from offensive operations with an integrated system of measures, implemented over time and space. The Krasnovians stress that there are diverse and numerous ways to achieve surprise:

- Keeping the concept of the operation absolutely secret.
- Selecting the right axis and timing for the main strike.
- Concealing the preparations for the operation.
- Using new methods of conducting combat operations.
- Opening massive fire unexpectedly from all assets.

- Employing new technological means of warfare.
- Achieving a swift break-through and carrying the offensive to the enemy's operational depths,
- Maneuvering personnel and equipment extensively.
- Exploiting terrain, weather, season, and time of day for combat operations.
- Deceiving the enemy about one's intentions.

Reconnaissance and intelligence collection capabilities have increased greatly in modern times, as have the scale and complexity of warfare. Totally concealing preparations for large operations is difficult. The Krasnovians do not believe, however, that the importance or necessity for surprise has lessened. They say that it IS crucial at the operational level to conceal the scope and scale of the operation, the plan for and axis of the main strike, and the exact time at which combat operations will begin. Their commanders and staffs maintain great secrecy regarding the concept of the operation and the composition of the main strike groupings. They pay a great deal of attention to issues such as-

- Communications discipline.
- Concealment of command and control (C²) assets.
- Deceptive actions on secondary or false axes.
- Active disinformation to mislead the enemy.
- Skillful use of new tactics and technology to accomplish the operational mission

The Krasnovians say that the importance of surprise has also increased due to the enormous destructive power of modern weapons. Achieving operational surprise can ensure the success of a mission. In some cases, it may be so critical that it determines the outcome of the operation.

2. Rapid Advance

The Krasnovian offensive is characterized by a high rate of advance. Over a period of several weeks or more, the Krasnovians anticipate a rate of advance of approximately 50 kilometers per day under nuclear or nonnuclear conditions. As mentioned above, they do not expect this rate to be uniform.

When confronting an enemy in a defensive position, the Krasnovians would target weak points in the defense. They would drive to the enemy's rear area whenever possible by bypassing major force concentrations. They would attempt to cripple the enemy quickly by destroying or disrupting his nuclear capability, C² facilities, and logistic system before he could effectively react.

Even if the Krasnovians must deal with an enemy emplaced in defensive positions across their entire frontage, they would still try to avoid a costly, time-consuming battle of attrition. They would try to penetrate to the enemy's rear area to topple his defensive structure. They anticipate that elements of a front second echelon would probably not have to fight enemy forces in defensive positions. They anticipate overrunning prepared positions within the first 2 to 5 days of the war. They expect combat to be characterized by rapid movement into the enemy rear, interrupted by violent, relatively brief meeting engagements.

3. Concentration of Forces (Main and Supporting Attacks)

A front normally conducts a main attack over one or more axes. The closeness of one axis to another depends on whether the front is to fragment or envelop the enemy in its drive to achieve its missions.

The direction of a main attack is critical to defeat the enemy and seize territory. One or more supporting attacks accompany the main attack. A supporting attack ties down opposing enemy forces to prevent them from reinforcing the sector threatened by the main attack.

An operational-level commander may designate certain sectors of enemy defenses as strike (breakthrough) sectors. These are areas, normally across a main attack axis that he deems necessary, desirable, or likely for major penetration. Under nuclear conditions, he may destroy enemy defenses in a strike sector by tactical nuclear strikes followed by rapid exploitation by maneuver units. Under nonnuclear, but nuclear-threatened, conditions, he may attack the sector with massed air and artillery fires and with numerous attacks on multiple axes by maneuver units.

The benefit gained by the attacker using only conventional weapons on the nuclear-threatened battlefield is that the enemy must also avoid concentrating forces. The defender must leave gaps or lightly manned sectors between his units. Whenever possible, the Krasnovian commander directs his attack against these undefended or lightly defended areas. He thus achieves a favorable force ratio without massing his own forces.

The greater range and increased mobility of modern artillery weapons enable Krasnovian artillery men to mass fires against a target without concentrating the weapons themselves. This practice reduces their vulnerability to a nuclear strike. It also hinders the enemy from predicting long in advance where a main attack might occur. The Krasnovians also integrate the fires of fire support helicopters and close air support fixed-wing aircraft into their overall fire planning. Again, this enhances their ability to concentrate fires without exposing masses of troops to possible enemy nuclear strike.

(c) *Operational formation*

For Krasnovian commanders, the term "operational formation" is the basic organization for combat by a front or army. The Krasnovians are quite flexible in their organization for combat. The operational formation must correspond to the needs of the mission and develop the necessary correlation of forces to achieve that mission. This section briefly defines the basic elements of the front operational formation in the offense. We will examine more closely two of the three key offensive concepts that the Krasnovians recognize: echelonment and mission depths. (The third concept, main and supporting attack axes, was discussed earlier.)

1. Echelonment.

Echelonment is how a force organizes in depth for combat. Doctrinally, the Krasnovians seldom, if ever, use more than two echelons at any level. Krasnovian planners have used the concept of echelonment of their forces in response to the increased depth of enemy defenses. By echeloning their forces, they can ensure the continuous buildup of combat force in the decisive sectors at the critical time. *They do not consider reserves to be echelons.*

Krasnovian forces have a wide range of options for echelonment. They might have a clear numerical advantage over the enemy, across their entire frontage, or the enemy might have positioned the bulk of its defending forces forward. In those cases, the Krasnovians would be more likely to use a single, strong echelon to effect multiple, narrow penetrations. In other cases, enemy defenses might be well prepared or echeloned in depth. Then, the Krasnovians would tend to use an attack force echeloned in depth to maintain the momentum of the attack after the initial penetration.

Usually, CAAs make up the first echelon of the front. TAs would normally appear in its second echelon or as the front OMG. A front may place TAs in its first echelon to attain greater speed when terrain and other conditions dictate. This variant would also be likely if a massive nuclear strike preceded the ground offensive or if enemy defenses were unprepared. A front's first echelon normally contains most of its forces. The remainder, or follow-on forces of the front could include a second echelon, a combined arms reserve, an OMG, and special reserves..

2. Missions and Norms

The mission of the front's first echelon would be to overcome enemy defenses and to attack through the immediate operational depth (to enemy corps rear areas). Front first-echelon forces may receive support from the artillery, other combat support, and logistic elements of the front's second-echelon forces.

A front second echelon, normally at least one army, has the primary mission to exploit success achieved by first-echelon forces. It normally does this by continuing the main thrust of the offensive to the front subsequent mission. Once the second echelon has been committed, the former first-echelon forces would then normally constitute a combined arms reserve.

The primary mission of a first-echelon force is generally to penetrate forward enemy defenses. The primary mission of a second echelon (if organized) is generally to exploit the success of the first echelon. Reserves, when formed- are contingency forces, given no initial mission. The Krasnovians seek to form reserves at all levels from regiment to front when the assets are available.

Echelonment is determined largely by factors of mission, enemy, troops, terrain and weather, and time available (METT-T), although the most important determining factor is the preparedness of the enemy defenses. The more prepared the enemy defenses, the more a Krasnovian force will be echeloned in depth.

First-echelon fronts typically receive immediate and subsequent missions. The front's subsequent mission normally coincides with the TVD's immediate strategic mission. The TVD second-echelon fronts also receive immediate and subsequent missions that correspond to the overall mission of the strategic operation within the TVD. A typical immediate mission for a second-echelon front would include-

- Neutralizing or destroying, in zone, the enemy's nuclear delivery capabilities.
- Destroying the enemy's main forces.
- Creating favorable conditions for developing the offensive deeper into enemy territory.

A typical subsequent mission would include-

- Destroying any newly detected nuclear delivery capabilities.
- Destroying any remaining army group forces, theater reserves, and national forces
- Seizing important industrial and political centers deep in enemy territory.

Krasnovian analysis of the terrain and enemy situation in the Krasnovian TVD yields time and distance norms for a TVD first-echelon front offensive operation. These norms are as follows:

- Depth of mission:
 - Immediate mission-250 to 350 kilometers.
 - Subsequent mission-600 to 800 kilometers

- Expected time to achieve mission:

Immediate mission-6 to 7 days.

Subsequent mission- 12 to 15 days

- Expected average rate of advance-50 kilometers per day. This rate will not be uniform. While fighting through major enemy defenses. Krasnovian forces expect a rate of only several kilometers per hour or up to 30 kilometers per day. Once they achieve a major penetration, their rate would increase considerably.

- Width of zone of action-300 to 400 kilometers. The Krasnovians base this width on a front with three or four armies in the first echelon. The zone of action depends on the number of axes of advance in the front first echelon, In assigning division frontages. the Krasnovians consider assessments of friendly and enemy forces as well as the nature of the terrain. The average division zone of action for offensive operations in a main attack is 15 to 20 kilometers. The width of a first-echelon army making the main attack might vary from 60 to 100 kilometers depending on the number of divisions in that army. For armies not making the main attack. the width of the zone of action could be even greater than 100 kilometers. The depth of the front forces may be 300 to 400 kilometers measured from the forward edge of friendly troops.

The norms indicated above for mission depths and times to achieve assigned missions are expressed as ranges. Within those ranges, the depths and times for a specific operation depend primarily on the preparedness of the enemies defenses. For example, an enemy in well-prepared defensive positions or in defenses prepared in depth would probably require the shallowest mission depths and the most time to achieve the assigned missions. An enemy in partially prepared defensive positions or in positions lacking depth would require average mission depths and times. Lastly, an enemy in unprepared defensive positions or one moving into position or even one caught by surprise would require the greatest. most optimistic mission depths and the shortest times within the ranges of the norms

3. Maneuver.

Krasnovian offensive operations greatly emphasize the role of maneuver. An offensive operation has three basic goals: the achievement of a tactical penetration; the development of the offensive into the operational depths; and the resulting isolation. encirclement. and destruction of the enemy force.

Krasnovian forces would try to attack the enemy's weakest points and gaps. preferring to make multiple penetrations. They would shift forces (air. ground. naval) and means (such as fire and materiel) to win a decided advantage over the enemy and to make maneuver possible.

4. Fire.

Fire is a generic term that includes artillery, aviation. tank, as well as other kinds of fire. The Krasnovians feel that modern conventional weapons are approaching the destructiveness of "weapons of mass destruction": that is, NBC weapons. As a result. maneuver by fire has assumed an increasingly, important role in warfare. In a nuclear environment, the Krasnovians could effect penetrations by nuclear weapons alone and exploit their results with ground forces. In a conventional environment. the Krasnovians would continue to mass ground forces and nonnuclear fires while also attempting to deceive the enemy or prevent being detected. They would concentrate forces rapidly at the decisive points and times and then disperse them. In a conventional war, air superiority would remain a key factor.

(d) *The Front OMG.*

The OMG is an element of the operational formation that has a particular mission. It may help the first echelon penetrate the enemy defenses, if required. Then, it may raid deep into the enemy rear area as early in the offensive as possible. Possible OMG missions include-

- Destroying enemy nuclear weapons, air defenses, communications, and C².
- Seizing airfields or disrupting lines of communication,
- Assisting advancing main forces by seizing bridgeheads, road junctions, and similar objectives.

The term “operational maneuver group” IS not synonymous with a particular organization. The word “group” connotes a force that is task organized for a particular mission. An operational commander may form an OMG either before or during the course of an operation. It normally consists of forces drawn from the resources of its parent front or army. However, a front OMG may consist of resources controlled by the High Command of Forces (HCF) in the TVD or by the Supreme High Command (VGK) At army level, an OMG probably consists of at least one TD or motorized rifle division (MRD) At front, the OMG would be larger from two or more divisions to an entire army in size.

The Krasnovians may not always form OMGs. Forming OMGs depends on a number of factors, including the mission, the planned direction of the main attack: the tactics, strength, and readiness of enemy forces; and the nature of the terrain over which an attacking force must maneuver.

The Krasnovians would most likely to use an OMG when the enemy defense system is at a low state of readiness or when enemy defenses are relatively shallow and not supported by large reserves. They could also use the OMG against the enemy's reserves. This would slow or prevent their commitment against attacking second-echelon forces

Secondary front and army, offensive operations may not have sufficient forces and combat support to employ an OMG Forming an OMG directly affects the correlation of forces that an army or front commander can achieve. The commander may have to sacrifice forces in either the first or second echelon to form an OMIG However, the OMG is also a force multiplier. It meets the Krasnovian desire to place a substantial force in the enemy rear area quickly to achieve simultaneous attacks throughout the enemy's defense The Krasnovians have not yet resolved the problems of combat and service support or C² for the OMG. They probably have not yet perfected the employment of OMGs, particularly at front level.

(e) *Other elements*

Artillery, air defense, aviation, airborne, air assault, engineer, and other specialized groups and units are also part of the operational formation of fronts.

(f) *Deep strikes.*

A nonnuclear Krasnovian front offensive would probably begin with a massive air operation This air operation could begin shortly before, or at the same time as, the initiation of ground force operations. The Krasnovians would employ the air operation continuously for several days, using massed assets from frontal, strategic, and naval aviation. The two main goals of the air operation would be to neutralize the enemy theater nuclear capability and to gain tactical air superiority for the remainder of the operation. Typical targets of the

air operation would be nuclear delivery systems, airfields and aircraft, air defense systems, and C² facilities. The Krasnovians would be willing to accept great losses in their own air assets to achieve their goals. They believe that they could conduct the remainder of the offensive with older, possibly obsolete, aircraft provided they can cripple enemy tactical airpower.

Ground attacks by front ground forces would follow a massive fire preparation conducted by, first-echelon armies. If the Krasnovians use nuclear weapons from the onset, they would probably do so in a massive, indepth strike before the nonnuclear preparation. Whether they use them or not, the Krasnovians always include nuclear strikes in their fire planning.

A front could launch an airborne or air assault operation either at the start of an offensive or at a later time, possibly after completion of the air operation. It could be of airborne regiment or possibly airborne division size. The airborne force may plan to link up with advancing ground forces, probably an OMG. Possible objectives would include nuclear weapons, C² centers, enemy airfields, major bridges, and logistic facilities. The Krasnovians equip their airborne forces with BMD airborne assault vehicles. On the ground, especially in the enemy rear area, these forces fight as motorized infantry.

Many aspects of an army or front operation help achieve simultaneous deep attacks throughout the enemy's defense. These include the air and airborne operations mentioned above as well as air defense, air assault, unconventional warfare, and naval and amphibious operations.

b. The army

Krasnovian operational-level doctrine similar in philosophy from front to army. An army is the largest peacetime ground maneuver formation. Armies conduct either offensive or defensive operations to support front missions.

(1) Army organization.

In wartime, the composition and size of an army reflect its mission. An army has a permanent staff structure and a complement of divisional and nondivisional combat and combat support elements. Its structure provides adequate control and ground-based support for the divisions assigned to it during the army's participation in a front operation. When the army's divisions are actively engaged in front combat operations, front assets will support the army's combat support elements.

An army may be either tank or combined arms. In the World War II Soviet army (from which the Krasnovian army derived), tank armies were the "exploitation" forces for a front operation. Tank armies were committed through a breach in the enemy's positional defense to open up the operation. They were to drive rapidly toward deep objectives, destroy enemy strategic reserves, or maneuver rapidly to the flanks to encircle large enemy groupings that would subsequently be destroyed by the slower moving infantry. The original TAs comprised little besides medium and heavy tank units and assault gun units. These TAs had a relatively small complement of motorized infantry. Today, Krasnovian infantry elements are completely mechanized, and the Krasnovian MRD includes a significant number of tanks. Tank armies, divisions, and regiments have all evolved into more balanced combined arms organizations with the expansion of artillery and motorized rifle subunits. Thus, the historical distinction between CAAs and TAs has largely disappeared. Any Krasnovian army, regardless of its divisional makeup, is designed to accomplish the tasks envisioned on a highly mobile battlefield.

(2) *Army-level offense*

An army offensive is intended to destroy enemy military forces and to achieve operational missions in support of front operations. The army is the smallest Krasnovian force organized and equipped to conduct operational maneuver. It can strike throughout the entire tactical-operational depths of the enemy through a combination of operational maneuver and fires. The forms of maneuver and types of fires used at the army level are similar to those at the front but on a smaller scale.

(3) *Missions and norms.*

An army in the first echelon of a front offensive normally has an immediate mission to attack through enemy defenses to the operational depth, the enemy corps rear area. The achievement of an army's mission is the culmination of successive attacks conducted by its divisions.

In the Krasnovian TVD, a typical army immediate mission would be to destroy the integrity of a NATO corps, including seizing important areas to facilitate offensive operations deeper into the NATO rear area. The task on the first day of the operation might be to penetrate the forward-defending NATO division and, subsequently, to advance to the counterattacking corps reserves. The army subsequent mission would depend primarily on the nature of the enemy defenses. It could include any or all of the following actions;

- The complete defeat, in zone, of the NATO corps.
- The destruction of army group reserves.
- The destruction of the integrity and operational stability of the opposing army group.

The combined depth of the immediate and subsequent missions of the army correspond to that of the Immediate mission of the front. The following are typical time and distance norms for an army offensive operation in the Krasnovian TVD:

- Depth of the operation:

Immediate mission-100 to 150 kilometers.
Subsequent mission-250 to 350 kilometers.

- Expected time to achieve:

Immediate mission-3 to 4 days.
Subsequent mission-6 to 7 days.

- Expected average rate of advance-50 kilometers per day. The Krasnovians expect 30 kilometers per day or less in initial offensive operations against a defending enemy.

- Width of zone of action-40 to 100 kilometers. The width of the zone of action depends on the mission and the Krasnovian assessment of the correlation of forces and desired rates of advance.

Subparagraph 2a(3)(c)2 "Missions and Norms." gave an example of how the preparedness of the enemy's defenses affected the time-distance norms listed above. The concept remains the same for the army.

(4) *Operational formation*

The army's organization for combat is quite flexible. much like that of the front. The operational formation may include a first echelon. a second echelon, a combined arms reserve. special reserves,. and an OMG.

(5) *Echelonment*

The nature of the enemy's defenses also largely determines how Krasnovian offensive for-matrons will be echeloned. If enemy defenses are not well prepared in depth or backed up by operational-level reserves. the army would probably attack in a single strong echelon followed by a combined arms reserve and possibly an OMG. If the enemy is well prepared in depth or has operational reserves, the army would probably attack in two echelons. In other words, if the enemy defense has an operational second echelon or reserve, the Krasnovians would employ an operational second echelon to sustain the momentum of the offensive.

First- and second-echelon forces operate together to destroy defending enemy forces up to assigned mission depths. An army commander normally plans to commit his second-echelon forces after attaining the army's immediate mission. If he employs an army OMG, he could commit it as early as the first day of an operation.

One or more first-echelon divisions attack on a predetermined army main attack axis. The forces conducting the main attack have the mission to penetrate the enemy's prepared defensive positions. Other first-echelon divisions conduct supporting attacks. First-echelon regiments of the army's first-echelon divisions attack from the march at top speed to achieve deeper penetration of the enemy's main defenses. They plan to exploit surprise and enemy disorganization. Second-echelon regiments of the army's first-echelon divisions exploit the best penetrations into the deep tactical rear of the enemy.

The army's second echelon normally consists of one or more divisions. This second echelon advances behind army first-echelon forces. It marches with its units dispersed laterally on multiple routes to minimize vulnerability to enemy detection and attacks. Depending on the development of the battle and assigned mission. the army commander commits his follow-on forces at the most opportune time and place. This achieves penetration, deeper exploitation and dissolution of enemy defenses at tactical and immediate operational depths.

(6) *Reserves.*

An army. will normally retain one or more regiments as a combined arms reserve in an offensive. This could be a mission for an independent motorized rifle regiment (IMRR) in those armies with an IMRR. Other reserve regiments may come from army second-echelon divisions or from first-echelon divisions in supporting attack sectors.

(7) Forward detachments

The characteristics of the offensive are surprise. speed, and attempts to preempt or forestall the enemy. Krasnovian doctrine emphasizes that regimental through army-level formations use forward detachments when enemy defenses are less than fully prepared. Some elements of first-echelon forces may attempt to strike deep into the enemy forward defensive area before enemy defenses are fully organized and solidified. Forward detachments of an army's first-echelon divisions, fully supported by artillery and close air support, may receive

such missions. It is also possible that an army could employ a regimental-sized “operational” forward detachment to achieve similar, but deeper, results in the enemy main defensive area.

Division forward detachments, normally reinforced tank battalions (TBs), could advance during the night before the offensive. They would attack on multiple axes across the army’s offensive zone to penetrate enemy covering forces. They would then drive at top speed in prebattle or march formation to seize and hold key terrain within the main defensive area. Battalion-sized heliborne assaults may also occur. They should be designed for linkup with the forward detachments. Such tactics in support of an operation would be to disrupt or preempt the enemy defensive structure while opening multiple avenues for shift attacks by larger first-echelon forces.

Throughout the operation, strong forward detachments would probably continue to press the advance into the enemy rear on several axes. Numerous deep penetrations by forward detachments or OMGs early in the operation would result in an intermingling of enemy and friendly forces. This situation would complicate or prevent enemy use of tactical nuclear weapons. The Krasnovians would probably accept heavy losses in deep-penetration forces if they could cause the enemy’s defensive structure to collapse before using nuclear weapons.

(8) *The army OMG.*

An army may form an OMG either from its own resources or from supporting front assets. An army commander may establish an OMG before an operation as part of the initial plan, or he may use it during an operation to exploit an unforeseen opportunity. At army level, the OMG may be as large as a reinforced division. An army that uses one of its divisions as an OMG may have a smaller second echelon or reserve as a result. An army OMG could operate 100 kilometers or more beyond other army forces.

Command and control of an army OMG is accomplished by a combination of radio, an airborne command element, and air and ground couriers. Sustainmg the OMG requires highly mobile transport and supply. The Krasnovians attempt to maintain a ground line of communications, but they plan for resupply by air.

The relationship between the army OMG and the second echelon varies depending on the concept of the operation. If the OMG is operating away from the main axis of advance, its activities and those of the second echelon may not be directly related. If the OMG is operating on the main axis of advance, the second echelon may have to destroy forces the OMG bypasses or secure the OMG’s lines of communications.

Unlike the second echelon the army OMG acts as a large operational raiding force. Typically, it has one or more objectives, perhaps located on the main axis. It would attempt to avoid a decisive engagement with large enemy forces; however, it could conduct raids en route. In this case, it would probably attack them with units detached for this purpose (raiding detachments). The relative importance of raiding versus achieving a mission depends solely on the OMG missions.

(9) *Other elements.*

A front first-echelon army receives artillery units from the front artillery division. The army commander then allocates army and frontal artillery to his divisions. He may retain some artillery at army level to form an army artillery group and perhaps an army group of rocket artillery. Within the army, artillery from second-echelon divisions may reinforce first-echelon divisions until the second echelon is committed to battle. The artillery, would then rejoin its parent divisions. A first-echelon army on the main attack axis would probably

receive. from front additional engineers and river-crossing equipment. air defense weapons, chemical units. and transportation assets.

The army commander would allocate these assets primarily to support the main effort. Subordinates could also receive these assets according to their specific needs. An army offensive could also include an airborne or heliborne assault operating with an OMG to seize deep objectives. Small *spetsnaz* teams could conduct reconnaissance and sabotage

(10) *Conduct of the offense.*

An army carries out the same three basic forms of combat action as the front. Again. as at the front level, the Krasnovians define these forms in terms of the postures of the attacker and defender, not the time available.

(a) *Meeting engagement.*

As an operational formation, an army conducts a meeting engagement. Its subordinate units conduct meeting battles.

(b) *Attack against a defending enemy.*

The army, like the front. conducts two basic types of attack. from the march (out of direct contact) and from a position in direct contact with the enemy The characteristics of these attacks are the same as for the front. (For a discussion of this, refer to the section on the “Front-Level Offense.”)

(c) *Pursuit.*

The same techniques are used as at front level. First-echelon armies will rely on their forward detachments and air assaults to cut off the withdrawing enemy. Operational pursuits may extend to a depth of several hundred kilometers.

(d) *Echelonment.*

Figures 3-3, 3-4, and 3-5 are doctrinal templates of a Krasnovian tank army (2 GTA) against enemy defenses of various degrees of preparedness.




Figure 3-3. Tank army operational formation against a fully prepared defense.

The Krasnovian definition of enemy defenses is important here, not our perception of our own defenses. A fully prepared tactical defense is one for which the enemy has had from 3 to 5 days to prepare. An unprepared tactical defense is one in which the enemy has had less than 8 hours to prepare. All other tactical defenses would be termed "partially prepared."

1. Against a fully prepared enemy defense, a Krasnovian army would normally echelon its forces with more divisions in the first echelon than in the second echelon, although the second echelon could be nearly as strong as the first. The typical reserve is a tank regiment or an IMRR. In the 2 GTA, we would expect to see the two motorized rifle divisions in the first echelon. One of the two tank divisions would probably constitute the second echelon, while the other tank division would probably be designated the OMG. In the case of the 2 GTA, the IMRR would be the probable reserve. We would not expect to see forward detachments used at the army or division levels against a fully prepared enemy defense.




Figure 3-4. Tank army operational formation against a partially prepared defense.

2. Against a *partially prepared enemy defense*, all divisions of the army except the OMG would probably be forward in the first echelon. With no second echelon, a reserve would generally be constituted. We expect to see both army- and division-level forward detachments employed against partially prepared defenses.




Figure 3-5. Tank army operational formation against an unprepared defense.

3. Against *unprepared enemy defenses*, we expect to see all of the divisions of the army in the first echelon, including the OMG. In this case, the reserve would probably be somewhat stronger; two maneuver regiments, probably tank regiments, would be a suitable army reserve. Against an unprepared enemy defense, the Krasnovians would make extensive use of forward detachments at all levels, from first-echelon regiments to army. This offensive would appear to be one massive meeting engagement with Krasnovian forces moving in column formation whenever possible. Momentum would be the chief goal against such a weak defense.

(11) **Reserves.**

Reserves are an integral part of the operational formation of fronts. They are contingency forces held by the commander to meet any unforeseen circumstances. An offensive reserve is doctrinally about one-ninth of the parent force, or two levels down. Thus, a division reserve during an offensive operation would typically be a battalion. The operational formation of a first in the offense may contain three basic types of reserves: combined arms, antitank (AT), and special.

(12) **Combined Arms Reserve.**

A combined arms reserve may reinforce or exploit the efforts of first- or second-echelon forces, repel and conduct counterattacks, provide flank and rear area security, or respond to any other contingency that may arise.

A front in the offense would generally retain at least one division as a combined arms reserve. Against a relatively weak and shallow enemy defense, or in other cases, the front might employ only a single echelon. The front would then probably retain a larger combined arms reserve of two, three, or more divisions.

Normally, a front will have an AT brigade assigned to its artillery division. The front's AT assets may reinforce first-echelon units or the combined arms reserve. Alternatively, they may form an antitank reserve, often reinforced with engineer assets.

Front commanders also retain special reserves that are formed from their special troops. These include engineer, chemical protection, communications, and radioelectronic combat units.

3. OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS-DIVISION AND BELOW (TACTICAL EMPHASIS)

a. Tactical organizations

Krasnovian divisional units are based on the same Soviet-style organizations as the Nebraskii forces described in lesson 2 of M/S310A. For specific structure and equipment, refer to the maneuver section of Student Test 100-7. Division regimental and battalion-level tactics are also similar to those of the Nebraskiis; however, the following information is added to emphasize important points and to point out those differences (that is, operational norms) that result from geography and mission.

b. Hierarchy of mission depths.

Hierarchy of mission depths is broken between division (tactical) and army (operational) levels. Thus, first-echelon divisions could be expected to fight for several days before ever attaining the army immediate mission. The overlapping hierarchy resumes again for army-and front -level units.

c. Missions and norms.

Well-defined norms govern Krasnovian offensive operations. These norms depend principally on an assessment of friendly and enemy capabilities. In particular, they depend on the preparedness of enemy defenses. They may also reflect other factors, such as terrain and weather. Thus, Krasnovian planners have established norms in distances, rates of advance, and time factors. The norms discussed in this appendix apply only to the Krasnovian TVD. These factors guide planning for an operation.

The Krasnovians generally assign two missions (objectives) at all levels above company. The first-echelon forces are normally responsible for achieving the *immediate mission* line. Second-echelon forces plan to achieve the subsequent mission line. If there is no second echelon, the first echelon also must achieve the subsequent mission. Regardless, first-echelon forces continue to fight through to the subsequent mission line as long as they are able. At the tactical level, the mission line is normally a force-oriented line on the map. At the operational level, this mission line can be either force or time oriented, or both. Krasnovian forces normally are required to destroy all enemy forces up to that line. The subsequent mission at one level is the immediate mission of the next higher headquarters. Thus, the subsequent mission line of a first-echelon regiment will also be the immediate mission line of a first-echelon division. This overlapping effect is designed to complete the destruction of enemy forces,

d. Main and supporting attack axes

Krasnovian military doctrine at division level and above generally requires at least one main attack axis and one supporting attack axis for every offensive operation. A main attack axis is normally narrower than a supporting attack axis. Assets, especially artillery, are centrally directed to support the main attack axis. This is to ensure a higher correlation of forces and means (COFM) on the main attack axis. A COFM of 5:1 is not uncommon on a main attack axis at the army level. The supporting attack axis, on the other hand, is normally wider, receives considerably fewer assets from higher headquarters, and may be nothing more than a fixing attack. A COFM of 1:1 or less is possible on an army supporting attack axis. Follow-on forces, especially tank forces, often follow the main attack, exploiting the success of the first echelon. Command posts, especially forward command posts, normally follow the main attack.

e. Tactical offensive maneuver


The Krasnovians recognize and practice the same three forms of tactical offensive maneuver they do at the operational level: the meeting battle, the attack against a defending enemy, and the pursuit.

(1) Meeting Battle.

The meeting battle is the primary form of maneuver employed by Krasnovian forces as they move from initial staging areas to attack enemy forces. This maneuver is fought primarily by forward detachments and advance guards at all levels from regiment to army. Much of the fight in NATO's covering force area would be against reinforced battalion-sized advance guards (of first-echelon regiments) or forward detachments (of first-echelon divisions), or even against an army forward detachment (reinforced maneuver regiment).

The forward detachment organization is very much like that of the advance guard. A divisional forward detachment, normally forward from a second-echelon regiment, may look exactly like an advance guard battalion. A division could conceivably form more than one forward detachment but, in any case, normally only if the enemy defenses were perceived as less than fully prepared. An army could also form a forward detachment, probably based on a reinforced maneuver regiment. Air assault forces can also function as forward detachments. Forward detachments at all levels are designed to move well ahead of the main forces, avoiding contact whenever possible, seeking to secure key objectives that would facilitate the momentum of the force. River-crossing sites, mountain passes, transportation nodes, firing positions for artillery groups, and enemy reserves are examples of such objectives.


The advance guard battalion is a forward security force for first-echelon regiments as the division moves in march column. Advance guards within a maneuver division are usually based on a motorized rifle (tank) battalion with additional reinforcements of up to a battalion of self-propelled (SP) artillery; a company of tanks (motorized rifle troops); and air defense, engineer, and chemical units. The advance guard equals about one-third of the combat power of a first-echelon regiment. Figure 3-6 represents a typical advance guard based on a motorized rifle battalion. Figure 3-7 depicts an advance guard conducting a meeting battle where both forces are moving to contact.



NOTE: This diagram show some, but not all, variants of reconnaissance and security groupings that an advance guard battalion could dispatch, depending on the situation.

1. Combat reconnaissance patrol (CRP)-usually a platoon. A battalion may send out as many as three CRPs to reconnoiter flanks and alternate routes, as well as the primary route.
2. Forward patrol-a squad or platoon that provides march security ahead of the forward security element
3. Forward security element (FSE)-a reinforced platoon or company that provides march security ahead of the advance guard main body.
4. Patrol squad-a single armored personnel carrier (AK), infantry fighting vehicle (IFV), or tank that either conducts reconnaissance or provides march security for the subunit that dispatched it. In this example, it provides flank security or reconnaissance for the FSE; however, the forward patrol could send a patrol squad forward along its route of march for added security.
5. Flank security element-a platoon or company that provides march security to the flank of the main body.
6. Rear security element-a platoon or company that provides march security to the rear of the main body.

Figure 3-6 Reconnaissance and security groupings.



1. Combat reconnaissance patrol (CRP).
2. Forward patrol.
3. Forward security element (FSE).
4. Advance guard main body.

Figure 3-7. Advance guard conducting a meeting engagement (battle).

Regardless of which force fights the meeting engagement or battle, the Krasnovians prefer to attack an enemy from the flank or rear whenever possible. Figure 3-8 provides an example of the two types of tactical envelopment practiced by the Krasnovians. The primary difference between the *close envelopment* and the *deep envelopment*, besides the obvious difference in depth, is that the latter form occurs outside of organic supporting indirect fires. As a result, a force conducting a deep envelopment would normally take its own supporting Indirect-fire means along. The close envelopment is normally conducted within range of organic supporting artillery.




Figure 3-8. Examples of a close envelopment (A) and a deep envelopment (B).

(2) *Attack against a defending enemy.*

If the enemy force is defending and not moving to contact, the Krasnovians are forced to conduct an attack against a defending enemy. They do this either from positions *in direct contact* or *out of direct contact* with the enemy. The Krasnovians prefer to attack from positions *out of direct contact*, also called an *attack from the march*. If not forced to deploy into attack (battle) formation, Krasnovian forces prefer to remain in march formation to maintain their momentum. This allows them to conduct the equivalent of an extended meeting engagement across the entire zone of attack. Figures 3-9, 3-10, and 3-11 represent the doctrinal echelonment of a tank division against various degrees of preparedness.




Figure 3-9. Tank division combat formation against a fully prepared defense.

Since the Krasnovians initiate their attack from staging areas in the rear, they would most likely move from the depths using advance guards (conducting meeting engagements) until they reach their forward assembly areas. First-echelon regiments of attacking divisions could move into their attack positions as close as 26 or 30 kilometers from the enemy defensive positions as long as they were out of range of enemy artillery. The rest of the division would go into assembly areas about 60 to 75 kilometers from enemy defenses.




Figure 3-10. Tank division combat formation against a partially prepared defense.

From these forward assembly areas (or forming up areas), the first-echelon regiments conduct the attack. Division and regimental reconnaissance elements conduct their detailed reconnaissance up to 24 hours ahead of

the lead regiments. The lead regiments would probably not leave their final assembly areas using advance guards. They would move in march (column) formation, one regiment per route. As they reached predetermined deployment lines, they would deploy into *prebattle* formation (first, battalion columns on separate routes, then company columns, and so on). About 1 kilometer from the enemy forward defenses, the lead battalions go into battle (attack) formation with maximum firepower forward. The final assault then takes place, and fighting continues to the immediate and subsequent mission lines of the respective units.




Figure 3-11. Tank division combat formation against an unprepared defense.




Figure 3-12. MRB deployment for an attack from the march.

Figure 3-12 is a doctrinal representation of a battalion as it deploys through its successive stages of prebattle formation.

This attack would not take place in isolation. For it to succeed, the Krasnovians would have to mass significant fire assets against our defenses, in particular, artillery, antitank, air, and SSMs. To do this, artillery battalions would be sent down from front and army to the first-echelon units conducting the main attacks. Army, divisional, and regimental artillery groups (AAGs, DAGs, and RAGs) would be formed to ensure the success of the attack. If air assets were employed, they would probably not be used simultaneously in the same sector with artillery. The Krasnovians plan four phases of offensive fire support to offensive operations. Figure 3-13 illustrates Krasnovian employment and sequencing of fires.




Figure 3-13. Phases of offensive fire support.

(a) *Phase I.* Phase I. Fire Support of Advance from the Depths, is an operational-level phase. Its fires are normally fired by AAGs firing counterbattery and preplanned fires to support maneuver forces moving forward from the depths.

(b) *Phase II.* Phase II. Fire Preparation of Attack, covers the maneuver forces as they deploy through prebattle formations to conduct the attack. This phase is primarily designed to isolate and totally destroy forward defenses at the points of penetration on main attack axis. As such, a massive amount of artillery is required to support each main attack axis. Artillery densities of 100 tubes per kilometer of breakthrough frontage are not uncommon on main attack axis. Supporting axis could expect about 40 tubes per kilometer of attack frontage, considerably less than for the main attack. The preparation may last from 15 minutes to over an hour, although an average preparation lasts about 30 minutes. The preparation phase lifts and shifts to the next phase of fire support as the final assault begins. This phase normally occurs as the forward forces reach their final deployment line about 1,000 meters forward of the enemy defenses.

(c) *Phase III.* Phase III. Fire Support of Attack, provides fire support to maneuver forces as they fight through to the division immediate mission line. Phase III fires are fired primarily by DAGs and RAGs against deeper, preplanned targets throughout the enemy defenses.

(d) *Phase IV*. Phase IV, Fire Accompaniment of Units Advancing in Depth, supports the maneuver forces as they fight to the division subsequent mission line while conducting the exploitation. This phase differs from the previous three phases in that most of the fires are not preplanned but are, rather, oncall-type missions.

The Krasnovians plan to commit second-echelon forces once the first-echelon forces have penetrated the enemy forward defenses. Generally, they commit follow-on forces to reinforce the success of the lead forces. The Krasnovians are flexible in their use of second-echelon forces, at least at the division and army levels. Their troop control and planning methods rely extensively on objective data. They plan variants to the original plan in detail as time permits. Battalions in the attack use simple but rigid tactics, relying extensively on battle drill.

Figures 3-14 and 3-15 are doctrinal templates of Krasnovian tank and motorized rifle regiments in the attack from the march. Each regiment is attacking with two reinforced battalions up and one back, typical against a fully prepared defense or through restrictive terrain. The regimental commander has two basic options available; he attacks with either two or three battalions forward. In the case of a main attack or restrictive terrain, he would probably employ two reinforced battalions forward. In the case of a supporting attack, unprepared enemy defenses, or unrestrictive terrain, he would probably employ three reinforced battalions forward. In any case, note that all first-echelon battalions are normally reinforced each with a motorized rifle company (for a tank regiment) or a tank company (for a motorized rifle regiment).




Figure 3-14. MRR in the attack from the march




Figure 3-15. Tank regiment in the attack from the march

(3) Pursuit.

Pursuit is the third form of offensive maneuver that the Krasnovians recognize. They recognize three forms of pursuit: *formal*, *parallel*, and a *combination* of the first two. Figure 3-16 describes these forms of pursuit. *The Krasnovians prefer to use the combination pursuit whenever possible*. Success in the pursuit depends on a high rate of advance and continuous pressure on the enemy. Pursuit is initiated whenever an enemy withdrawal is detected. It is concluded only on the orders of the next higher commander. Figure 3-17 depicts an example of a division-level pursuit.




Figure 3-16. Forms of pursuit.

The Krasnovians attempt to initiate pursuit against withdrawing covering forces once their withdrawal is detected. In the case of a pursuit against withdrawing covering forces, the first-echelon regiments normally attempt to conduct a frontal pursuit with advance guards or forward detachments, and the main body of the first-echelon regiments attempts to conduct the parallel form of pursuit.




Figure 3-17. Pursuit of a withdrawing enemy

4. DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS-ARMY AND ABOVE (OPERATIONAL EMPHASIS)

a. Role of the defense.

The role of the defense at the operational level is well defined. Fronts and armies may conduct defensive operations to-

- Halt and repulse an enemy offensive.
- Hold key terrain.
- Inflict maximum losses on the enemy.
- Buy time.
- Perform economy-of-force missions.

The general goal of defensive actions is to defeat advancing enemy forces and to create conditions favorable for transition to the offense. The difference from past concepts for the defense is a greater emphasis on aggressive execution and conduct of counterstrikes. Current defensive operations would involve increased use of maneuver, mines, and barriers.

The Krasnovians view the defense (at all levels) as temporary until they can assume or resume the offensive. Their military writings and training reflect this. They believe that they can attain victory only through offensive actions. Krasnovian planners generally discuss full-scale front defensive operations in the context of an initial NATO offensive. In such a scenario, the Krasnovians initially defend, then follow with a counterstrike. But within a given front or army offensive operation, subordinate formations and units may execute defensive missions. This may be out of necessity as when encountering a superior enemy force during the course of an offensive, or it may be in an economy-of-force role, permitting the concentration of forces on the main attack axes. The primary focus of Krasnovian operational-level defensive planning is at army level.

The Krasnovians define a front or army defensive operation as the aggregate of operations and battles of subordinate units unified by a single concept and plan. The combined arms concept is an integral part of the Krasnovian approach to defensive operations. The subordinate operations include those of-

- First- and second-echelon maneuver forces.
- Reserves.
- Missile troops and artillery units.
- Air forces of the front.
- Army aviation.
- Airborne and air assault units.
- Air defense forces.
- Naval and amphibious forces (on a coastal axis).

Krasnovian commanders do not conduct a static positional defense. Reserves and second-echelon forces have planned commitment lines. Should a penetration develop, they would assume blocking positions or initiate counterattacks on these lines. Echelonment within belts and the belt system itself allows room and the necessary forces for maneuver.

Krasnovians disperse forces laterally and in depth to reduce their vulnerability to nuclear attacks and strikes by improved conventional munitions strikes. They achieve depth in an army defense by establishing battalion

positions within a series of *defensive belts* or *lines*. These are not shoulder-to-shoulder, solid defensive lines like those used in World War II. Defensive belts within army or front defensive sectors are uneven, deeply deployed, and concentrated on major avenues of approach.

Modern Krasnovian defensive concepts emphasize the need to delay, defeat, or weaken the enemy offensive as far forward of the main defensive line as possible. Reconnaissance troops attempt to locate enemy forces and determine enemy intentions. When possible, an army or front establishes a security zone. An army security zone may extend as far forward as 50 kilometers. The depth of such a security zone depends primarily on the forces, resources, terrain, and time available. The security zone should delay, weaken, and deceive the enemy. Using artillery, rockets, missiles, helicopters, and aircraft, Krasnovian commanders would try to attack the enemy in concentrated areas before an attack. They would conduct counterpreparation fires to break up and disorganize enemy formations in advance of the main defense lines. Krasnovian missile and artillery forces would locate far forward in initial fire positions to strike the enemy as deeply as possible. They would then fall back to planned primary and alternate firing points in the main defensive area.

The basis of the defense is a coordinated and integrated fire system that is primarily antitank in nature. The AT weapons deploy to achieve interlocking fires along the front and in depth. The AT reserves up to front level provide a quick-reaction AT force to block penetrations, generally in conjunction with mobile obstacle detachments. Commanders carefully integrate their obstacle and barrier plans with their fire plans to create fire destruction zones. Enemy nuclear-capable weapon systems remain the top-priority target in the defense because of the threat they represent. Krasnovian units continually improve defensive positions for defense against both conventional and nuclear munitions. Engineer support is extensive.

Armies will employ the same types of reserves in the defense as they do in the offense. In the defense, the Krasnovians may also designate a battalion- or regimental-sized force to be an antiassault reserve. This may be a quick-reaction force separate from a combined arms reserve or second echelon. All Krasnovian units will plan reactions to possible enemy airborne or air assault operations in the defense, whether or not they form a specially designated reserve.

b. Conduct of the defense.

In the Krasnovian view, transition to the defense occurs either in direct contact with the enemy or out of direct contact with the enemy. After hostilities begin, the Krasnovians consider the most likely form of defense to be that executed in direct contact with the enemy. This could occur during an offensive when a Krasnovian army might conduct a defense because it encountered a superior enemy force, or it may be required to perform an economy-of-force role to permit the concentration of forces on the front's main attack axis. Krasnovian military scientists write much less about operational-level defense than they do about tactical-level defense. This reflects their traditionally offensive emphasis and belief that full-scale front defensive operations or TVD strategic defensive operations would be rare.

An entire army would probably not shift to the defense in direct contact with the enemy. If its forward tactical units shift to the defense, they would use the tactics described earlier. Their initial priorities, then, would be to establish good defensive positions; this might require offensive actions to seize suitable terrain. Planning time for these units would obviously be limited, but depending on the enemy situation, follow-on forces could have a great deal of time. They would establish typical defensive positions as discussed above. Krasnovian forces in direct contact with the enemy during the assumption of the defense are unlikely to withdraw to establish a security zone. Ground forces would continue to upgrade their positions as long as they are defending. As a

result, with the exception of the security zone, the defense in direct contact with the enemy eventually differs little from the defense executed out of direct contact with the enemy.

The Krasnovians might establish a defense out of direct contact with the enemy before a war begins, or during wartime, they might establish one along a secondary axis. It can also occur during an offensive when follow-on front and army forces must block an enemy counteroffensive. If under no direct enemy pressure, the Krasnovian army would probably establish a security zone. The time available for preparation of the defense depends on the enemy situation.

Figure 3-18 depicts a Krasnovian tank army in a static defense. We could expect to see two likely variants at the army level. The most likely variant would have two motorized rifle divisions forward in the main defensive belt, with a third division (a tank division) spread across the army sector in the second defensive belt. The fourth division (also a tank division) would become the army counterattack force, located in assembly areas in the vicinity of the second defensive belt. If forced to defend with fewer divisions, they would certainly opt for a strong first belt, retaining a substantial counterattack force in lieu of a second defensive belt.




Figure 3-18. Defense by a tank army.

5. DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS-DIVISION AND BELOW (TACTICAL LEVEL)

The basic elements of the Krasnovian defense are the company strongpoint and the battalion defensive area. A Krasnovian commander will disperse these tactical unit positions based on the possible use of tactical nuclear

weapons. For example, if the enemy uses a medium-sized nuclear weapon of about 20-kiloton yield against a regimental defensive area, it should not be able to destroy more than one battalion. Company strongpoints in a battalion area are far enough apart that a small-sized yield of a few kilotons cannot destroy more than one company strongpoint. Platoon positions within a company strongpoint are at intervals so that a “super small” yield of less than 1 kiloton cannot destroy more than one platoon. The army commander places the series of strongpoints to cover the most likely enemy attack routes. He blocks or covers gaps by obstacles, reserves, and AT positions.

The Krasnovians recognize two forms of transitioning to the defense: *in direct contact or out of direct contact* with the enemy. The primary difference between the two is the absence or presence of a *security zone*, similar to our covering force area. They plan to conduct a stubborn defense throughout the depth of the security zone, fighting from generally fully prepared company strongpoints. Several situations would cause the Krasnovians to go over to the defense in the course of an offensive operation.

The current Krasnovian doctrinal defense is primarily static. It centers around company strongpoints formed into battalion defensive areas. Fire sacks, similar to our kill zones, are planned at all levels from company level upward. Tank-heavy counterattacks are planned for commitment at all levels above company in the event that the enemy should succeed in penetrating forward defenses. Artillery is planned for direct and indirect fires. Tanks and antitank forces are integrated into forward motorized rifle formations to strengthen the forward defenses. The Krasnovian use of key terrain and extensive engineer preparation of obstacles and positions is impressive by any standard.




Figure 3-19. Defense by a tank division.

Figures 3-19 and 3-20 depict Krasnovian tank and motorized rifle divisions in the main defensive belt of the army. Where the main enemy attack is expected (in this case, the northern regiment sector), the first-echelon regiment is echeloned more in depth, with two battalion defensive areas forward in the first defensive position and one back in the second defensive position. The southern regiment is typical of a defense against a suspected supporting attack or of a situation where the regiment defends a sector broader than 8 to 10 kilometers.




Figure 3-20. Defense by a motorized rifle division.

Refer to figure 3-20 for the remainder of this discussion. Tank-heavy counterattack forces are kept in reserve at battalion through division levels to complete the destruction of enemy forces that succeed in penetrating or by-passing the fire sacks. At the division level, reinforced forward detachments are sited forward in the security zone only when defending out of contact. They fight stubbornly from well-fortified strongpoints, withdrawing only on orders from the division staff. They normally withdraw to subsequent positions within the security zone. They finally occupy previously prepared strongpoints about 5 kilometers forward of the main defenses, referred to as the "forward positions." The forward detachment normally withdraws to forward positions out of the expected enemy main axis of advance. The plan may require the forward detachment to withdraw to prepared positions within the main defensive belt. Fresh companies from second-echelon regiments also occupy forward positions but generally only on the expected enemy main axis of advance. This final line of company strongpoints forward of the main defenses (forward positions) is designed to deceive the enemy as to the true location of the main defensive belt.




Figure 3-21. Tank battalion defensive area.

The Krasnovians plan to engage the enemy as far forward as possible with both direct- and indirect-fire means. Artillery concentrations are preplanned and extensive. Fires are planned forward, to the flank, and on top of their own positions. Figures 3-21 and 3-22 depict a typical defensive area of a tank battalion and a motorized rifle battalion, both based around company strongpoints. The company strongpoints are usually arranged with two forward and one back. They are well fortified with extensive obstacles sited forward and to the flanks. This battalion defensive area forms a fire sack in which the enemy forces are to be destroyed by the maximum application of indirect and direct fires.




Figure 3-22. Motorized rifle battalion defensive area.

FUNDAMENTALS OF ECHELONS ABOVE DIVISION COMBAT OPERATIONS

Chapter 4. Krasnovian Order of Battle

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

1 Krasnovian Front

18 TA	12 AT Bde
94 GMRD (BMP-2/T-80)	
207 MRD (BMP-2/T-80)	15 Engr Bde
7 TD (T-80)	2 Ponton Brg Regt
16 TD (T-80)	42 Ponton Brg Regt
160 TD (T-72)	23 Aslt Crossing Bn
	131 Aslt Crossing Bn
47 TA	
6 MRD (BMP-1/T-72)	27 Cml Prot Bde
8 GMRD (BMP-2/T-80)	UI pers and equip decon bn
15 GTD (T-80)	1 Cml Bn of the Rear
23 TD (T-80)	UI radl and cml recon bn
37 GTD (T-80)	UI smoke bn
37 GTA	UI <u>spetsnaz</u> bde
10 GTD (T-80)	
47 GTD (T-72)	73 Sig Bde
9 IMRR (BMP-2/T-80)	16 Rdotech Recon Regt
	87 Indep RADREL Bn
<u>Front</u> -Level Units	37 Rdo Recon Regt
20 GTD (T-80) (37 GTA) [<u>Front</u> reserve]	UI sig bde
20 AASLT Bde	91 Rdo Jamming Regt
	32 AD Jamming Regt
	55 Early Warning Regt
34 Arty Div	
27 Gun Bde (2S5)	75 Mat Spt Bde
14 How Bde (2S3)	
24 How Bde (2S3)	
35 How Bde	
36 Rkt Lchr Bde (BM-22)	Various other CS and CSS units
21 High-Powered Arty, Bde (2S7)	Air Forces of the <u>Front</u>
	two ftr-bmr divs
5 SSM Bde (Scud-B)	two ftr divs
	two indep recon regts

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

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UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

2 Krasnovian Front

2 GTA

- 3 MRD (BMP-2/T-80)
- 17 GMRD (BMP-2/T-80)
- 22 TD (T-80)
- 57 GTD (T-80)
- 13 IMRR (BMP-2T-80)

16 TA

- 20 MRD (BMP-2/T-80)
- 73 MRD (BMP-2/T-80)
- 12 TD (T-80)

Front -Level units42 TD (T-80)(16 TA) [Front reserve]

21 AASLT Bde

10 Arty Div

- 22 Gun Bde (2S5)
- 13 How Bde (2S3)
- 17 How Bde (2S3)
- 29 How Bde (2S3)
- 37 Rkt Lchr Bde (BM-22)

41 AT Bde

1 High-Powered Arty Bde (2S7)

- 19 SSM Bde (Scud-B)
- 48 SSM Bde (Scud-B)
- 67 SSM Bde (Scud-B)

60 SAM Bde (SA-4)

66 SAM Bde (SA-12)

43 Cml Prot Bde

56 Engr Bde

UI *spetsnaz* bde

3 Sig Bde

- 23 Rdotch Recon Regt
- 41 Rdo Recon Regt

54 Sig Bde

- 3 Rdo Jamming Regt
- 7 Early Warning Regt
- 15 AD Jamming Regt

31 Mat Spt Bde

- 15 Ponton Brg Regt
- 27 Aslt Crossing Bn
- 31 Aslt Crossing Bn

Various other CS and CSS units

Air Forces of the Front**two ftr divs**

- one ftr-bomr div
- one indep recon regt

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

2 GTA

Unit	System	No	Unit	System	No
Division-Level Units					
3 MRD			25 Gds Arty Regt		
118 MRR			1 SP How Bn	2S3	18
1181 MRB	BTR-80	50	2 SP How Bn	2S3	18
1182 MRB	BTR-80	50	3 SP How Bn	2S3	18
1183 MRB	BTR-80	50	25 MRL Bn	BM-21	18
1184 TB	T-80	31	55 SAM Regt	SA-8	20
118 SP Arty Bn	2S1	18	3 Recon/REC Bn	BMP-2	17
118 AD Bn	2S6	6		BRDM	13
	BMP-2	6	3 AT Bn	BRM-1K	7
	SA-13	6		AT-5	9
118 AT Bn	AT-5	9		MT-12	12
	MT-12	6	17 GMRD		
188 MRR			151 GMRR		
1881 MRB	BTR-80	50	1511 MRB	BMP-2	45
1882 MRB	BTR-80	50	1512 MRB	BMP-2	45
1883 MRB	BTR-80	50	1513 MRB	BMP-2	45
1884 TB	T-80	31	1514 TB	T-80	31
188 SP How Bn	2S1	18	151 SP Arty Bn	2S1	18
188 AD Bn	2S6	6	151 AD Bn	2S6	6
	BMP-2	6		BMP-2	6
	SA-13	6	151 AT Bn	SA-13	6
188 AT Bn	AT-5	9		AT-5	9
	MT-12	6		MT-12	6
194 MRR			153 GMRR		
1941 MRB	BMP-2	45	1531 MRB	BMP-2	45
1942 MRB	BMP-2	45	1532 MRB	BMP-2	45
1943 MRB	BMP-2	45	1533 MRB	BMP-2	45
1944 TB	T-80	31	1534 TB	T-80	31
194 SP How Bn	2S1	18	153 SP How Bn	2S1	18
194 AD Bn	2S6	6	153 AD Bn	2S6	6
	BMP-2	6		BMP-2	6
	SA-13	6	153 AT Bn	SA-13	6
194 AT Bn	AT-5	9		AT-5	9
	MT-12	6		MT-12	6
196 TR			156 GMRR		
1961 TB	T-80	31	1561 MRB	BTR-80	50
1962 TB	T-80	31	1562 MRB	BTR-80	50
1963 TB	T-80	31	1563 MRB	BTR-80	50
196 SP How Bn	2S1	18	1564 TB	T-80	31
196 AD Bn	2S6	6			
	BMP-2	6			
	SA-13	6			

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Unit	System	No	Unit	System	No
156 SP How Bn	2S1	18	39 TR		
156 AD Bn	2S6	6	391 TB	T-72	31
	BMP-6	6	392 TB	T-72	31
	SA-13	6	393 TB	T-72	31
156 AT Bn	AT-5	9	394 MRB	BMP-2	45
	MT-12	6	39 SP Arty Bn	2S1	18
161 GTR			39 AD Bn	2S6	6
1611 TB	T-80	31		BMP-2	6
1612 TB	T-80	31		SA-13	6
1613 TB	T-80	31	44 TR		
161 SP How Bn	2S1	18	441 TB	T-72	31
161 AD Bn	2S6	6	442 TB	T-72	31
	BMP-2	6	443 TB	T-72	31
	SA-13	6	444 MRB	BMP-2	45
119 Gds Arty Regt			44 SP How Bn	2S1	18
1 SP How Bn	2S3	18	44 AD Bn	2S6	6
2 SP How Bn	2S3	18		BMP-2	6
3 SP How Bn	2S3	18		SA-13	6
119 MRL Bn	BM-21	18	87 TR		
81 SAM Regt	SA-8	20	871 TB	T-72	31
17 Gds Recon/ REC Bn			872 TB	T-72	31
	BMP-2	17	873 TB	T-72	31
	BRDM	13	874 MRB	BMP-2	45
	BRM-1K	7	87 SP How Bn	2S1	18
17 Gds AT Bn	AT-5	9	87 AD Bn	2S6	6
	MT-12	12		BMP-2	6
				SA-13	6
22 TD			11 Arty Regt		
52 MRR			1 SP How Bn	2S3	18
521 MRB	BMP-2	45	2 SP How Bn	2S3	18
522 MRB	BMP-2	45	11 MRL Bn	BM-21	18
523 MRB	BMP-2	45	59 SAM Regt	SA-6	20
524 TB	T-72	31	22 Recon/REC Bn	BMP-2	27
52 SP How Bn	2S1	18		BRDM	13
52 AD Bn	2S6	6		BRM-1K	7
	BMP-2	6			
	SA-13	6			
52 AT Bn	AT-5	9			
	MT-12	6			

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Unit	System	No	Unit	System	No
57 GTD			76 SAM Regt	SA-8	20
33 GMRR			57 Gds Recon/ REC Bn	BMP-2	17
331 MRB	BMP-2	45		BRDM	13
332 MRB	BMP-2	45		BRM-1K	7
333 MRB	BMP-2	45			
334 TB	T-80	31	13 IMRR		
33 SP Arty Bn	2S1	18			
33 AD Bn	2S6	6	131 MRB	BMP-2	45
	BMP-2	6	132 MRB	BMP-2	45
	SA-13	6	133 MRB	BMP-2	45
33 AT Bn	AT-5	9	134 TB	T-80	31
	MT-12	6	37 Indep		
41 GTR			AASLT Bn	BMD	17
411 TB	T-80	31			
412 TB	T-80	31	41 Arty Bde		
413 TB	T-80	31	1 Gun Bn	2A36	18
414 MRB	BMP-2	45	2 Gun Bn	M-46	18
41 SP How Bn	2S1	18	3 How Bn	2S3	18
41 AD Bn	2S6	6	4 How Bn	2S3	18
	BMP-2	6			
	SA-13	6	47 Rkt Lchr Regt		
85 GTR			1 MRL Bn	BM-21	18
851 TB	T-80	31	2 MRL Bn	BM-21	18
852 TB	T-80	31	3 MRL Bn	BM-21	18
853 TB	T-80	31			
854 MRB	BMP-2	45	36 SSM Bde		
85 SP How Bn	2S1	18	361 SSM Bn	SS-21	6
85 AD Bn	2S6	6	362 SSM Bn	SS-21	6
	BMP-2	6	363 SSM Bn	SS-21	6
	SA-13	6			
87 GTR			11 SAM Bde		
871 TB	T-80	31	111 SAM Bn	SA-4	9
872 TB	T-80	31	112 SAM Bn	SA-4	9
873 TB	T-80	31	113 SAM Bn	SA-4	9
874 MRB	BMP-2	45			
87 SP How Bn	2S1	18	42 SAM Bde		
87 AD Bn	2S6	6	421 SAM Bn	SA-4	9
	BMP-2	6	422 SAM Bn	SA-4	9
	SA-13	6	423 SAM Bn	SA-4	9
10 Gds Arty Regt					
1 SP How Bn	2S3	18			
2 SP How Bn	2S3	18			
10 MRL Bn	BM-21	18			

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Unit	System	No	Unit	System	No
Army-Level Units, 2GTA			41 AT Bde		
2 Indep Hel Regt			1 AT Bn	MT-12	12
1 Atk Hel Sqdn	Mi-24	20		AT-5	9
2 Atk Hel Sqdn	Mi-24	20	2 AT Bn	MT-12	12
3 CS Hel Sqdn	Mi-8a	20		AT-5	9
			3 AT Bn	MT-12	12
				AT-5	9
17 Indep Hel Regt			4 AT Bn	MT-12	12
1 CS Hel Sqdn	Mi-8a	20			
2 CS Hel Sqdn	Mi-8a	20	1 High-Powered Arty Bde		
3 Atk Hel Sqdn	Mi-24	20	1 Hv Arty Bn	2S7	12
			2 Hv Arty Bn	2S7	12
20 Cml Prot Bn			3 Hv Arty Bn	2S7	12
31 Engr Bde			4 Hv Arty Bn	2S7	12
4 Ponton Brg Regt					
21 Sig Regt			21 AASLT Bde		
10 Rdo Recon Bn			1 AASLT Bn	BMD	34
36 Early Warning Bn			1 Para Bn		
20 Mat Spt Bde			2 Para Bn		
39 Hv Lift Regt			3 Para Bn		
			21 Arty Bn	D-30	12
				BM-21V	6
Various other CS/CSS units					

Miscellaneous Front-Level Units

10 Arty Div		
22 Gun Bde		
1 Gun Bn	2S5	18
2 Gun Bn	2S5	18
3 Gun Bn	2S5	18
14 How Bde		
1 How Bn	2S3	18
2 How Bn	2S3	18
3 How Bn	2S3	18
17 How Bde		
1 How Bn	2S3	18
2 How Bn	2S3	18
3 How Bn	2S3	18
29 How Bde		
1 How Bn	2S3	18
2 How Bn	2S3	18
3 How Bn	2S3	18
37 Rkt Lchr Bde		
1 MRL Bn	BM-22	18
2 MRL Bn	BM-22	18
3 MRL Bn	BM-22	18

Air Forces of the Front

8 Ftr Div		
157 Ftr Regt		
1571 Ftr Sqdn	MiG-23	15
1572 Ftr Sqdn	MiG-23	15
1573 Ftr Sqdn	MiG-23	15
191 Ftr Regt		
1911 Ftr Sqdn	MiG-21	15
1912 Ftr Sqdn	MiG-21	15
1913 Ftr Sqdn	MiG-21	15
220 Ftr Regt		
2201 Ftr Sqdn	MiG-21	15
2202 Ftr Sqdn	MiG-21	15
2203 Ftr Sqdn	MiG-21	15

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Unit	System	No	Unit	System	No
23 Ftr Div			48 SSM Bde		
133 Ftr Regt			481 SSM Bn	Scud-B	6
1331 Ftr Sqdn	MiG-29	15	482 SSM Bn	Scud-B	6
1332 Ftr Sqdn	MiG-29	15	483 SSM Bn	Scud-B	6
1333 Ftr Sqdn	MiG-29	15	67 SSM Bde		
154 Ftr Regt			671 SSM Bn	Scud-B	6
1541 Ftr Sqdn	MiG-23	15	672 SSM Bn	Scud-B	6
1542 Ftr Sqdn	MiG-23	15	673 SSM Bn	Scud-B	6
1543 Ftr Sqdn	MiG-23	15			
156 Ftr Regt					
1561 Ftr Sqdn	MiG-23	15			
1562 Ftr Sqdn	MiG-23	15			
1563 Ftr Sqdn	MiG-23	15			
6 Ftr-Bmr Div					
177 Ftr-Bmr Regt					
1771 Ftr-Bmr Sqdn	Su-25	15			
1772 Ftr-Bmr Sqdn	Su-25	15			
1773 Ftr-Bmr Sqdn	Su-25	15			
179 Ftr-Bmr Regt					
1791 Ftr-Bmr Sqdn	Su-25	15			
1792 Ftr-Bmr Sqdn	Su-25	15			
1793 Ftr-Bmr Sqdn	Su-25	15			
181 Ftr-Bmr Regt					
1811 Ftr-Bmr Sqdn	MiG-27	15			
1812 Ftr-Bmr Sqdn	MiG-27	15			
1813 Ftr-Bmr Sqdn	MiG-27	15			
15 Trans Hel Regt					
151 Hv Lift Sqdn	Mi-26	12			
152 Hv Lift Sqdn	Mi-26	12			
153 Mdm Lift Sqdn	Mi-17	16			
154 Mdm Lift Sqdn	Mi-17	16			
10 Indep Recon Regt					
101 Indep Recon Bn	MiG-25	15			
102 Indep Recon Bn	MiG-25	15			
103 Indep Recon Bn	YaK-28	15			
21 Hel ECM Sqdn	Mi-8J/K	20			
76 GP Hel Sqdn	Mi-8T	30			
19 SSM Bde					
191 SSM Bn	Scud-B	6			
192 SSM Bn	Scud-B	6			
193 SSM Bn	Scud-B	6			

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
FUNDAMENTALS OF ECHELONS ABOVE DIVISION COMBAT OPERATIONS

Chapter 5. LANDCENT Contingency Operation Plan (COP) CRASHING FIST

This appendix provides LANDCENT guidance and tasks to subordinate commands. While extensive, this plan contains nowhere near the detail or level of completeness to be found in an actual contingency operation plan (COP). It goes into greater depth and is more specific than AFCENT COP 30101 (CHESHIRE CAT) (used in M/S320A but not included in M/S320B) since actual employment of troop units is included. It provides essential information for use in practical exercises. The information contained in this contingency operation plan is applicable to any plan developed for X (US) Corps in a NATO environment.

In the scenario for M/S320B, you will work with X (US) Corps OPLAN 6099 (DEPUTY DAWG) (chapter 8 of this staff planning book). The corps plan was developed in peacetime based on the LANDCENT COP 31201 (CRASHING FIST) as presented in this appendix. The II Allied Army Group (AAG) plan is not presented because the AAG does not exist in peacetime-the AAG is activated only during periods of crisis or war. Therefore, the tasking for subordinate corps are addressed in LANDCENT COP 31201 along with the AAG taskings.

LANDCENT COP 31201 (CRASHING FIST) is presented on following pages. A series of asterisks (* *) indicates that material has been omitted intentionally. The graphic below conceptually shows the inter-relationship of planning at LANDCENT, II AAG, and X (US) Corps:



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9X-D-053

CONTINGENCY OPERATION PLAN (COP) 31201 (CRASHING FIST)

References:

- a. STANAG 2014, Operation Orders, Warning Orders and Service Support Orders, 22 Oct 9_.
- b. ACE Directive 80-17, 12 Feb 9_.
- c. SACEUR' s Rapid Reinforcement Plan (RRP) 10002, 14 Dec 9_.
- d. AFCENT General Defense Plan (GDP) 33002 (CARAVAN COWBOY), 24 Mar 9_.
- e. AFCENT Contingency Operation Plan (COP) 30101 (CHESHIRE CAT), 1 June 9_.
- f. AIRCENT Contingency Operation Plan (COP) 35201 (COZY GOOSE), 10 June 9_.
- g. AFCENT Contingency Operation Plan (COP) 30105 (CHARTRUESE CATHUSIAN)
- h Maps * * *

Time Zone Used Throughout the Plan: ALPHA

Task Organization: Annex A (Task Organization)

1. SITUATION

Continued destabilizing and debilitating developments in the western region of the former COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES (CIS) resulted in a power vacuum. In a coordinated move, disenchanted military officers and hard-line Communists seized power throughout the region. They established the Socialist state of KRASNOVIA. Its hard-line government repressed internal dissent and then intervened to suppress ethnic unrest in ROMANIA. This dramatically halted and violently reversed the democratic trends of the past 10 years.

The United Nations, NATO, and many concerned individual nations pursued numerous approaches, but they were powerless to bring an end to the crisis. KRASNOVIA vigorously refused all demands to withdraw from ROMANIA. Although POLAND fully supported multinational diplomatic and economic moves directed against KRASNOVIA, it felt severely threatened due to its proximity to the crisis. Without consultation with other states, POLAND unilaterally threatened KRASNOVIA' s interests in the region.

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The Polish Government threatened internment of forces still in POLAND, seizure of pm-positioned stocks still on Polish soil, the termination of present basing rights. and the denial of any future basing rights.

Striking quickly, KRASNOVIA deployed its 16 TA and 37 GTA into POLAND to protect its military interests. Former CIS forces, remaining in GERMANY awaiting return home. declared allegiance to KRASNOVIA, relocated to POLAND, consolidated with Krasnovian elements there. and assisted in the subjugation of that country.

GERMANY, FRANCE, the UNITED KINGDOM, and the UNITED STATES declared the Four Plus Two Agreement abrogated and the restriction on NATO forces in GERMANY's eastern five districts invalidated. In a move to minimize tension throughout the region, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) refrained from deploying units forward into the former EAST GERMANY. It was hoped this would preclude undue pressure on the Krasnovian Government.

Krasnovian forces in POLAND have undergone major reorganization and collective training. They have experienced a significant improvement in their materiel and personnel status and in both their level of training and morale. Recently, Krasnovian forces have been conducting large-scale training exercises in POLAND. predominantly in the Pommeranian Military District. Krasnovian forces have attained an ability to conduct offensive operations not seen in the region since the mid-to-late 1980s.

a. Enemy Forces. Annex C (Operation Overlay).

(1) The Krasnovian strategic objective is to reestablish control of Eastern Europe.

(2) The Krasnovian operational objectives are to reestablish the buffer provided by the old Warsaw Pact, prepare to defend along the old inner-German and Czech borders. and repel NATO counterattacks.

(3) The Krasnovian TVD consists of two strategic echelons. The first strategic echelon consists of five armies organized into two fronts, the 1 and 2 Krasnovian Fronts. Following 20 to 30 days of mobilization, Krasnovian TVD forces are expected to attack into the LANDCENT area with both fronts. The main effort is expected in the north. where the first operational echelon of the 1 Krasnovian Front will initially attack with two armies (42 TA in the north and 18 TA in the south). The operational goals of the 1 Krasnovian Front are to capture BERLIN, continue to secure the old IGB, establish and improve defensive positions along that line, resupply and reconstitute its forces. and consolidate its gains. The lead armies will be followed by a third (37 GTA) seeking to ensure continued advance or exploitation of success where possible, 2 Krasnovian Front will make a supporting attack in the southern portion of the LANDCENT area. It is anticipated that 2 Krasnovian Front will conduct its main attack with 2 GTA toward FULDA and KASSEL in the north and with a supporting attack from 16 TA toward NURNBERG and LANDSHUT in the south. The operational goal of the 2 Krasnovian Front attack is to prevent LANDCENT from reinforcing in the north or from counterattacking against the flank of 1 Krasnovian Front. The second strategic echelon, consisting of five to six armies organized into two fronts, is forming east of the URALS. Lead elements of the second strategic echelon should start arriving in POLAND at about D+30.

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(3) Enemy Vulnerabilities.

(a) Ability to maintain control of Eastern European countries and Krasnovian allies in the face of renewed nationalism and active resistance movements in POLAND, ROMANIA, and the eastern districts and on Krasnovian home soil.

(b) Krasnovian forces are most vulnerable in their ability to rapidly mobilize, deploy, employ, and sustain committed forces and their decision-making abilities to exploit apparent successes.

(c) In the LANDCENT theater of operations (TO), the Krasnovian center of gravity is the ability to attack rapidly with high shock effect and to sustain the momentum over extended LOCs from the Krasnovian homeland to, and through, hostile territories while possibly making simultaneous attacks against AFNORTHWEST and AFSOUTH.

b. Friendly Forces.

(1) III (GE) Korps, under German national authority initially, defends in sector along the German-Polish and German-Czech borders to delay Krasnovian forces.

(2) Allied Forces. Central Europe (AFCENT), intent is to defeat the Krasnovian attack and create military conditions favorable to NATO at war termination. AFCENT-

(a) Defends to defeat the first strategic echelon of the Krasnovian TVD.

(b) Concurrently builds operational reserves.

(c) Counterattacks the second operational echelon and destroys enemy units in zone.

(d) Ejects bulk of enemy forces from NATO territory and ensures that enemy units remaining are unable to operate effectively above regimental level.

(e) Restores the territorial integrity and sovereignty of NATO member states.

(3) An Forces, Central Europe (AIRCENT)-

(a) Conducts operations to gain and maintain air superiority

(b) Provides offensive air support (OAS) and attacks echeloned forces IAW the procedures for joint-precision interdiction (JPI).

(4) Allied Forces. Baltic Approaches (BALTAP)-

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(a) Conducts triservice defense in sector to defend national integrity of JUTLAND and the DANISH ISLES.

(b) Protects allied airports and seaports of supply and debarkation.

(c) Prevents egress of Krasnovian naval elements from the Baltic

(d) Controls the SKAGERRAK and KATTEGAT SLOCs.

(5) German Territorial Forces.

(a) Provide security to rear of LANDCENT corps boundaries.

(b) Coordinate host nation support in LANDCENT AOR.

(6) LANDCENT conducts operations IAW AFCENT GDP 33002. Its operational objectives are to restore the German-Polish and German-Czech borders, destroy any Krasnovian forces remaining in German! after restoration of the borders, and eliminate the threat posed by the second strategic echelon. LANDCENT-

(a) Activates I Allied Army Group (AAG) and II AAG.

(b) Defends in sector from NORTH Sea to intersection of ELBE River and German-Czech border.

(c) Plans for employment of Allied Command. Europe. Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) in sector.

(d) Prepares to receive ARRC in sector

(e) Establishes liaison with French forces in sector.

(7) II AAG activates and conducts operations IAW AFCENT GDP 33002. II AAG-

(a) Defends in sector from NORTH Sea to intersection of ELBE River and German-Czech border.

(b) Coordinates north coastal operations with BALTAP and denies Krasnovian access to North German ports.

(c) Protects BALTAP southern flank and defeats fist operational echelon armies of 1 Krasnovian Front.

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- (d) Forces commitment of second-echelon army (37 GTA).
 - (e) On order, counterattacks to assist in destruction of the second operational echelon
 - (f) On order, restores German-Polish border in sector and prepares to defend against second strategic echelon attacks.
 - (g) Assists German Territorial Forces in control of displaced persons
 - (h) Establishes liaison with French forces in sector.
- (8) I AAG activates and then operates IAW AFCENT GDP 33002. I AAG-
- (a) Occupies hide positions and plans counterattack against main attack
 - (b) Assists German Territorial Forces in control of displaced persons
 - (c) Counterattacks to destroy second operational echelon
 - (d) Establishes liaison with French forces in sector

c. Attachments and Detachments. Annex A (Task Organization).

- (1) On implementation of NATO Augmented Defense System (NADS)-
- (a) 1 (Nord), II (Sud), and III (Ost) German Korps detach predesignated OberKommando and Military District command structures and relinquish to them responsibilities for German Territorial Army requirements in their respective AORs.
 - (b) I (Nord), II (Sud), and III (Ost) German Korps are redesignated I (GE), II (GE), and III (GE) Korps respectively.
 - (c) II (GE) and III (GE) Korps retain tactical and operational responsibilities for their designated sectors.
- (2) On activation, II AAG receives OPCON of 1st (NL) Corps, 10th (US) Corps, and II (GE) Korps.
- (a) OO, receives OPCON of 7th (GE) PzGren Div in phase II.
 - (b) Be prepared to receive OPCON of 1st (GE) PzGren Div from BALTAP during phase III.

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(3) On activation, I AAG receives OPCON of I (GE) Korps and 1st (BE) Corps.

(a) On rearward passage of lines and battle handover, receives OPCON of III (GE) Korps.

(b) OO,. receives OPCON of II (US) Corps.

d. Assumptions.

(1) III (GE) and II (GE) Korps will be in position to defend German-Polish and German-Czech borders (respectively) at D-day.

(2) NATO indications and warning system provide at least 20 days' warning of attack preparations and 48 hours attack warning.

(3) NAC renders timely political decisions to allow military operational execution.

(4) Prior to contrary political determination. NATO ground forces will not cross the Polish border (PL ARGON) or the Czech border (PL NEON).

(5) IAW reference d, forward-deployed LANDCENT forces will be in position to defend in sector at the outbreak of hostilities.

(6) Nations providing augmentation forces designated for COMLANDCENT will flow forces into theater IAW reference c.

(7) Reinforcing forces arrive according to schedule for reception, onward movement, and change of operations control (CHOP) to appropriate principal subordinate commands, and they are available to initiate counterattack

(8) Krasnovian forces may use chemical weapons.

(9) Krasnovian use of tactical nuclear weapons is expected only in retaliation.

(10) FRANCE will not integrate into the military structure of NATO but will participate in military operations IAW existing agreements on initiation of hostilities.

2. MISSION

When directed, LANDCENT conducts a forward defense in sector with assigned forces to assist in the defeat of the Krasnovian TVD by destroying the 1 and 2 Krasnovian Fronts, reestablishes the German-Polish and German-Czech borders. restores German territorial integrity, and secures conflict termination on conditions favorable to NATO.

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3. EXECUTION

INTENT. The purpose of this operation is to defeat the Krasnovian TVD. I intend to destroy the 1 Krasnovian Front, which is making the TVD main attack, while defeating the 2 Krasnovian Front, which is making the TVD supporting attack. To accomplish this, LANDCENT will defend well forward in sector, significantly reducing the combat capabilities of the first operational echelon. Forward units will identify and contain the enemy main effort. When sufficient operational reserves are built up, we will counterattack to destroy the enemy's second operational echelon army. On conclusion of this operation, we must have secured the LANDCENT sector, the enemy must be incapable of regimental or higher operations, the borders with POLAND and the CZECH REPUBLIC must be restored, we must have prepared a coherent defense, and our forces must be disposed for future defense in support of AFCENT plans.

a. Concept of Operation. The campaign in LANDCENT's TO will be conducted in five phases. The deception effort will attempt to induce the Krasnovian TVD commander to commit the second-echelon army in the north of the II AAG sector and to mask the true location and posture of the I AAG counterattacking forces. LANDCENT will accept risk by not having a true reserve and by assigning very large sectors for forward corps.

b. Maneuver

(1) Phase I-Preconflict Preparation/Transition to War (T-day to D-day). This phase commenced with violation of the CFE (Conventional Forces, Europe) Treaty, hereafter referred to as T (for treaty violation)-day, and ends when Krasnovian forces attack into NATO territory. Objectives in this phase are to avoid being surprised, to receive reinforcements, and to prepare for the outbreak of hostilities. This phase will see LANDCENT increase vigilance of its forces. On indication of imminent hostilities or attack, forces will deploy to forward dispersal areas. Phase I will culminate on D-day with Krasnovian westward violation of German territorial integrity. LANDCENT inmates deception efforts to lead Krasnovian TVD commander to focus on potential for success in northern portion of LANDCENT sector.

(a) Operational Concept. The intent during phase I is for all actions to support increased readiness for defensive operations and to prepare for the reception of reinforcements from contributing nations before the outbreak of hostilities. LANDCENT will prepare to receive and will receive OPCON of III (GE) Korps on initiation of stage II of NADS. General command tasks common to all LANDCENT subordinate units include-

1. Increasing unit readiness.

(a) Activate intelligence channels to facilitate early warning of threat mobilization and attack.

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- (b) Implement ACE countersurprise measures
 - (c) Increase counterterrorist and countersabotage measures,
 - (d) Increase air defense posture.
 - (e) Exchange liaison elements
 - (f) Refine rules of engagement
 - (g) Complete infrastructure, mobility, and maintenance projects where possible
 - (h) Raise sustainment stocks to highest attainable level
 - (i) Initiate logistic corrective action for all continuing national shortfalls and report uncorrected shortfalls through intermediate HQs to LANDCENT G4 for cross-leveling where possible. consolidation. and reporting to the Logistics Readiness Center (LRC), SHAPE.
2. Preparing to receive reserves and theater reinforcement augmentation
- (a) Implement political arrangements to expedite reception, staging, and movement of reinforcing formations.
 - (b) Secure LOCs, APODs, POMCUS, and bed-down airfields
 - (c) Pre-position ground and air assets to decrease descision-implementation lag
 - (d) Prepare to execute national support agreements with emphasis on preplanned host nation support.
 - (e) Open LOCs and MSRs in LANDCENT rear and implement traffic controls to ensure support to deploying forces.
 - (f) On declaration of general alert and initiation of NADS, the three German corps will activate wartime organizations. Territorial units and functions will separate and function under German national authority as OberKommandos for appropriate areas. All German corps will assume operational and tactical responsibilities and ensure cadre units are fully mobilized. III (GE) Korps will remain under German national control until stage II of NADS.
 - (g) When directed. activate II AAG and 1 AAG.
 - (h) On order, provide additional fire support to augment fires of III (GE) Korps.

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(b) Tasks to Subordinate Commands.

1. II AAG.

(a) Activate command. initiate communications channels and assume OPCON of 1st (NL) Corps, 10th (US) Corps, and II (GE) Korps.

(b) Coordinate cohesive defense with BALTAP (LANDJUT).

(c) Coordinate initial defense with III (GE) Corps and prepare to receive OPCON of 7th (GE) PzGren Div.

(d) Coordinate cross-boundary air defenses with LANDCENT, BALTAP, AIRCENT and III (GE) Korps.

(e) Coordinate air operations with BALTAP, I AAG, AIRCENT, and III (GE) Korps. (Continue for all phases.)

(f) Prepare to receive the ARRC in sector.

2. I AAG. * * *

3. 1st (NL) Corps. * * *

4. X (US) Corps.

(a) On NAC decision. deploy forces to forward locations.

(b) Coordinate initial defense with III (GE) Corps, 1st (NL) Corps on the left, and II (GE) Corps on the right.

(c) Continue reception of forces IAW reference c.

5. 1 (GE) Korps. * * *

6. 1st (BE) Corps. * * *

7. II (GE) Korps.

(a) Coordinate initial defense with X (US) Corps on the left and III (GE) Korps.

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* * * * *

8. III (GE) Korps.

(a) Activate *OberKommando Ost* and CHOP predesignated assets on implementation of NADS.

(b) Assume operational responsibility for eastern five districts on implementation of NADS.

(c) Establish covering positions as far forward as possible oriented on German-Polish and German-Czech borders.

(d) Plan fires for and prepare to receive fire support augmentation from 1st (NL) Corps, X (US) Corps, and II (GE) and I (GE) Korps.

(e) Coordinate battle handover and rearward passage of lines with II AAG, 1st (NL) Corps, and X (US) Corps.

* * * * *

9. II (US) Corps. Move into assembly areas/hide positions as mobilization, deployment and reception are completed.

(2) Phase II-Deployment/Initial Defense (D-Day through D+TBD). This phase may begin during phase I with the deployment of the first NATO command forces forward into GDP locations. Phase II begins with a Krasnovian attack into NATO territory (D-day). LANDCENT objectives are to identify and contain the front making the main attack, defeat armies making supporting attacks, and protect and move counterattacking forces to achieve positional advantage against the army in the second echelon. Activities may continue into phases III and IV until the major reinforcing formations have closed in theater and effective forward defense is established. Be prepared to receive AFCENT reserve formations OPCON for conduct of phase III. Deception effort continues to indicate potential weakness and failure of defense in II AAG and to conceal location and intent of I AAG. Concurrently, AIRCENT will gain and maintain air superiority in LANDCENT's TO and conduct JPI/AI cast of RIPL (PL ARGON) with priority of effort forward of II AAG, shifting to I AAG after defeat of first operational echelon armies of 1 Krasnovian Front and prior to counter-attack. OAS priority is in II AAG AOR and will be prepared to shift priorities to I AAG on 8 hours' notice.

(a) Operational Concept. Efforts must be directed toward maintaining a mobile defense while building combat power in the rear area in preparation for counteroffensive. LANDCENT prepares to defend in sector with II AAG. Forward of LANDCENT/II AAG positions, III (GE) Korps will function as a covering force for 24 hours while the forward corps move into sector. III (GE) Korps will cover with 8th (GE) PzGren Div oriented toward the German-Polish border and 7th (GE) PzGren Div oriented generally along the

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German-Polish/German-Czech border. III (GE) Korps will delay Krasnovian forces east of the ELBE River for 24 hours. OO, II AAG will assume OPCON of III (GE) Korps for battle handover. Upon III (GE) Korps handover of the battle to II AAG main defense forces. II AAG passes III (GE) Korps to the rear and defends in sector. Deep operations will delay, disrupt, and deplete the second-echelon army. General LANDCENT command tasks include-

1. Deploy to forward defensive positions.

2. Process, stage, receive, and reposition deploying forces to marshaling areas to facilitate CHOP to NATO.

3. Plan for AFCENT counteroffensive.

(b) Tasks to Subordinate Commands.

1. II AAG.

(a) Establish cohesive defense from north German coast south to Austrian and Czech borders. Observe neutrality of each country.

(b) Maintain a cohesive defense with LANDJUT Corps on left flank. Continue in all phases.

(c) Coordinate Baltic coastal operations in conjunction with BALTAP.

(d) Conduct reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) operations to determine threat main effort IAW AFCENT collection plan.

(e) Coordinate, facilitate, and accept handover of battle from and rearward passage of elements of III (GE) Korps. Positioning of all long-range fire support elements will be well forward to support the covering operations and facilitate disengagement of III (GE) Korps. First priority of calls for fire will be to III (GE) Korps.

(f) Facilitate rearward and lateral passage of III (GE) Korps elements through sector as required.

(g) Receive 7th (GE) PzGren Div OPCON.

(h) Continue to receive forces IAW reference c until deployment is completed.

(i) Defend in sector along a line running from STRALSUND on the north coast (UA750200) to DEMMIN (UV710750) to NEUBRANDENBURG (UV851362) to NEUSTRELITZ

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(UV725161) to ZEHDENICK (UU891721) to BRANDENBURG (UU316095) to WITTENBERG (UT380500) following the ELBE River to RIESA (US800880), then to DRESDEN (VS100550), and then to the point where the ELBE River crosses GERMAN-CZECH border (VS402365).

(j) Allow controlled penetration of Krasnovian main effort to a line running from PARCHIM (PE895230) to LUDWIGSLUST (PE670118) to DANNENBERG (PD-401846) to SALZWEDEL (PD460591) to WOLFSBURG (PD222095) to BRAUNSCHWEIG (PC048915) to OSCHERLEBEN (PC531677) to ROSSLAU (UT108540) to WITTENBERG (UT380500) in preparation for AFCENT counteroffensive operations.

(k) Be prepared for boundary change adding 1st (GE) PzGren Div sector to army group area if depth of designed penetration is exceeded.

(l) Defend in sector running from WITTENBERG (UT380500) to DRESDEN (VS100550) to the point where the ELBE River crosses GERMAN-CZECH border (VS402365) against Krasnovian secondary effort and destroy the army making the 2 Krasnovian Front main attack.

(m) Be prepared to accept attachment of one attack helicopter group from II (US) corps.

(n) Guard along a line running from HALBERSTADT (PC407506) to STASSFURT (PC790485) to DESSAU (UT095464) as the 1 Krasnovian Front penetration develops

(o) Be prepared to conduct offensive operations toward NEUPRIN (UU533685) in the north. BRANDENBURG (UU316095) in the center. or along an axis CHEMNITZ (US550350) (formerly KARL MARX STADT) to DRESDEN (VS100550) in the south.

(p) Be prepared to restore German-Polish border and German-Czech border in sector.

(q) Reserve will be committed only with approval of LANDCENT commander.

(r) Be prepared to operate in concert with the forces of the CZECH REPUBLIC should that nation abandon its neutrality or be drawn into the conflict. (Continue in all phases.)

(s) Be prepared to operate in concert with the forces of AUSTRIA should that nation abandon its neutrality or be drawn into the conflict. (Continue in all phases.)

2. I AAG. * * *

3. 1st (NL) Corps. * * *

4. X (US) Corps

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(a) Defend in sector from TREUENBRIETZEN (UT545749) to WITTENBERG (UT380500) to EILENBURG (UT388049) to GRIMMA (US407789) to ALTENBERG (US204505) to LICHTENSTEIN (US337260) to FALKENSTEIN (UR138947) to POSSECK (TR918802) to destroy 2 GTA to cause the defeat of 2 Krasnovian Front.

(b) Be prepared to conduct offensive operations toward BRANDENBURG (UU316095) in the north or PILSEN (VR778507) in the south.

(c) Commit reserve only with approval of Commander, II AAG.

(d) Coordinate, facilitate, and accept handover of battle from and rearward passage of elements of III (GE) Korps.

(e) Facilitate rearward and lateral passage of III (GE) Korps elements through sector as required.

(f) Continue to receive forces IAW reference c until deployment is completed.

5 1 (GE) Korps * * *

6 1st (BE) Corps. * * *

7 II (GE) Korps.

(a) Facilitate rearward and lateral movement of III (GE) Korps elements through sector as required.

(b) Defend in sector from TR970660 to UQ690430 to defeat the 16 TA.

(c) Establish cohesive defense south to AUSTRIAN and CZECH borders. Maintain neutrality of each country.

* * * * *

8 III (GE) Korps.

(a) Conduct covering force operations from the German-Ppolish/German-Czech borders to PL BORON for 24 hours.

(b) Destroy enemy reconnaissance units

(c) Delay and disrupt forward detachments and first-echelon divisions

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(d) Defend as far forward as possible, oriented on German-Polish and German-Czech borders.

(e) OO, given fire planning authority and first priority of calls for fire of long-range fire assets of 1st (NL) Corps, 1 (BE) Corps, X (US) Corps, and I (GE) Korps.

* * * * *

9. II (US) Corps.

(a) Complete moves into assembly areas/hide positions

(b) Continue to hide and prepare for counterattack.

(3) Phase III-Counteroffensive (OO). This phase will commence once intelligence sources confirm the commitment of the 37 GTA by the Krasnovian TVD commander and 1 AAG elements are in their attack position.

(a) Operational Concept. Initiation of this phase depends on our success in making the Krasnovian TVD commander believe an opportunity exists to exploit vulnerabilities in the north of the II AAG sector. II AAG forward corps will continue defense in sector to control the shoulders of the penetration and, at the same time, funnel attacking forces into the vicinity of COLDITZ LETZLINGER HEIDE, north of MAGDEBURG. OO, I AAG counterattacks to destroy the second-echelon Krasnovian army seeking to continue the offensive through the shaped penetration created by the collapsing defenses in the north of the II AAG sector. Deep operations shift to delaying and disrupting the second strategic echelon.

(b) Tasks to Subordinate Units.

1. II AAG.

(a) Continue defense in sector from north German coast south to Austrian and Czech borders

(b) Coordinate Baltic coastal operations in conjunction with BALTA to divert Krasnovian assets in support of main attack.

(c) Continue to defend in sector

(d) Allow controlled penetration of Krasnovian forces in preparation for AFCENT counteroffensive operations.

(e) Be prepared to pass counterattacking I AAG.

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(f) OO. counterattack to destroy the lead elements of the second operational echelon armies.

(g) Be prepared to pass the ARRC.

(h) On order, initiate counterattack toward BRANDENBURG or CHEMNITZ-DRESDEN

2. I AAG.

(a) On order. counterattack in Lone into and through the II AAG sector to destroy the 37 GTX east of BERLIN vic FRANKFURT AM ODER.

(b) Skin and avoid becoming decisively engaged in BERLIN.

(4) Phase I-Reconstitution/Defense. This phase begins with the defeat of the second operational echelon army. The objectives are to prepare for and absorb the attack of the second strategic echelon and restore GERMAN national boundaries along antebellum lines.

(a) Operational Concept. The battlefield will be reorganized with I AAG in the north and II AAG in the south. All units will occupy defensive positions and be prepared to revert to offensive operations on 24 hours notice.

1. OO boundary between II AAG and I AAG to be established along a line generally following the E30 autobahn from FRANKFURT AM ODER to MAGDEBURG and then along Bundesstrasse 81 to HALBERSTADT (Overlay of actual boundary to be provided subsequent to I AAG counterattack.)

2. Significant reassignment of forces will accompany implementation of on-order boundary, dependent upon actual force locations after destruction of the first strategic echelon.

(b) Tasks to Subordinate Units.

1. II AAG.

(a) Defend in sector.

(b) Pass OPCON of 1st (NL) Corps to I AAG.

2. I AAG. * * *

(5) Phase V--Conflict Termination/Post Conflict/Extended Operations.

(a) Operational Concept. To be published upon further NAC guidance.

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(b) Tasks to Subordinate Units. To be determined in line with NAC guidance

c. Coordinating Instructions

(1) This plan is effective for planning on receipt and implementation on receipt of appropriate message through the NATO alert system.

(2) II AAG and I AAG provide completed plans to this headquarters NLT 151200 Jun 9_.

(3) T-day = M-day.

(4) Receive reinforcement/replacement augmentation IAW reference c.

(5) Request for release of nuclear and chemical weapons will be passed through COMAAGs, COMLANDCENT, CINCENT, and SACEUR to NAC for consultation and approval.

(6) Restrict continued westward movement of non-German refugees. They will be cleared from imminent danger of areas of conflict, consolidated at displaced persons containment areas in the rear, and passed to the German territorial army control.

(7) There are two on-order RIPLs.

(a) PL KRYPTON runs generally parallel and east of the German-Polish border and will be activated as a RIPL on D-day by message from AFCENT. (See Annex C.)

(b) PL OZONE runs generally parallel and south of the German-Czech border and will be activated by message from AFCENT, dependent upon Krasnovian violation of Czech neutrality and use of Czech approaches to the LANDCENT AOR. (See Annex C.)

(8) Operations beyond either RIPL are limited to engagement of Krasnovian troop and logistic concentrations outside urban and population areas. Targets not meeting these criteria may be engaged on clearance and approval by SACEUR.

(9) Major ground operations into POLAND are not authorized. (See special considerations in ROE.)

(10) Ground or air operations into or over AUSTRIA or the CZECH REPUBLIC are not authorized without prior approval of SACEUR.

(11) Civil control and rear area security within the borders of GERMANY are a national responsibility.

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(12) Principal subordinate commands will help host nation authorities destroy enemy forces located in rear areas.

(13) Fire Support. Submit target nominations and air requests IAW SOP. For planning only the following air allocations are projected: Report further allocation to corps level through LANDCENT G3 (Air).

(a) Tactical Air Reconnaissance (TAR).

	D-Day	D+1	D+2	D+3	D+4	D+5	D+6
III (GE) Korps	20	20	10	5	0	0	0
II AAG	20	30	30	25	25	15	15
I AAG	5	5	10	30	30	20	20
LANDCENT	<u>15</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>30</u>	<u>30</u>	<u>25</u>
TOTAL	60	70	70	85	85	65	60

(b) Battle Air Interdiction (BAI).

	D-Day	D+1	D+2	D+3	D+4	D+5	D+6
III (GE) Korps	60	60	10	0	0	0	0
II AAG	0	0	50	30	30	25	15
I AAG	0	0	0	0	20	25	15
LANDCENT	<u>0</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>75</u>	<u>50</u>	<u>30</u>	<u>60</u>
TOTAL	60	85	80	105	100	80	90

(c) Close Air Support (CAS).

	D-Day	D+1	D+2	D+3	D+4	D+5	D+6
III (GE) Korps	100	150	150	0	0	0	0
II AAG	0	150	250	350	250	250	200
I AAG	0	0	0	50	100	100	150
LANDCENT	<u>100</u>	<u>50</u>	<u>70</u>	<u>50</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>50</u>	<u>50</u>
TOTAL	200	350	470	450	450	400	400

4. SERVICE SUPPORT

Sustainment, although a national responsibility, must be organized to support a rapidly shifting battle-field that will be highly mobile. Logistic support must be available both out of sector and on an area basis. Sustainment operations will be conducted by national authorities through the rapid establishment of lines of communication into the theater of war and the establishment of adequate stockage levels and supporting transportation assets to support each phase of the campaign. Logistic support remains a national responsibility.

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ity. Interallied support is conducted IAW bilateral agreements. The NATO Mutual Support Act and the NATO-declared logistic emergency procedures remain in effect.

a. Sustainment priorities by phase.

(1) Phase I-II AAG.

(2) Phase II-III (GE) Korps.

(3) Phase III-I AAG.

(4) Phase IV-I AAG.

(5) Phase V

(a) Return all units in theater to highest possible levels of preparedness.

(b) Prepare for redeployment of reserves and reinforcements.

(c) Provide all possible assistance to the conduct of civil-military operations in all areas

b. Declaration of Operational Emergency in War will be IAW SHAPE allied tactical publication (ATP) and major subordinate command standard procedures.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

a. Command.

(1) Command Relationships. COMLANDCENT exercises operational control over all NATO command forces, all NATO assigned forces, and all NATO earmarked forces in the LANDCENT AOR when national forces are declared to be in combat-ready status by national authorities.

(2) Succession of Command: COMLANDCENT: DCOMLANDCENT; Cdr, II AAG: Cdr, I AAG.

(3) Headquarters Locations (Initial).

(a) AFCENT-BRUNSSUM, NETHERLANDS.

(b) AFCENT Allied War Headquarters-MAASTRICT, NETHERLANDS

(c) LANDCENT-HEIDELBERG, GERMANY.

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(d) LANDCENT Allied War Headquarters-RUPPERTSWEILLER, GERMANY.

(e) II AAG-WIESBADEN, GERMANY.

(f) I AAG-OSNABRUECK, GERMANY.

(g) AIRCENT-RAMSTEIN AB, GERMANY.

(h) III (GE) Korps-POTSDAM, GERMANY.

b Signal. Annex F (Signal).

Acknowledgement

VAN RYKSDAL
General (NLA)

SCHMIDT
BG, ACOS (OPS)
(GEA)

Annexes: A-Task Organization
C-Operation Overlay (TBP)
F-Signal (TBP)

DISTRIBUTION:

SACEUR
CINCNORTHWEST
COMAIRCENT
COM I AAG (Designate)
MOD, Paris (for 1st (FR) Armee)
CDR 1st (BE) Corps
CDR LANDJUT Corps
CDR II (US) Corps
CDR I (GE) Korps (Nord)
CDR, III (GE) Korps (Ost)

CINCENT
COMBALTAP
COM II AAG (Designate)
MOD, BONN
CDR 1st (NL) Corps
CDR, X (US) Corps
CDR, CFE
CDR, ARRC
CDR, II (GE) Korps (Sud)

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ANNEX A (TASK ORGANIZATION) to CONTINGENCY OPERATION PLAN (COP) 31201 (CRASH-
ING FIST)-LANDCENT

The following task organization is effective for planning upon receipt.

II Allied Army Group (All units listed here are OPCON to this army group.)

1st (NL) corps
 4th (NL) Div
 2d (GE) PzGren Div
 23d (US) Armd Div (available T+15)

X (US) corps
 4th (GE) PzGren Div
 52d (US) Mech Div
 25th (US) Armd Div (POMCUS)
 4th (CA) CMBG
 209th (US) ACR

II (GE) Korps
 5th (GE) PzGren Div
 6th (GE) PzGren Div

I Allied Army Group (All units listed here are OPCON to this army group.)

I (GE) Korps
 1st (NL) Mech Div
 3d (GE) PzGren Div

1st (BE) Corps
 20th (BE) Mech Bde
 21st (BE) Armd Bde
 30th (BE) Armd Bde
 31 st (BE) Armd Bde
 313th (US) Sep Mech Bde

*III (GE) Korps: 00. OPCON II AAG for phase II battle handover only
 7th (GE) PzGren Div: 00. OPCON II (GE) Corps
 8th (GE) PzGren Div

*Available for planning only until completion of mobilization and deployment and release from national control.

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ANX A (TASK ORG) to LANDCENT COP 31201 (CRASHING FIST)

- II US Corps (M+30)
 - 53d (US) Mech Div
 - 54th (US) Mech Div
 - 55th (US) Mech Div
 - 208th (US) ACR

On political determination by FRANCE. the following units may become available for employment in LANDCENT AOR.

1st French Armee

- 1st (FR) Corps
 - 7th (FR) Armd Div
 - 10th (FR) Armd Div
 - 12th (FR) Lt Armd Div
 - 14th (FR) Lt Armd Div

- 2d (I-R) Corps
 - 1st (FR) Armd Div
 - 3d (FR) Armd Div
 - 5th (FR) Armd Div

FUNDAMENTALS OF ECHELONS ABOVE DIVISION COMBAT OPERATIONS

Chapter 6. II Allied Army Group FRAGO 4-1

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 II Allied Army Group
 PADERBORN (MC8529), GE
 220001A Aug 19

FRAGMENTARY ORDER 4-1

References: No change to basic order

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces. While the Krasnovian strategic objective of reestablishing control of Eastern Europe remains unchanged the Krasnovian TVD commander has failed to achieve his initial mission lines in the north. There are clear indications that the 2 Krasnovian Front is now his main effort

b Friendly Forces. No change

c. Attachments and Detachments

* * * * *

The following units are further attached to X (US) Corps, effective 231700A Aug 19__ :

54th Mech Div	753d Trans Co (Lt/Mdm Trk)
HHD, 83d Med Gp	729th Trans Co (Hv Trk)
HHC, 19th CSG	582d Ord Co (DS) (MOADS/PLS)
HHD, 19th CSB	592d Ord Co (Convl) (GS MOADS/PLS)
HHD, 127th CSB	250th QM Co (Sup) (GS)
HHD, 197th CSB	328th QM Co (Petri Sup)
811th CSH	212th QM Co (Sup) (DS)
812th CSH	248th QM Co (Sup) (DS)
8261st Med Co. Dent Svc	253d QM Co (Fld Svcs) (DS)
860th Med Co, Gnd Amb	295th QM Co (Fld Svcs) (DS)
861st Med Co, Air Amb	9022d Maint Co (DS)
712th Trans Co (Mdm Trk PLS)	9023d Maint Co (DS)
745th Trans Co (Mdm Trk Cntnr/Cgo)	9024th Maint Co (DS)
723d Trans Co (Mdm Trk POL)	9026th Maint Co (DS)

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2. MISSION

On order, II AAG conducts offensive operations to the east to destroy the 1 and 2 Krasnovian Fronts in zone to establish preconditions for the defeat of the Krasnovian TVD.

3 EXECUTION

INTENT: I intend to defeat the Krasnovian TVD by quickly transitioning to the offense to destroy remaining forces of the 1 and 2 Krasnovian Fronts in zone.

dispositions before reinforcing forces from the Krasnovian second strategic echelon transit POLAND. At the conclusion of these simultaneous operations, the enemy must be incapable of battalion or higher operations. and we must be postured in a defense anchored on X (US) Corps PL X-RAY prepared to repulse any additional Krasnovian forces.

3 Concept of Operation Offensive operations will be conducted in one phase. The X (US) Corps will conduct the II AAG main attack in the south against remnants of the 2 Krasnovian Front while the 1st (NL) Corps conducts a simultaneous supporting attack against remaining elements of the 1 Krasnovian Front in the north. The II (GE) Korps will provide a division to be II AAG reserve.

b. Tasks to Maneuver Units

(1) 1st (NL) corps. * * *

(3) X (US).Corps

(3) Destroy 2 Krasnovian Front forces in zone

(b) Establish a hasty defense along PL X-RAY

* * * * *

d Coordinating Instructions

* * * * *

(3) Do not cross the German-Polish border (VIC PL ARGON) with ground maneuver forces.

(4) Current corps boundaries remain in effect

(5) Projected D+7 to D+10 air allocations:

X (US) Corps. TAR (10), BAI (20), CAS (100)

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4. SERVICE SUPPORT

* * * * *

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

Nochange.

ACKNOWLEDGE

APPLEBY
General

OFFICIAL
KORN
BG.ACofS.G3

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FUNDAMENTALS OF ECHELONS ABOVE DIVISION COMBAT OPERATIONSChapter 7. II Allied Army Group Periodic intelligence Summary No 1

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PADERBORN (MCX539). GE
20001A Aug 19__
NZ20

PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 1

Period Covered: 22 Aug to 5 Sep 19__

References. Maps. Joint Operations Graphic (JOG) Series 1501, GERMANY. sheet NM32-2 (KASSEL), edition 4-DMG, 1:250,000.

JOG Series 1501, GERMANY, sheet NM32-3 (HALLE), edition 4-DMG, 1:250,000

JOG Series 1501, GERMANY. sheet NM32-5 (FRANKFURT AM MAIN), edition 3-DMG. 1:250,000.

JOG Series 1501, GERMANY. sheet NM32-6 (ERFURT), edition 5-DMG, 1:250,000.

JOG Series 1501. GERMANY, sheet NM32-8 (MANNHEIM), edition G-DMG, 1:250,000.

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JOG Series 1501, GDR, sheet NM33-1 (LEIPZIG). edition 4-GSGS. 1:250,000.

JOG Series 1501, GDR sheet NM33-2 (GORLITZ). edition J-GSGS. 1:250,000.

JOG Series 1501, GDR sheet NM33-4 (KARL-MARX-STADT), edition 5-DMG. 1:250,000.

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JOG Series 1501, GDR, sheet NN33-11 (FRANKFURT AM ODER). edition 3-GSGS. 1250,000.

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION

a The enemy opposing 11 AAG is the Krasnovian TVD consisting of two strategic echelons. The TVD attacked with three fronts. The 1 Krasnovian Front in the center was the TVD main effort. The 2 Krasnovian Front in the south was the TVD supporting attack responsible for protecting the southern boundary of 1 Krasnovian Front. Operational objectives of the TVD were to seize the capital, BERLIN, and reestablish the former IGB. The 3 Northern Front was responsible for securing the BALTIC coast to prevent NATO's reinforcement from the BALTIC Sea approaches and securing sea lines of communications in the BALTIC. The second strategic echelon consists of two fronts, the 3 and 4 Krasnovian Fronts. A sketch of the current enemy situation is in annex A.

(1) The 1 Krasnovian Front consists of two TAs, one GTA, air forces of the front, one air assault brigade, one artillery division, and one GTD serving as front reserve. This front currently is in defensive positions just northwest of BERLIN. The front failed to capture or encircle BERLIN.

(2) The 2 Krasnovian Front consists of two TAs, air forces of the front, one air assault brigade, one artillery division, and one tank division serving as front reserve. The 2 Krasnovian Front also failed to achieve its objectives and currently is in defensive positions vic of PL PROTON.

(3) The 3 Krasnovian Front * * *

(4) The 4 Krasnovian Front consists of two tank armies, one GTA, air forces of the front, one air assault brigade, one artillery division, and one GTD serving as front reserve. This front is moving west through POLAND and should arrive at the German-Polish border NLT 7 Sep 19__

b. Hostilities began on 16 Aug 19__ (D-day). The successful defense conducted by 1st (NL) Corps in the north, X (US) Corps in the center, and II (GE) Korps in the south forced the TVD commander to temporarily establish defensive positions.

c. The Northern Front opposing BALTAP has attained some success. The impact on II AAG operations has been substantial. Frontal aviation operations north of HANNOVER have forced a realignment of NATO air defense assets to protect forces north of BERLIN.

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2. ENEMY ACTIVITIES

a. Ground. In the north, the 1 Krasnovian Front attempted to encircle BERLIN and drive toward HANNOVER. In the center, the 2 Krasnovian Front reached its initial mission lines; however, it did not have sufficient combat power to exploit success and, therefore, failed to reach its overall objectives. In the south, the 2 Krasnovian Front violated the territorial integrity of the CZECH REPUBLIC and encircled PRAGUE. CZECH REPUBLIC forces continue to defend PRAGUE. Again lacking sufficient combat power, the front commander ceased offensive operations and established defensive positions just west of PRAGUE.

b. Air. The Krasnovians initiated hostilities with an air operation designed primarily to gain at least local air superiority by destroying or neutralizing NATO air defenses, command and control facilities, and air forces on the ground. This air operation used practically all fixed-wing assets in the Krasnovian theater of operations for the first 2 to 3 days of the offensive. The ground offensive followed 4½ hours after the air operation began. Once the Krasnovian air operation attained its operational goals, significant fixed-wing assets were released to the various fronts to support ground operations.

(1) Over the last 24 hours, Krasnovian air activity has significantly decreased. Krasnovian air forces initially benefited from NATO's inability to place sufficient air defenses forward due to the CFE Treaty. NATO's ability to rapidly deploy air forces to the theater and the advanced theater air defenses produced over the last couple of years have enabled NATO to quickly force the Krasnovians to shift from offensive air support to counterair missions. The Krasnovians have used only rotary-wing aircraft for CAS to support their ground operations during the last 24 hours.

(2) Krasnovian forces have established a belt of fixed air defense sites along the German-Polish border to protect frontal and army-level C² and CSS facilities. These fixed air defense sites also provide increased protection for the movement of the second strategic echelon. This has allowed the 3 and 4 Krasnovian Fronts to move faster than originally estimated.

c. Naval. * * *

d. Special Operations. Krasnovian special operations forces infiltrated the II AAG AOR prior to hostilities. They have been responsible for numerous terrorist attacks against civilian and military targets. They were initially effective in providing strategic intelligence to the TVD commander and assessing damage to NATO forces by Krasnovian deep attacks. Due to the increased use of counterterrorist units from the different NATO members, many of these forces have been eliminated or neutralized.

e. Nuclear, Biological, or Chemical Operations. There are no confirmed reports of the use of NBC weapons at this time.

3. ORDER OF BATTLE

a. Composition and Disposition. There has been no change from the initial order of battle for the 1 and 2 Krasnovian Fronts. Information on the composition of the 3 and 4 Krasnovian Fronts is being compiled as

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information becomes available. Annex B has a current OB of the 3 and 4 Krasnovian Fronts. indicates the following composition:

(1) The 3 Krasnovian Front* * *

(2) The 4 Krasnovian Front consists of 20 TA, 38 TA, 17 GTA, air forces of the Front. one UI air assault brigade, one UI artillery division, and the 17 High-Powered Arty Bde.

(a) The 20 TA consists of the 5 and 21 MRDs and the 13 TD

(b) The 38 TA consists of the 72 and 29 MRDs and the 45 TD

(c) The 17 GTA consists of the 52 and 71GMRDs, the 19 and 63 GTDs, and the 29 and 79 TDs.

(d) The aviation of the 4 Krasnovian Front consists of two unidentified (UI) fighter divisions, two UI fighter-bomber divisions, two UI transportation helicopter regiments, and one UI independent reconnaissance regiment.

(e) The UI air assault brigade consists of two UI air assault battalions, two UI parachute battalions, and a reconnaissance company.

(f) The UI artillery division consists of one UI gun brigade (2S5), two UI howitzer brigades (2S3), and the 50 Gun-How Bde (2A65), the 22 Rkt Lchr Bde (BM-22), and the 97 AT Bde (MT-12/AT-5).

(g) The 17 High-Powered Arty Bde consists of two UI heavy artillery battalions (2S7) and two UI heavy mortar battalions (2S4).

b. Strength. The 1 and 2 Krasnovian Fronts are from 50 to 60 percent combat effective. Both the 3 and 4 Krasnovian Fronts of the second strategic echelon are at or near full strength.

(1) 1 Krasnovian Front's 18 and 47 TAs are 40 to 50 percent combat effective and are essentially, canalized by the poor terrain north of BERLIN. The 37 GTA has established prepared defensive positions within a second defensive belt just east of the GERMAN-POLISH border. The front reserve, the 20 GTD, has begun to move south toward FRANKFURT AM ODER and is at 80-percent strength.

(2) 2 Krasnovian Front's 2 GTA is at 40- to 50-percent strength overall. The 16 TA is at 70- to 80-percent strength but is facing increased resistance from forces of the CZECH REPUBLIC as its LOCs are extended. The 42 TD, front reserve, is at 80- to 85-percent strength and has sent its reconnaissance battalion toward DRESDEN from its current position at MLADA BOLESLAV (VR9585). It is expected to reach its assigned assembly area NLT 252000A Aug 19__near DRESDEN.

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(3) 3 Krasnovian Front is at 95-percent strength Planned commitment is thought to be in the zone of the 1 Krasnovian Front. Its lead armies are expected to cross the German-Polish border between 5 and 8 Sep 19.

(4) 4 Krasnovian Front is at 95 to 98-percent strength, and its planned commitment is toward the zone of the 2 Krasnovian Front. Its lead Aries, the 20 and 38 TAs. are expected to cross the German-Polish border between 5 and 7 Sep 19__.

(a) We expect the 20 TA. followed by the 17 GTA. to resume the attack in the 2 GTA zone. Both of these units are expected to be between 90-and 95percent strength when committed against X (US) Corps units.

(b) The 38 TA is expected to be at 95-percent strength when it is committed in the II (GE) Korps sector.

c. Tactics/Capabilities (General)

(1) The aim of the TVD commander is to resume offensive operations as soon as possible to accomplish the strategic objectives assigned to him by the Krasnovian Central Committee. The TVD commander will no doubt alter his concept of operation to take in the realities of the current situation. We should expect the TVD commander to focus his attack using one of four fronts as a main attack when he resumes the offensive.

(2) Using the broad front, multiple axis form of operational maneuver during the initial phase of his campaign, the TVD commander failed to reach his operational-strategic mission lines. Since he no longer has the required correlation of forces and means to resume the attack using this concept. we can expect him to attempt an operational encirclement.

d. Training Reports from captured Krasnovian soldiers indicate that extensive individual training emphasizing NBC protection was conducted just prior to hostilities. Captured soldiers from the 2 GTA also report extensive unit training in linkup operations with air assault or forward detachment units

(1) All units of the 1. 2. 3. and 4 Krasnovian Fronts arc well trained in individual skills, small-umt operations. and the employment of attack helicopters in a close air support role.

(2) Krasnovian training was thought to have the following negative aspects: the stifling of young leaders' initiative by overbearing and sometimes incompetent supervisors and some difficulty in training the non-Krasnovian-speaking conscripts. Indicators to date reflect the exact opposite.

(a) A byproduct of the breakup of the Soviet Union appears to be increased professionalism of junior NCOs and junior officers. A large number of the junior leaders have combat experience from the various conflicts that erupted throughout the former Soviet Union immediately after the breakup. In addition, almost all NCOs and officers have attended the appropriate military schools for their rank and experience. Reports from

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captured soldiers indicate these cadres haven't sustained heavy losses; therefore, small-unit leadership within Krasnovian units is still effective.

(b) Another effect of the breakup is a change in philosophy of the Krasnovian High Command. It appears that many units of the former republics were allowed to maintain their national identities when reintegration began. These two indicators reinforce the previous analysis that the Krasnovian soldier is well trained, experienced, and motivated.

e. Combat Service Support The initial movement of army and front materiel support brigades into built-up areas in western POLAND facilitated the rapid repair and return of materiel to the frontline units. Major combat service support activities have been identified in an area centered around the cities of ZARY (WT1020)--ZAGAN (WT2118)--SZPRPTAWA (WT3614)--KOZUCHOW (WT4132). These activities indicate this might be the support area for the front's materiel support brigade. If so, this capability may provide the 2 Krasnovian Front commander with the capability to regenerate battalion-sized motorized rifle and tank groupings quickly.

f Analysis of the Front and Krasnovian TVD Combat Effectiveness

(1) After analyzing the following factors, we have determined that the Krasnovian TVD and all fronts are fully combat effective depending on the immediate mission assigned to them. The 1 and 2 Krasnovian Fronts can only defend against II AAG. In the north, 1 Krasnovian Front now defends 1:2. In the center against X (US) Corps, the 2 GTX can defend 1:2, and in the II (GE) Corps sector, the 16 TA can defend 1:1.

(2) Other additional indicators include the following:

(a) Personnel strength is currently 70 to 75 percent of authorized personnel

(b) Weapon and equipment statuses throughout the Krasnovian TVD are between 50 and 75 percent on hand and combat ready. Equipment repairs may bring the 2 Krasnovian Front to 75 to 80 percent on hand and combat ready status by 1 Sep 19__.

(c) The status of training is discussed in paragraph 3d

(d) The NCO and officer corps are highly efficient, professional, and experienced

(e) Leaders from army to battalion levels are highly efficient and generally combat tested

(f) As a result of the different regional conflicts within the former Soviet Union, several of the units within all the Krasnovian fronts have combat experience.

(g) The performance of the units of the 1 and 2 Krasnovian Fronts has been of the highest standard, and indicators suggest the enemy soldiers still maintain their high morale.

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(h) Present unit commanders are the cream of the Krasnovian command selection and training system. They all followed the exclusive command career track with attendant experience and formal training. Many have received additional training at various foreign senior- and intermediate-level schools throughout the NATO membership and are familiar with the respective doctrine and weapon systems of those particular members.

(i) Morale, esprit, health, discipline, and political reliability are very high among the Krasnovian forces.

(j) Technical and logistic support throughout the TVD is combat ready. It is estimated that the TVD has 15 total days of supply for POL, ammunition, and supplies contained in materiel support units from front to regiment, with an additional 30 days of supply moving forward with the 3 and 4 Krasnovian Fronts.

g. Miscellaneous Data-Personalities

(1) Krasnovian TVD. Marshal of the Krasnovian Order Pavel Ivanovich Sazonov was appointed Krasnovian TVD commander 1 year ago. In addition to being the distinguished graduate of the Voroshilov General Staff Academy (1980), he also attended and did well at the US Army War College and several senior schools throughout Europe. He is in his early fifties and has extensive military experience. He fought in Afghanistan and the Georgian Civil War of 1993-94 and served as Commander, United Nations Forces-South Africa. He has written extensively on Krasnovian doctrinal matters, including space operations and the operational use of technology to increase the effectiveness of strategic-operational fire support and intelligence. He is considered to be the leading advocate of advanced technologies to enhance operational fire support and intelligence collection. He is an avid student of the deep-attack concept originally developed by Marshal Tuchechevsky in the 1930s and later refined by Marshal Ogarkov in the 1980s.

When reintegration of the former Soviet republics began, he designed the 10th of November Maneuvers that stretched from the North Sea to the Caspian Sea and from the western boundary of the Krasnovian alliance to the Urals. Three major significant events took place during those maneuvers. The first was the use of special operations forces; air assault units; forward detachments; and space platforms to detect, target, and destroy enemy operational reserves. The next major significant event was the use of air assault formations to conduct search and attack operations to secure key objectives within the inner ring of an encirclement. The effective use of this technique quickly destroys the cohesion of an encircled force's defense and reduces the time and resources needed by the Krasnovians to destroy a large encircled unit. The final significant event was the forward positioning of the front's materiel support brigade. Positioning the front materiel support brigade forward and using fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft to provide immediate transportation and distribution capabilities increases the overall responsiveness of the Krasnovian logistical system. Marshal Sazonov's appointment as the Krasnovian TVD commander indicates the Krasnovian High Command's apparent desire for an aggressive, bold, and innovative theater commander.

(2) 1 Krasnovian Front. * * *

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(3) 2 Krasnovian Front. General Vladimir Petrovich Podbielskiy, an ethnic Russian, has been in command of the 2 Krasnovian Front for less than a year. In addition to being the distinguished graduate in his Voroshilov General Staff Academy (1985), he was the first former Soviet officer invited to attend the US Army War College in 1990 after the breakup of the Soviet Union. His assignments include Director of Strategy at the prestigious Frunze Military Academy, commander of the 16 TA, and commander and chief of staff in the 1-4 Tank Division Northern Group of Forces. He is in his early forties and has earned a reputation as a brash, audacious commander. He has frequently been known to take risks and exceed the textbook possibilities of merely adhering to established correlation of forces and means. He is a published author of numerous articles on the operational art and mobile armored warfare.

(4) 3 Krasnovian Front. * * *

(5) 4 Krasnovian Front. General Alexander Ivanovich Garin assumed command of the 4 Krasnovian Front 6 months ago. He had previously been the 37 GTA chief of staff and, most recently, the 17 GTA commander. He graduated from the Voroshilov General Staff Academy in 1988. He has commanded an air assault brigade, a motorized rifle division, and a guards tank division. He has written several articles on employing motorized rifle forces in heliborne operations, including one dealing with using heliborne troops and independent motorized rifle regiments as forward detachments or operational groupings in offensive operations.

He participated in the Georgian Civil War of 1993-94 as the commander of the 71 GMRD. During his command of that unit, he demonstrated skill in organizing and executing multiple air envelopments combined with motorized rifle, tank and artillery groupings to encircle enemy forces sometimes three times the size of his division. He is considered by many as one of the boldest and most aggressive commanders in the Krasnovian military today. During the 10th of November Maneuvers, as commander of the 17 GTA, he executed a 450-kilometer-deep attack destroying the enemy's operational reserve. He accomplished this by employing the principles developed by Marshal Sazonov and the techniques he pioneered as the commander of the 71 GMRD during the Georgian Civil War.

4. WEATHER

a. Existing Situation.

(1) General. No major changes in the weather are expected for the next 10 days.

(2) Precipitation

(a) Current precipitation is normal; precipitation for the next 10 days is expected to be within the normal range.

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Precipitation (Inches)

Month	LEIPZIG (396)	FULDA (892)	KLEINER FELDBERG (2622)	DRESDEN (721)	NEUWEID (220)
Aug	2	2	2	2	7
Sep	2	2	2	2	2
*	*	*	*	*	*

(3) Temperature. Temperatures are expected to be higher than normal during the nest 10-day period.

(4) Relative Humidity. Due to the moist northwesterly airflow, the air will have a higher moisture content, combined with higher temperatures and longer days. For the nest 10 days, the relative humidity will be lower than normal, ranging from 60 to 75 percent.

(5) Winds. The Ion-level airflow over the area is northwesterly. Surface winds, wind direction, and wind speeds reflect this flow pattern; however, terrain differences often cause many local deviations. Windspeeds reach maximums in the afternoon in association with maximum solar heating.

(6) Fog. Fog is the primary restriction to visibility and is generally confined to hours around sunrise. During the nest 10 days, fog should be infrequent with visibility less than 4 kilometers occurring 1 or 2 days.

Light Data (22 August 19- to 5 Sep 19_-)

Date	<u>BMNT</u>	<u>BMCT</u>	<u>EECT</u>	<u>EENT</u>	<u>Moonrise</u>	<u>Moonset</u>
22 Aug	0341	0428	1956	2042	1759	0140
24 Aug	0345	0431	1951	2037	1837	0402
26 Aug	0350	0435	1947	2032	1906	0635
28 Aug	0354	0438	1940	2027	1937	0851
30 Aug	0358	0442	1938	2021	2020	1127
01 Sep	0403	0445	1933	2016	2125	1402
03 Sep	0404	0447	1928	2011	2334	1602
05 Sep	0410	0452	1924	2005	0111	1714

b. Effect on Enemy Courses of Action

(1) Precipitation may hinder cross-country movement.

(2) Westerly winds may affect Krasnovian employment of nonpersistent chemical agent

(3) Good visibility will not favor Krasnovian attack.

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c. Effect on Own Courses of Action

- (1) Precipitation may hinder cross-country movement.
- (3) Westerly winds will not affect our use of NBC
- (3) Good visibility will favor our defense

5. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

a Enemy Capabilities. The Krasnovian TVD is capable of resuming offensive operations within the next 10 days. Once the strategic second echelon reaches the GERMAN-POLISH border, the TVD commander will have sufficient combat power to conduct an operational-level encirclement and support combat operations for an additional 30 to 25 days. The TVD commander is expected to employ extensive deception operations before committing the second strategic echelon in an attempt to deceive the II AAG commander as to the time of the attack and direction of the lines of operation the TVD will use to reach its strategic and operational objectives.

b Enemy Vulnerabilities. Since the beginning of hostilities, four major vulnerabilities to Krasnovian forces have been identified.

(1) The Krasnovian Army is vulnerable to air interdiction forward of PL ARGON CAS is also effective against regimental and battalion elements.

(2) The general populations of POLAND and the CZECH and SLOVAK REPUBLICS are openly hostile to Krasnovian troops as a result of the previous occupation and stationing of Soviet troops in these countries. While Czech forces are openly engaging the Krasnovian forces, SLOVAK REPUBLIC armed forces have remained in their garrisons. This seems to be an attempt by political leaders of the SLOVAK REPUBLIC to avoid any pretext for Krasnovian interference within their domestic affairs. In POLAND, a fairly extensive and aggressive partisan organization has formed, and an increasing number of partisan activities have occurred over the last 5 days. This will increase the effectiveness of our intelligence-gathering efforts and provide increasing opportunities for the use of special operations forces in conducting direct action, strategic reconnaissance, unconventional warfare (UW), and search and rescue (SAR) activities.

(3) Enemy formations rely heavily on traffic control parties (TCPs) to quickly move motorized and tank units along multiple routes. Eliminating these control elements can delay the commitment of divisional elements at the appointed time and place desired by the front and army commanders.

(4) While the Krasnovian Army has made technological advances in applying operational intelligence and fires, its regiments and divisions still lack advanced fire direction and target acquisition capabilities. This deficiency in their force structure means the enemy's RAGs and DAGs are more susceptible to NATO counterfire operations.

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c. Conclusions. The current operational pause by the Krasnovian TVD is expected to end between 3 and 5 September 19. The most likely enemy COA is to conduct an operational encirclement with the main attack through the X(US) Corps and supporting attacks to fix NATO forces in the 1st (NL) Corps and II (GE) Korps sectors. The line of operation will mostly focus on HANNOVER, using the HANNOVER-BERLIN urban sprawl and the canal systems between the two cities as a barrier, encircling both X (US) Corps and 1st (NL) Corps elements. Once the encirclement is complete, the outer ring most likely will orient on BREMEN. If successful three to five division equivalents will be encircled, the X (US) Corps destroyed, and 1st (NL) Corps and BALTAP in danger of encirclement

ACKNOWLEDGE

APPLEBY
General

OFFICIAL:
VON MUELLER
G2


Annexes: A-Current Enemy Situation sketch
B-Order of Battle-Second Strategic Echelon
C-Most Probable Enemy COA

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ANNEX A (CURRENT ENEMY SITUATION SKETCH) to PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
NO 1-II Allied Army Group



NOTE: The pie-shaped circles beneath each unit are combat effectiveness graphics. They are explained in FM 101-5-1, page 3-2.

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ANNEX B (ORDER OF BATTLE-SECOND STRATEGIC ECHELON) to PERIODIC
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 1-II Allied Army Group**3 Krasnovian Front**

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

4 Krasnovian Front


20 TA	17 Hi -Powered Arty Bde (2S7)
5 MRD (BMP-2/T-80)	UI hv arty bn (2S7)
21 MRD (BMP-2/T-80)	UI hv arty bn (2S7)
13 TD (T-80)	UI hv mort bn (2S4)
	UI hv mort bn (2S4)
38 TA	
29 MRD (BMP-1/T-72)	UI engr bde
72 MRD (BMP-2/T-80)	
45 TD (T-80)	UI cml prot bde
17 GTA	UI <i>spetsnaz</i> bde
52 GMRD (BMP-2/T-80)	
71 GMRD (BMP-2/T-80)	UI sig bde
19 GTD (T-80)	
79 TD (T-80)	UI sig bde
29 TD (T-72)	
	UI mat spt bde
12 IMRR (BMP-2/T-80)	
	7 SAM sde (SA-4)
<u>Front-Level Units</u>	
63 GTD (T-80) (17 GTA) [<u>Front</u> reserve]	10 SAM Bde (SA-12)
	UI SSM bde (Scud-B)
UI AASLT Bde	
UI AASLT Bn	UI SSM bde (Scud-B)
UI AASLT Bn	UI SSM bde (Scud-B)
UI Para Bn	
UI Recon Co	Various other CS and CSS units
UI Arty Division	Air Forces of the Front
UI gun bde (2S5)	two UI ftr divs
UI how bde (2S3)	two UI ftr-bmr divs
UI how bde (2S3)	two UI trans hel regts
	one indep recon rcgt

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ANNEX C (MOST PROBABLE ENEMY COURSE OF ACTION) to PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE
SUMMARY NO 1-II Allied Army Group

Operational Encirclement of X (US) and 1st (NL) Corps



FUNDAMENTALS OF ECHELONS ABOVE DIVISION COMBAT OPERATIONS**Chapter 8. X (US) Corps OPLAN 6099 (DEPUTY DAWG)**

In this extension of the general scenario first introduced in M/S320A, you will solve a corps-level tactical problem and work within the framework of the LANDCENT COP CRASHING FIST, provided in Chapter 5 of this staff planning book. As you recall, II AAG did not develop a separate plan.

The X (US) Corps OPLAN DEPUTY DAWG provided the overall plan for a mobile defense that the corps executed to defeat the attack of the Krasnovian 2 GTA. Whereas in M/S320A you used X (US) Corps OPLAN DEPUTY DAWG (phase 111) as a basis to develop the 25th Armd Div tactical plan. in M/S320B, you will use the corps plan (now an operation order (OPORD)) along with additional scenario information. as a point of departure to plan the corps sequel to phase III.

The X (US) Corps OPLAN 6099 (DEPUTY DAWG) is presented on the following pages. A series of asterisks (* * *) indicates that material has been omitted intentionally.

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Copy _ of _ copies
X (US) corps
GERSFELD (NA6589). GE
150001A Jul 199-
AZ 14

OPERATION PLAN 6099 (DEPUTY DAWG)

References: Maps, JOG Series 1501, GERMANY, 1:250,000.

JOG Series 1501, GERMANY, sheet NM32-2 (KASSEL), edition 4-DMG.

JOG Series 1501, GERMANY, sheet NM32-3 (HALLE), edition 4-DMG.

JOG Series 1501, GERMANY, sheet NM32-5 (FRANKFURT AM MAIN), edition 3-DMG.

JOG Series 1501, GERMANY. sheet NM32-6 (ERFURT), edition 5-DMG.

JOG Series 1501, GERMANY, sheet NM32-8 (MANNHEIM). edition 6-DMG.

JOG Series 1501. GERMANY, sheet NM32-9 (NURNBERG), edition 5-DMG.

JOG Series 1501, GDR sheet NM33-1 (LEIPZIG). edition 4-GSGS

JOG Series 1501. GDR sheet NM33-2 (GORLITZ). edition 4-GSGS.

JOG Series 1501, GDR sheet NM33-4 (KARL-MARX-STADT). edition 5-DMG.

JOG Series 1501, GDR sheet NM33-5 (PRAGUE). edition 3-GSGS.

JOG Series 1501, GDR sheet NM33-7 (PILSEN). edition 5-DMG.

JOG Series 1501, GDR sheet NN32-11 (HANNOVER). edition 5-DMG.

JOG Series 1501, GDR sheet NN32-12 (MAGDEBURG). edition 4-DMG

JOG Series 1501, GDR sheet NN33-10 (BERLIN). edition 4-GSGS.

JOG Series 1501, GDR sheet NN33-11 (FRANKFURT AM ODER), edition 3-GSGS

Time Zone Used Throughout the Plan: ALPHA.

Task Organization: Annex A (Task Organization)

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OPLAN 6099-X (US) Corps (DEPUTY DAWG)

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces Annex B (Intelligence). X (US) Corps is opposed by the 2 CTA, which is expected to make the main attack for the 2 Krasnovian Front. The 2 GTA is expected to move quickly into eastern GERMANY with immediate missions west of the ELBE River and subsequent missions west of the THURINGER WALD toward KASSEL, FULDA, and COBERG. The 2 GTA will most probably attack with two MRDs in the first echelon, two tank divisions in the second echelon, and the IMRR in reserve.

b. Friendly- Forces

(1) LANDCENT Commander's Intent. The purpose of this operation is to defeat the 0Krasnovian TVD. I intend to destroy the 1 Krasnovian Front, which is making the TVD main attack, while defeating the 2 Krasnovian Front, which is making the TVD supporting attack. To accomplish this, LANDCENT will defend forward in sector, significantly reducing the combat capabilities of the first operational echelon. Forward units will identify and contain the enemy main effort. When sufficient operational reserves are built up, we will counterattack to destroy the enemy's second operational echelon army. I will accept risk along our southern flank and by maintaining a small reserve. On conclusion of this operation, we must have secured the LANDCENT sector, the enemy must be incapable of regimental or higher operations, the borders with POLAND and the CZECH REPUBLIC must be restored, we must have prepared a coherent defense, and our forces must be disposed for future defense in support of AFCENT plans.

(2) 1st (NL) Corps defends in sector along a line from MURITZEE to BRANDENBURG to WITTENBERG

(3) II (GE) Corps defends in sector along the German-Czech border from TR9706600 to UQ690430 to defeat the 16 TA

(4) Military District Command VIII (8th PzGren Div) defends and delays in sector along the German Polish border forward of 1st (NL) Corps

(5) Military District Command VII (7th PzGren Div) defends and delays in sector along the German-Polish border forward of X (US) Corps

(6) LANDCENT reserve is 1st (BE) Corps

(7) Elements of AIRCENT support X (US) Corps. AIRCENT provides continuous J-STARS support.

(8) German Korps South provides assistance for rear area operations and/or host nation support,

c. Attachments and Detachments. Annex A (Task Organization)

d. Assumptions

(1) Only Krasnovian forces will initiate a ground invasion of NATO territory

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(2) Krasnovian forces may use chemical weapons but are expected to use tactical nuclear weapons only in retaliation.

(3) The NATO indications and warning system will provide a minimum of 180 days' learning of Krasnovian preparations for attack and 72 hours warnings of attack into NATO territory.

(1) Deployment prior to D-day cannot be east of the former national boundary (PL QUASAR) or into the CZECH REPUBLIC. After D-day, maneuver forces cannot cross the German-Polish border

(5) German Korps East will be mobilized and defend in position along the Polish border on D-day.

(6) Local air superiority will be achieved on or about D+3

2. MISSION

On order. X (US) Corps defends in sector to destroy the 2 GTA to cause the defeat of the 2 Krasnovian Front

3. EXECUTION

INTENT Our purpose is to defeat the 2 Krasnovian Front destroying the 2 GTA as it attacks into our sector. Thus will allow LANDCENT to restore the borders and prepare to conduct offensive operations in support of the AFCENT campaign plan. I intend to destroy the 2 GTA by using a mobile defense. We'll establish conditions for the decisive operation by using a firepower-oriented force positioned well forward. Then, using the majority of the corps maneuver forces positioned farther back, we'll attack to destroy remaining forces in the corps area of operation. Our success will be measured by having destroyed the 3 GTA, being positioned to attack north, and establishing the conditions to allow German Korps East to attack to restore the German-Polish border.

a Concept of Operation Annex C (Operation Overlay)

(1) Maneuver. This is a three-phased operation. During phase I, the corps will move to initial defensive positions while 7th Pz Gren Div delays the 2 GTA forward of PL X-RAY. After assuming the sector from 7th Pz Gren Div, the corps will conduct deep operations with 10th Avn Bde; 68th and 67th FA Bdes; and BAI, CAS, and IEW. They will destroy the two first-echelon divisions of the 2 GTA forward of PL NEUTRON. 4th CMBG and 209th ACR will establish a cover along PL NELTRON. During phase II, 209th ACR (main effort) will delay the northern threat second-echelon division, and the 4th CMBG will screen the southern threat second-echelon division. This will allow the corps to shape the movement of the second-echelon divisions so that the southern division will be forward (west) of the northern division as phase III starts. During phase III, 52d Mech Div will defend in sector while corps deep fires and Army aviation continue to shape the enemy. The 25th Armd Div. as **the main** effort, and 4th Pz Gren Div will attack into the flanks of the remaining Krasnovian divisions within their Zones. This will complete the destruction of the 2 GTA. The corps will then reconstitute in AAs along its north boundary in preparation for future operations to the north. No reserve is planned in phases I and II. 4th CMBG becomes X (US) Corps reserve in phase III.

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(a) Phase I. On order, elements of X (US) Corps move from tactical assembly areas into defensive positions. 7th PzGren Div. German Korps East, already forward in the corps sector, delays the 2 GTA forward of PL X-RAY until H+24. This will allow time for the X (US) Corps deep operations assets to occupy positions behind PL NEUTRON. X (US) Corps will accept responsibility for the sector from 7th PzGren Div at H+24. 7th PzGren Div will then conduct passage through 4th CMBG and 209th ACR and occupy AA SOLAR. 4th CMBG and 209th ACR cover along PL NEUTRON to destroy all reconnaissance and forward detachments to protect forces in AOs CHARM and STRANGE and deny the threat intelligence regarding our plans and dispositions. 67th FA Bde occupies AO CHARM. 68th FA Bde occupies AO STRANGE. 10th Avn Bde occupies AA ONE in AO STRANGE and AA TWO in AO CHARM Corps aviation. artillery, CAS, BAI, and IEW. as the corps main effort. will conduct operations to destroy the southern lead division of the army prior to its arrival at PL NEUTRON while delaying the northern division. After corps destroys the southern division. it will destroy the northern division. Both divisions will be destroyed east of PL NEUTRON. 52d Mech Div establishes an area defense in its sector. 25th Armd Div and 4th PzGren Div occupy TAAs and prepare for offensive operations. 52d Mech Div provides one ground brigade (two battalion TFs) as the tactical combat force (TCF) Priority of TCF commitment is to protect forces sustaining the deep operations along PL NEUTRON The corps u-ill accept risk on its north and south flanks. Flank security will be provided by corps and echelons above corps IEW between PL QUASAR and PL NEUTRON. There is no corps reserve.

(b) Phase II. This phase begins when the 4th CMBG and 209th ACR start to withdraw from PL NEUTRON. 209th ACR delays the northern threat division in sector as the main effort. allows no penetration of PL PROTON until H+120 or OO, and then defends along PL BLAST to force the threat northern division to move south. 4th CMBG screens the southern threat division in sector and OO withdraws screen to TAA ELECTRON west of PL QUASAR 52d Mech Div continues to prepare defenses in sector as in phase I. 25th Armd Div and 4th PzGren Div remain in TAAs and prepare for offensive operations. 52d Mech Div continues to provide one ground brigade (two battalion TFs) to the rear area operations center (RAOC) as the TCF. TCF priority of commitment is to protect withdrawing forces in support of the deep operations. 4th CMBG assumes corps reserve after reconstitution in TAA SOLAR. The corps will accept risk on its flanks as in phase I.

(c) Phase III. This phase will begin when the lead regiments of the southern threat division have crossed PL BARIUM or OO. The 25th Armd Div and 4th PzGren Div will then move to and attack in zone 25th Armd Div. as the corps main effort. destroys first-echelon regiments of the second-echelon divisions. 4th PzGren Div. supporting attack. will destroy second-echelon regiments of the second-echelon divisions. 52d Mech Div, supporting effort, continues to defend in sector to blunt any penetrations. 10th Avn Bde will fix the northern threat division north of PL GAMMA RAY and the southern threat division south of PL GAMMA RAY to allow the 25th Armd Div and the 4th PzGren Div to destroy the southern division and then the northern division sequentially. OO, 10th Avn Bde will assist destruction of remaining 2 GTA forces north of PL GAMMA RAY. No change in corps TCF. TCF priority for commitment is to protect forces sustaining the main and supporting attack and then to forces being reconstituted 4th CMBG continues as corps reserve with priority of counterattack planning to 52d Mech Div. At the completion of the destruction of the 2 GTA, 52d Mech Div, 25th Armd Div, 4th PzGren Div, 209th ACR and 4th CMBG occupy AAs HAWKINGS, EINSTEIN, FERMI, CURIE, and GRAVES respectively. OO, 52d Mech Div, 25th Armd Div. and 4th PzGren Div establish screens along boundary between X (US) Corps and 1st (NL) Corps. Phase III ends when the corps completes the destruction

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of the 2 GTA, has secured its northern boundary and eastern flank and is in assembly areas ready for reconstitution.

(2) Fires. Annex F (Fire Support). Corps fire support (in conjunction with BAI, IEW, and attack helicopters) will disrupt the 2 GTA attack, delay arrival of follow-on echelons in support of the scheme of maneuver, and shape the 2 GTA's advance to established engagement areas. Lethal and nonlethal fires will disrupt or destroy high-payoff targets (HPTs) during each phase of the operation, thus defeating the army in detail. Targets will be attacked LAW the attack guidance matrices developed for each phase of the operation and each preplanned aviation brigade mission.

(a) Phase I. From H to H+20, the corps will position two GS artillery brigades forward and will use the aviation brigade to support deep operations NLT H+24. During this time, corps will delay and disrupt the first-echelon divisions and supporting army CS and CSS with limited BAI, EAC assets, and IEW cast to the RIPL, and SOF special reconnaissance and direct-action missions east of the border (see PIR for phase I). After X (US) Corps assumes responsibility for the sector, corps army aviation artillery, IEW, and BAI will be the corps main effort and will destroy the southern lead division of the army forward of PL NEUTRON while continuing to delay and disrupt the northern lead division. The main effort will shift to the destruction of the northern division after the southern division is destroyed.

(b) Phase II. Priority of fires is to 209th ACR to delay and disrupt the follow-on divisions in the north to prevent penetration of PL PROTON until H+120 or OO. Corps deep fires will also limit the southern second-echelon division to continuing west along avenue of approach E. Priority of fires will then shift to 4th PzGren Div to prevent the southern division from attacking south along avenue of approach G. The intent of the corps fires during this phase is to delay the second-echelon divisions by limiting the 2 GTA's advance to facilitate our two-division attack into his flank during phase III. Corps deep fires will focus on the disruption of the army's fire support, army-level surveillance, ADA fire control radars, and CSS.

(c) Phase III. Priority of fires to 25th Armd Div and 4th PzGren Div, in order. On destruction of the follow-on divisions, priority shifts to 4th CMBG and 4th PzGren Div to block any remaining 2 GTA Forces west of PL ROD, Corps fires will then focus on destroying any army reserve and reducing any encircled enemy forces. At the end of phase III, the corps artillery must be in a position to support a corps counterattack to the north.

(3) Counterair Operations. Annex G (Air Defense). The concept for counterair operations M-ill be to initially weight the protection of deep operations forces and their sustainment operations during Phase I. During phases II and III, the priority is to protect the 25th Armd Div and 4th PzGren Div and their sustainment operations. Throughout all phases, critical CSS assets and operations must be protected. During Phases II and III, 209th ACR will require additional protection as well. To meet these competing priorities, we will accept risk to the bulk of the corps combat and CSS assets by providing area coverage using Patriot assets. Positioning of counterair assets will be to deep operations elements and critical CSS assets and operations during phase I; 67th and 68th FA Bdes, 209th ACR and critical CSS assets and operations, in order, during phase II; and 25th Armd Div, 4th PzGren Div, 68th FA Bde, 209th ACR and critical CSS assets and operations, in order, during phase III. Incidental coverage to 7th PzGren Div during phases I and II as high-to-medium air defense assets allow.

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(4) Intelligence. Annex B (Intelligence). Priority of tasks throughout each phase is to nuclear and/or chemical indicators and warnings. identification of threat main effort. response to corps deception plan. deep operations targeting, commitment of front au assault (AASLT) brigade and 2 GTA AASLT battalion, and identification of rear area threats. in order. During phase I, intelligence sources must identify the main effort. determine if 2 GTA attacks with two or three divisions in the first echelon. and conduct battle damage assessment of phase I operations. Monitoring corps NAIs forward of PL NEUTRON is essential. During phase II. intelligence must continue to identify 2 GTA main effort and maintain the locations of first- and second-echelon regiments, the IMRR, and the army reserve. During phase III, intelligence sources will monitor the location of the threat regiments. detect follow-on forces moving toward the corps zone, and support IPB for future operations.

(5) Electronic warfare. Corps EW will augment implementation of the corps deception plan through all phases of the operation. During phase I. EW assets n-ill assist in the delay of the northern threat divisions and destruction of the southern threat divisions. Targeting priorities are to disrupt ADA and artillery C² and RSTA high-payoff targets (HPTs). in order. Phase II operations will assist the 209th ACR delay of the northern division. Targeting priorities are to disrupt division and army ADA, artillery C² HPTs. and artillery HPTs. in order. Phase III priority is to support the attack of the 25th Armd Div and 4th PzGren Div. Targeting priorities are to disrupt division and army ADA. artillery C² HPTs. and artillery HPTs. in order

(6) Engineer. Annex D (Engineer) Phase I priority is initially to mobility, movement of deep operations forces. and CSS forward of PLs LIGHT and XENON. then to countermobility and construction of obstacles to support the disengagement of 7th PzGrc., Div Phase II priority is to countermobility to delay the advance of the northern division and then to mobility to support the operations of 209th ACR and 4th CMBG. Phase III priority is to mobility to support the attacks of the 25th Armd Div and the 4th PzGren Div. OO, priority shifts to mobility in support of 4th CMBG: OO to reestablishment of road. rail. and air LOCs to division assembly areas. and. OO, to countermobility to protect the corps during reconstitution efforts.

(7) Deception. Annex L (Deception). The target of the corps deception plan is the 2 GTA commander. The objective of our deception is to get the 2 GTA to attack in two echelons with two divisions in its first echelon and to attack directly to the west instead of the south or northwest. The corps deception story is that X (US) Corps defends forward of the former IGB with its main effort in the south and with a heavy covering force located well forward.

b. Tasks to Maneuver Units

(1) 52d Mech Div.

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(a) Phases I, II. and III.

1. Defend in sector to block threat second-echelon divisions from advancing beyond PL LIGHT to prevent the threat from escaping the corps attack in phase III.

2. Provide a brigade (two battalion TFs) to form the corps TCF.

3. Construct obstacles in barrier zones D26, D25, D27, F02, F03, F05, F04, and F06, in order.

(b) Phase III.

1. OO, occupy AA HAWKINGS to prepare for an attack north.

2. Screen the corps northern flank between PL QUASAR and PL LIGHT while occupying AA HAWKING S

3. Be prepared to attack in 25th Armd Div and 4th PzGren Div zones to clear threat forces from the corps sector

4. Be prepared to become the corps reserve after commitment of 4th CMBG if threat situation dictates a reserve requirement.

(2) 75th Armd Div.

(a) Phases I and II

1. Occupy AA and prepare for offensive operations.

2. Construct obstacles in barrier zones D24 and C08.

(b) Phase III

1. OO. attack in zone to destroy threat forces to cause the destruction of 2 GTA

2. OO, occupy AA EINSTEIN and prepare to attack north

3. Be prepared to attack into 4th PzGren Div zone.

(3) 4th PrGren Division

(a) Phases I and II

1. Occupy AA and prepare for offensive operations

2. Construct obstacles in barrier zone D23

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(b) Phase III.

1. OO. attack in zone to destroy threat forces in zone to cause the destruction of 2 GTA
2. OO. occupy AA FERMI and prepare to attack north
3. Be prepared to attack into the 25th Armd Div zone.
4. Be prepared to attack east to occupy defensive positions along PL ARGON or as a supporting attack for 7th PzGren Div phase III attack.

(4) 4th CMBG.

(a) Phase I.

1. Cover along PL NEUTRON to prevent threat forward detachments. advance guards, or reconnaissance forces from penetrating PL NEUTRON to protect forces in AO CHARM
2. Assist the passage of the 7th PzGren Div.
3. Construct obstacles in barrier zones B02, B01, B/A05 (with support from 7th PzGren Div), C06 and C05, in order.

(b) Phase II.

1. Screen in zone forward of PL PROTON to obtain intelligence on southern threat division and destroy reconnaissance forces.
2. OO, withdraw screen, occupy AA ELECTRON, reconstitute. and assume corps reserve mission

(c) Phase III.

1. Priority of counterattack planning is to 52d Mech Div.
2. OO, move to and occupy AA GRAVES.
3. OO, screen along PL ROD from PL ORBIT to PL BLAST.

(5) 10th Avn Bde.

(a) Phase I.

1. Occupy AA ONE in AO STRANGE and AA TWO in AO CHARM

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2. Be prepared to assist 7th PzGren Div withdrawal along PL X-RAY

3. OO, attack in corps designated TAIs to destroy the first-echelon divisions of the 2 GTA to establish the conditions for the corps attack in Phase III.

4. OO, or when 209th ACR and 4th CMBG begin to delay and displace from PL NEUTRON. occupy AAs THREE and FOUR.

(b) Phase II.

1. OO, conduct operations forward of 209th ACR. Priority for operations planning is delaying the northern threat division. locating and destroying the IMRR and 2 GTA reserve. then supporting the blocking of the threat along PL BLAST, in order.

2. Assist 4th CMBG in withdrawal of screen; then maintain contact with the southern second-echelon division. Protect 25th Armd Div and 4th PzGren Div by destroying enemy ground reconnaissance elements south of PL GAMMA RAY.

(c) Phase III

1. OO, attack to fix the lead regiments of either second-echelon divisions until the 25th Armd Div and 4th PzGren Div can close with and destroy them while simultaneously locating and destroying the 2 GTA reserves.

2. Be prepared to support screens along the corps not-them boundary.

(6) 209th ACR.

(a) Phase I

1. Cover along PL NEUTRON to prevent threat forward detachments and reconnaissance forces from penetrating PL NEUTRON to protect forces in AO STRANGE.

2. Assist the passage of 7th PzGren Div.

3. Construct obstacles in barrier zones B03, B04, C02, and B06. in order

(b) Phase II.

1. Delay the northern threat division forward of PL PROTON until H+120 or OO.

2. Construct obstacles in barrier zones C07, C11, C01, and C09. in order

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3. OO, defend along PL BLAST to limit the threat to avenue of approach E.

(c) Phase III

1. Defend along PL BLAST to limit northern threat division to avenue of approach E to position threat forces for attack by 25th Armd Div and 4th PzGren Div.

2. OO, occupy AA CURIE. reconstitute. and prepare to continue the attack north

c. Tasks to Combat Support Units

(1) Fire Support

(a) Air Support

1. BAI and TAR Corps will retain control of all BAI and TAR allocations. Corps anticipates 25 BAI and 10 TAR sorties daily from D-day through D+3; 40 BAI and 10 TAR sorties daily from D+4 through D+6. BAI missions allocated after D+3 will be used to isolate the 2 GTA from other front-assets and supplies.

2. CAS (allocations for planning purposes)

	D-Day	D+1	D+2	D+3	D+4	D+5	D+6
52d Mech Div	0	0	0	0	0	0	30
4th PzGren Div	0	0	0	0	40	60	20
25th Armd Div	0	0	0	0	90	100	30
4th CMBG	0	10	30	30	0	0	0
10th Avn Bde	0	50	50	70	20	0	0
209th ACR	0	10	30	70	30	0	0
Corps control	0	<u>30</u>	<u>40</u>	<u>30</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>40</u>	<u>40</u>
TOTAL	0	100	150	200	200	200	120

(b) Chemical * * *

(c) Field Artillery Support

1. General

a. 67th and 68th FA Bde MLRS launchers will be configured for ATACMS and will remain that way for the operation.

b. Organization for Combat, Annex A (Task Organization)

2. Phase I

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a. 68th and 67th FA Bdes will move to AOs STRANGE and CHARM respectively. Be prepared to conduct operations NLT H+23.

b. Fires will be planned in corps-designated TAIs. The decision to implement these fires will be based on actions at corps NAIs and decision points as reflected on corps decision support template.

c. 67th and 68th FA Bdes will fire required SEAD for 10th Avn Bde

d. 52d Mech DIVARTY will clear all fires south of PL XENON and forward of PL LIGHT with 25th Armd Div.

3. Phase II

a. 68th FA Bde will occupy AO SPACE. GS to X (US) Corps

b. 67th FA Bde GS to X (US) Corps positioned within 4th CMBG AO;oo position south of PL MASS to be coordinated directly with 4th PzGren Div and 25th Armd Div.

c. 52d ntech DIVARTY will clear all fires south of PL XENON and east of PL URANIUM with 25th Armd Div.

4. Phase III. OO, PL GAMMA RAY or PL ORBIT will be an RFL between the 209th ACR in the north and the advancing 25th Armd Div and the 4th PzGren Div in the south

(d) Nuclear Fire Support * * *

(e) Miscellaneous.

1. Coordinating Instructions. * * *

2. CSR * * *

3. Unexpended ordnance will be jettisoned into corps free-fire areas.

(2) Air Defense. * * *

(3) 53d Engr Bde. * * *

(4) 10th ADA Bde * * *

(5) 40th Cm1 Bdc * * *

(6) 20th MI Bde * * *

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(7) 20th MP Bde. * * *

(8) 70th Sig Bde. * * *

(9) 200th PYSOP Bn. * * *

(10) 10th CA Bde. * * *

(11) 110th Press Camp HQ. * * *

d. Coordinating Instructions

(1) This plan is effective for planning on receipt and implementation on order.

(2) CCIR. What are the 2 Krasnovian Front commander' s opportunities and capabilities to secure crossings over the ELBE and MULDE Rivers? How can X (US) Corps deny him?

(a) PIR.

1. Phase I.

- a. Where are the lead threat divisions and regiments''
- b. How are the threat divisions echeloned?
- c. How is the threat reacting to the corps deception plan' !
- d. Is the threat preparing to use chemical or nuclear weapons?

2. Phase II.

- a. Where are the lead threat divisions' reconnaissance battalions or forward detachments' ?
- b. What is the disposition and strength of the two first-echelon divisions?
- c. What is the location and disposition of the 13 IMRR?
- d. Where are the two independent helicopter regiments. the 37 Indep AASLT Bn. and the heavy lift regiment?
- e. Where are the 2 GTA' s two ponton bridge regiments, two assault crossing battalions, and the engineer brigades?

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2. Phase III

- a. Where are the lead and trail regiments of the second-echelon division?
- b. Where are the 13 IMRR and the 2 GTA reserve?

(b) EEFI

- 1. The attack plans of 25th Armd Div and 4th PzGren Div.
- 2. Composition and disposition of forces in AOs STRANGE and CHARM.

(c) FFIR. Will the maneuver forces of the corps be configured and postured to rapidly transition to offensive operations' ?

(3) Antiterrorist Actions. Barricade all high-speed avenues of approach into rear area facilities to reduce entering traffic to a maximum speed of 10 kmph. All entry points will be manned by armed guards

(4) Au Defense Weapons Status. Per TSOP

(5) MOPP

(a) Phase I. Level 1: 209th ACR 4th CMBG, 10th Avn Bde, 68th and 67th FA Bdes. Level 0: remainder of corps.

(b) Phase II/III. Level I.

(6) Troop Safety.

- (a) Phase I: negligible risk to unwarned exposed personnel
- (b) Phase II: negligible risk to warned exposed personnel.

(7) When the 25th Armd Div crosses the LD, its north boundary will be extended to PL XENON

(8) When the 25th Armd Div crosses PL XENON, its north boundary will be extended to PL GAMMA RAY.

(9) When the 25th Armd Div crosses PL GAMMA RAY. its north boundary will be extended to PL ORBIT.

(10) Counterfratricide Measures. All leaders will minimize the potential for fratricide by complying with all procedural and positive (P²) controls and countermeasures specified by TSOP.

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(11) Priority of road movement initially to deep operations forces (phase I), then corps reserve on commitment.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT

a. Concept of Support. 10th (US) COSCOM must accept risk with support units to provide continuous support to X (US) Corps deep operations. Support operations will require extensive use of rail and highway transportation modes and emergency augmentation by aerial resupply with X (US) Corps aviation assets. 10th (US) COSCOM will coordinate use of rail assets with TAMCA and host nation. German Territorial Forces have primary responsibility for support of 7th PzGren Div and 4th PzDiv. 10th (US) COSCOM will coordinate Integration of host nation support forces into traffic circulation plans and provide fuel, medical, and limited ammunition support on an as-required basis. 10th COSCOM will provide combat service support with the 70th CSG (Rear), 13th CSG (Fwd), 14th CSG (Fwd), and the 80th Med Bde.

(1) Support Before the Operation. On M-day or OO, 10th (US) COSCOM GS units will deploy to wartime locations east of PL QUASAR to distribute supply shortages to deploying corps units. Division, separate brigade, ACR units, and DSUs deploy to wartime positions and draw remaining basic load and DS stocks from designated forward storage sites. COSCOM will retain combat vehicles received front theater for reconstitution activities. Initial priority on MSRs is to unit movements to assembly areas east of PL QUASAR, then to movement of supplies and equipment. Priority of COSCOM transportation assets to movement of classes I, III, V, and IV. Initial priority of support is to ACRs, aviation brigades, and artillery brigades of the covering force. COSCOM will form 15th CSG (Prov), under command of deputy COSCOM commander, to provide DS to covering force operations east of PL NEUTRON and deep operations conducted by field artillery and aviation brigades. 13th CSG (Fwd) priority of support is to 35th Armd Div; 14th CSG (Fwd) priority to 52d Mech Div and corps TCFs, in order.

(2) Support During Phase I. 10th (US) COSCOM priority of support during this phase is to the 15th CSG (Prov), which will deploy with covering force units to support locations vic MERSEBURG (QB000970). COSCOM will forward supplies to covering force area via rail assets of 714th Ry Bn. Priority of shipments is class V, III, IV, and IX, in order. Unit distribution of supplies will be made to regimental support areas, AAs ONE and TWO, and AOs CHARM and STRANGE. Initial priority of support is to 209th ACR, 68th and 69th FA Bdes, then to 10th Avn Bde, in order. Covering force units will limit repairs to 23 hours or request evacuation of reparable equipment to railhead at MERSEBURG. Priority of rail evacuation is to attack helicopters, MLRSs, howitzers, and tanks, in order. Air evacuation of URGENT patients goes to 85th MASH; all other medevacs will be to medical facilities in corps rear. 14th CSG (Fwd) will provide DS to corps TCF units operating between PL PROTON and PL NEUTRON. 15th CSG (Prov) has backup support responsibility for the 7th PzGren Div during passage of lines. ACRs will provide required assistance with maintenance and evacuation and area medical support. Priority of support then shifts to ACRs, FA brigades, and aviation brigades in order.

(3) Support During Phase II. 10th (US) COSCOM initial priority of support during this phase is to 15th CSG (Prov) with priority to the 209th ACR, 68th FA Bde, and 10th Avn Bde in the north. At H+55 or OO, 15th CSG (Prov) will echelon support forces to vic NORDHAUSEN (PC240070) to provide priority support to 68th FA Bde and 10th Avn Bde as they move to AO SPACE and FAA 3 respectively. 13th CSG (Fwd) will prepare to pick up support of the 209th ACR and 69th FA Bde as they move to positions on the X (US) Corps southern

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flank. 15th CSG (Prov) element vic MERSEBURG u-ill continue priority support to 209th ACR. At H+84 or OO, 13th CSG (Fwd) assumes support of 209th ACR and 69th and 70th FA Bdes. at which time 15th CSG (Prov) will complete its move to vic NORDHAUSEN. OO, 15th CSG (Prov) will move to designated area in the corps rear to continue support to 209th ACR 10th Avn Bde, and 68th FA Bde, in order

(4) Support During Phase III Priority of support during this phase is to 25th Armd Div and 10th Avn Bde. Due to anticipated destruction of railways immediately west of PL PROTON. the primary transportation support mode for the attack will be highway with augmentation by emergency aerial resupply. 13th CSG (Fwd) must be prepared to provide continuous fuel and ammunition support to 25th Armd Div with priori? to resupply immediately after the destruction of the southernmost second-echelon division. Bypassed threat elements will continue to remain a threat to COSCOM elements operating in 25th Armd Div zone until cleared. Medical and maintenance evacuation has priority on southbound traffic. Evacuations will continue southward until 25th Armd Div is in AA EINSTEIN. 13th CSG (Fwd) will coordinate protection of convoys with 25th Armd Div until zone is secure and provide support to 209th ACR as it screens the corps east flank. 14th CSG (Fwd) will continue support to 52d Mech Div and prepare to assume primary support of units reconstituting in assembly areas north of PL BLAST. 15th CSG (Prov) will detach subordinate battalions to 14th CSG (Fwd).

(5) Support After the Operation. OO after attack completed. 13th CSG (Fwd) will assume support of 52d Mech Div and 209th ACR as these units continue screening missions. 14th CSG (Fnd) will assume support mission for corps units reconstituting north of PL MASS. Priority of reconstitution effort is to 209th ACR 25th Armd Div. and aviation brigade, in order. Priority of effort is to prepare to support continued offensive operations to the north.

- b. Material and Services. Service Support Plan 1.
- c. Medical Evacuation and Hospitalization. Service Support Plan 1
- d. Personnel. Senice Support Plan I.
- e. Civil-Military Cooperation. Annex S (Civilian Affairs).

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

a. Command

(1) Phase I

(a) Rear CP will control the movement of the corps from its assembly areas into positions forward of PL QUASAR. Rear CP is at WURZBURG (NAG660170).

(b) TAC CP will control the battle forward of PL LIGHT and north of PL XENON. TAC CP is at GRIMMA (US4278); alternate is at ALTENBURG (US2050).

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OPLAN 6099-X (US) Corps (DEPUTY DAWG)

(c) Main CP will control the units west of PL LIGHT and south of PL XENON. Main CP is at GOTHIA (PB199459); alternate is at SONDERHAUSEN (PB3092)

(2) Phase II.

(a) Rear CP is at WURZBURG (NA650150).

(b) TAC CP will control the battle forward of PL LIGHT and north of PL XENON. TAC CP location initially at GRIMMA (US4278). OO, TAC CP will move to RUDOLSTADT (PB6521).

(c) Main CP initially, is at GOTHIA (PB2045). After TAC CP has completed its move to RUDOLSTADT, the main CP will move to SONDERHAUSEN (PB3092).

(3) Phase III.

(a) Rear CP is at WURZBURG (NA650150)

(b) TAC CP initially is at RUDOLSTADT (PB6521); OO, TAC CP will move to ZORBIG (UT0025).

(c) Main CP initially is at SONDERHAUSEN (PB3092). After the TAC CP has completed its move to ZORBIG, the main will move to LEIPZIG (US1997)

(4) Succession of Command deputy corps commander. Cdr. 52d Mech Div; Cdr. 25th And Div; Cdr, 4th PzGrcn Div, in order

b. Signal

(1) X (US) Corps SOI INDEX 1-2 in effect

(2) Commanders and staff at battalion level and above will maximize the use of MSE communications and minimize use of FM communications to higher and lateral headquarters

Acknowledge

CHASE
LTG

OFFICIAL:
SAGE
G3

Annexes: A-Task Organization

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M/S320B

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OPLAN 6099-X (US) Corps (DEPUTY DAWG)

- B-Intelligence (TBP)
- C-Operation Overlay (Overlays 4-1 and 3-2)
- F-Fire Support (TBP)
- G-Air Defense (TBP)
- D--Engineer (TBP)
- L-Deception (TBP)
- S-Civilian Affairs (omitted)

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ANNEX A (TASK ORGANIZATION) to OPERATION PLAN 6099-X (US) Corps (DEPUTY DAWG)

* * * * * *

Phase III

52d Mech Div (-)
 3-606 FA (155. SP): (R) 52d Mech DIVARTY
 413th Cml Co (Decon) (DS)
 62d Engr Gp (Cbt): DS
 501st Engr Cbt Bn Hvy (Corps)(Whl)
 572d En Cbt Bn (Hvy)
 5055th Engr Fltbrg Co (Ribbon)
 5080th Engr Cbt Spt Equip Co
 706th Area Sig Bn: DS

B/200th PSYOP Bn: DS
 A/55th CA Bn: DS

4th PzGren Div (4th (GE) Mech Div)
 2-635 FA (155mm. SP): (R) 4th PzGren
 DIVARTY
 A/1-434 ADA (Avenger): OPCON
 5052d Engr Fltbrp Co (Ribbon): OPCON
 705th Area Sig Bn DS

75th Armd Div
 66th FA Bde: (R) 25th Armd DIVARTY
 2-633 FA (155-mm, SP)
 2-631 FA (155-mm,SP)
 2-662 FA (MLRS)

B/I -434 ADA (Avenger): OPCON

401 st Cml Bn. OPCON
 411st Cml Co (Decon)
 421st Cml Co (Smoke Genr) (Mech)
 422d Cml Co (Smoke Genr) (Mech)
 503d Engr Cbt Bn (Corps) (Whl): DS
 5050th Engr Fltbrg Co (Ribbon) OPCON
 5051 st Engr Fltbrg Co (Ribbon). OPCON
 232d MP Bn: DS
 707th Area Sig Bn: DS
 C/200th PSYOP Bn: DS
 B/55th CA Bn DS

4th CMBG

403d Cml Bn. OPCON
 414th Cml Co (Decon)
 423d Cml Co (Smoke Genr) (Mech)

424th Cml Co (Smoke Genr) (Mtz)
 273d MP Co: DS
 C/55th CA Bn: DS

10th Avn Bde (Corps)
 402d Avn Regt (At Hel)
 1/402d Atk Hel Bn
 2/402d Atk Hel Bn
 3/402d Atk Hel Bn
 403d Avn Regt (Atk Hel)
 1/403d Atk Hel Bn
 2/403d Atk Hel Bn
 3/403d Atk Hel Bn
 404th Avn Regt (Atk Hel)
 1/404th Atk Hel Bn
 2/404th Atk Hel Bn
 3/404th Atk Hel Bn
 400th Avn Regt
 1/400th Aslt Hel Bn (UH-60)
 2/400th Aslt Hel Bn (UH-60)
 3/400th Aslt Hel Bn (CH-47)
 4/400th Cmd Avn Bn (OH-58/UH-60)
 A/ 1-435 ADA (Avenger): OPCON
 416th Cml Co (Decon): OPCON
 277th MP Co: DS

700th ACR
 65th FA Bde (DS)
 2-631 FA (155-mm. SP)
 2-632 FA (155-mm. SP)
 3-661 FA (MLRS)
 402d Cml Bn (OPCON)
 412th Cml Co (Decon)
 441st Cml Co (Smoke Genr) (Mech)
 442d Cml Co (Smoke Genr) (Mtz)
 443d Cml Co (Smoke Genr) (Mtz)
 507d Engr Cbt Bn (Corps) (Mech) DS
 270th MP Co: DS
 D/55th CA Bn (DS)

Tactical Combat Force (TCF)

* * *

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ANX A (TASK ORG) to OPLAN 6099 -10th (US) Corps (DEPUTY DAWG)

10th corps Arty
67th FA Bde: GS
2-636 FA (155-mm. SP)
2-663 FA (MLRS)
2-664 FA (MLRS)
68th FA Bde GS
2-665 FA (MLRS)
2-666 FA (MLRS)
2-667 FA (MLRS)
B/1-435 ADA (Avenger): OPCON
233d MP Bn DS

10th ADA Bde
1-500 ADA (Patriot)
1-461 ADA (Patriot)
1-434 ADA (-) (Avenger)
1-435 ADA (-) (Avenger)

40th Cml Bde
404th Cml Bn (GS)
415th Cml Co (Decon)
444th Cml Co (Smoke Gem) (Mech)
451st Cml Co (Recon) (Fox)

53d Eng Bdc (Corps)
5001 st Engr Topo Co: GS
5053d Engr Fltbrg Co (Ribbon). GS
5059th Engr Mdm Girder Brg Co GS
5060th Engr Mdm Girder Brg Co. GS

61st Engr Gp (Cbt Hvy): GS
500th Engr Cbt Bn (Corps) (Mech)
570th Engr Cbt Bn (Hvy)
571st Engr Cbt Bn (Hvy)
573d Engr Cbt Bn (Hvy)
5054th Engr Fltbrg Co (Ribbon)

20th MI Bde
200th MI Bn (Aerial Xplt)
210th MI Bn (Tac Xplt)
220th MI Bn (Op)
250th LRSC
286th UAV Det (Prov)

20th MP Bde
230th MP Bn (-): GS
231st MP Bn (-): GS

70th Sig Bde (ME)
700th Sig Bn :GS
708th Area Sig Bn. GS
730th TACSAT Co: GS

10th CA Bde
55th CA Bn (-)

200th PSYOP Bn (-)

2d Fin Gp

664th Pers Gp

110th Press Camp HQ

10th (US) COSCOM

**Theater Army Units Providing DS to
10th (US) Corps**

713th Trans Rv Bn
7411th Trans Ry Eng Co
7416th Ry Tran Operating Co
7417th Ry Tram Operating Co
7418th Trans Ry Equip Maint Co

Other Direct Reporting Units

1800th RAOC
1801st RAOC
1802d RAOC
1803d RAOC

101st Mil Hist Det

140th Army Band

FUNDAMENTALS OF ECHELONS ABOVE DIVISION COMBAT OPERATIONSChapter 9. Service Support Plan 1

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SERVICE SUPPORT PLAN 1-10th (US) COSCOM

RELATED OPERATION PLAN: OPLAN 6099-X (US) Corps (DEPUTY DAWG)

Reference: OPLAN 6099-X (US) Corps (DEPUTY DAWG)

Time Zone Used Throughout the Plan: ALPHA

Task Organization: Annex A (Task Organization)

1. SITUATION

See OPLAN 6099-X (US) Corps (DEPUTY DAWG)

2 MISSION

Provide CSS for deep and CF operations along PL NEUTRON. defense in sector. and corps attack to destroy the 2 GTA Plan for reconstitution of CF and corps maneuver units in preparation for continued offensive operations to the north IAW the AFCENT campaign plan.

3. GENERAL

a. 10th COSCOM provides CSS. less classified maps. communications security (COMSEC). and personnel services. At M-day, GS supply, and ammunition units will deploy stocks to designated storage sites and continue to receive and distribute stocks as directed by the CMMC. OO, remaining COSCOM units deploy to wartime locations and prepare for combat operations. COSCOM units will not conduct support operations or deploy units west of PL QUASAR until commencement of hostilities on D-day. Corps units will draw their basic loads and DS stockages of classes I, III, and V from COSCOM storage sites located in the corps sector as listed in annex B (Supply Point Locations).

(1) 20th CSG (Rear). Provides GS supply and reinforcing direct support maintenance to forward CSGs. Provides DSM and DS/GS supply support on an area basis to units employed in or passing through the corps rear

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SERVICE SUPPORT PLAN 1-10th (US COSCOM)

area. Provides corpswide support of petroleum, ammunition, transportation, AVIM, airdrop, and mortuary affairs.

(2) 13th CSG (Fwd). Prior to D-day, supports 25th Armd Div, 68th FA Bde, and all nondivisional units on an area basis. Priority prior to D-day is to 209th ACR and units designated to conduct deep operations. On D-day, priority shifts to and remains with 25th Armd Div and its attached and OPCON nondivisional units through completion of phase III. Support for 10th Avn Bde, 67th FA Bde, and 68th FA Bde resumes during phase II. After completion of phase III, priority of support shifts to 52d Mech Div and 25th Armd Div as these units screen the corps north boundary. Provides emergency fuel, medical, and limited ammunition support to 7th PzGren Div and 4th PzGren Div as required.

(3) 14th CSG (Fwd). Prior to D-day, supports 52d Mech Div, 209th ACR, and all nondivisional units on an area basis. Priority prior to D-day is to 209th ACR and units designated to conduct deep operations. Priority shifts to 52d Mech Div and the corps TCF through completion of phase III. After completion of phase III, priority of support shifts to reconstitution of 209th ACR, 25th Armd Div, the corps aviation brigades, and the 67th FA Bde for continued offensive operations to the north. Provides AVIM to all nondivisional units and backup AVIM to division aviation maintenance companies. Provides throughput of supplies to corps TCF.

(4) 15th CSG (Prov). Prior to D-day, conducts corps deep and CF operations during Phases I and II. On D-day, conducts movement of supplies and equipment to vic MERSEBURG (QB090970) and continues to receive and distribute supplies to deep operations and covering forces. Initial priority of support during phase I is the ACR, corps artillery brigades, and aviation brigades, in order. Priority of support during phase II is to 209th ACR and supporting corps artillery brigades, in order. Conducts movement to support location vic NORDHAUSEN (PC240070) during phase II. OO, conducts movement to designated location in corps rear and continues to support covering force. Priority of support is to 209th ACR, 67th FA Bde, and 10th Avn Bde and supporting units in phase III. After completion of phase III, be prepared to detach subordinate units to 14th CSG (Fwd) to assist in the reconstitution of 209th ACR and 25th Armd Div. Provides emergency fuel and medical assistance to 7th PzGren Div as required during passage of lines.

(5) 55th Ammo Bn

(a) Provides DS/GS conventional ammunition supply to the corps.

(b) Operates ammunition transfer points (ATPs) to support 25th Armd Div attack of threat second-echelon divisions.

(c) In coordination with 15th CSG (Prov), provides DS ammunition company to issue ammunition from forward railheads and to provide ATPs to support corps artillery conducting deep fires and support of covering forces.

(d) Positions ammunition supply points (ASPs) within local haul distance of units in the main battle area (MBA).

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SERVICE SUPPORT PLAN 1-10th (US) COSCOM

(e) Maintains prerigged ammunition packages for emergency air delivery. Priority to ATACMs, MLRS. Hellfire, tank, and TOW ammunition. in order.

(f) OO, operates ATPs for corps artillery units in support of corps attack

(6) 80th Med Bde

(a) Provides health services to the corps

(b) In coordination with 15th CSG (Prov) provides a mobile army surgical hospital and acromedical evacuation companies to support deep and CF operations.

b. 2d Fin Gp (Corps) and 644th Pers Gp (Corps) provide personnel services to the corps on an area basis

c. 714th Trans Ry Bn provides rail transportation to X (US) Corps sector. Unit has four diesel locomotive engines to offset major loss of electrical power on Bundesbahn railways. Initial priority of support to deep operations and CF units.

d. Coordinating Instructions

(1) CSS task organization is at annex A

(2) Supply point locations are at annex B.

(3) CSS locations and support boundaries are at annex C

(4) Highway MSRs are at annex D

(5) Railway MSRs are at Annex E.

4. MATERIEL AND SERVICES

a. Supply.

(1) Class I.

(a) Units deploy with 3 days of MREs in basic load

(b) Issue cycle to DSUs is 3/2/3.

(c) Ration mix is two MREs and one T-ration with sundry packs

(d) B-rations are available from GSUs on request.

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SERVICE SUPPORT PLAN 1-10th (US COSCOM)

(2) Classes II and IV

(a) Command regulated.

(b) Unit defensive packets and corps barrier materials are released at M+2.

(c) Units deploy with 15 days of general supplies, two NBC protective overgarments per individual and unit defensive packets.

(d) DSUs maintain stockage of one set per individual of NBC protective overgarments for supported unit strength

(3) Class III

(a) Units deploy with 15 days of packaged products and all bulk fuel tankers topped off.

(b) DSUs deploy with bulk fuel tankers topped off. Unit distribution from GSUs to fill collapsible bags.

(c) Throughput distribution to 521st FSB, 52d Mech Div, while designated as the corps TCF.

(4) Class v.

(a) Units deploy with basic loads. Shortages filled from GS stocks prior to D-day. Munitions for barrier plans available at M+2. CSR/CCL stocks not available until D+1.

(b) CSRs:

1 D+1 through D+3.

<u>DODIC</u>	<u>Ammo Type</u>	<u>52d Mech</u>	<u>25th Armd</u>	<u>Avn Bde</u>	<u>ACR</u>	<u>FA Bda</u>
C786	120-mm APFSDS	0	0	0	30	0
D509	155-mm R4AMS	0	0	0	10	10
D510	155-mm CLGP	0	0	0	3	1
D563	155-mm DPICM	0	0	0	140	115
D563	155-mm RAP	0	0	0	10	10
H104	MLRS, LP/C	0	0	0	0	3
PA79	GM, Hellfire	0	0	20	15	0
PA93	GM, TOW	0	0	0	10	0

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SERVICE SUPPORT PLAN 1-10th (US) COSCOM

2. After D+3

DODIC	Ammo Type	52D Mech	25th Armd	Avn Bde	ACR	FA Bdes
C786	120-mm APFSDS	0	30	0	20	0
D509	155-mm RAAMS	5	10	0	5	0
D510	155-mm CLGP	2	2	0	1	1
D563	155-mm DPICM	70	140	0	100	115
D579	155-mm RAP	5	10	0	0	0
H104	MLRS LP/C	3	5	0	0	12
PA79	GM, Hellfire	10	15	15	10	0
PA93	GM. TOW	5	8	0	5	0

(5) Class VI. Suspended at D-day. Health and comfort sundry packs are issued with class I. Post exchange services commence about D+5.

(6) Class VII

(a) All GS stocks are command regulated

(b) GS stockage is limited to combat vehicles-40 M1A1, 50 M2 Priority is to reconstitution effort after completion of phase III.

(c) Aircraft and tactical vehicle replacements are available from GS maintenance returns after D+4.

(d) Aircraft and combat vehicle replacements are controlled through weapon systems replacement operations.

(7) Class VIII. TSOP

(8) Class IX

(a) Command-Regulated Items

1. All aircraft engines
2. M1A1 tank engines
3. M2/M3 transmissions
4. 5-ton engines

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SERVICE SUPPORT PLAN 1-10th (US COSCOM)

5. M109 howitzer final drives.

6. M1A1 tank track.

(b) Shortages of electronic repair parts exist for fire control and surveillance equipment.

(c) Cannibalization is authorized at DSU level.

(9) Class X. Limited food stocks are available for civil-military, operation companies to assist refugees

(10) Maps, Unclassified maps are available at DSUs. Classified maps are requested/distributed through S2/G2 channels.

(11) Water.

(a) Use of local water sources will be coordinated through supporting CMO companies.

(b) DSUs provide bulk water supply at ration distribution points.

b. Transportation and Movements.

(1) MSRs and Traffic Circulation.

(a) All MSRs are controlled routes requiring movement credits. Priority for eastbound traffic is to class V and III shipments. Priority, for westbound traffic is to medical and maintenance evacuation, in order.

(b) Highway MSRs are at annex D; railway MSRs are at annex E.

(c) Traffic circulation and control overlay is at annex F.

(2) Terminals.

(a) Air.

1. Corps airfield vic GIEBELSTADT (NA700000).

2. Alternate vic KITZINGEN (NA850110) and SCHWEINFURT (NA840450).

(b) Rail.

1. ASCHAFFENBURG (NA 100370).

2. BAD HERSFELD (NB500370).

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SERVICE SUPPORT PLAN 1-10th (US) COSCOM

3. GIESSEN (MB765040).
4. NORTHEIM (NC690290).
5. KASSEL (NB350870).
6. MERSEBURG (QBO50950).
7. NORDHAUSEN (PC240070).
8. WURZBURG (NA690180).

(c) Water.

1. BAMBERG (PA360290).
2. LOHR (NA420390).
3. SCHWIENFURT (NA880440).

(d) Pipeline. GIESSEN (MB780020).

(3) Movement Management.

(a) Corps movement control center is located at 10th (US) COSCOM headquarters

(b) Regional Movement control Team (MCT) Locations: TBP.

c. Services.

(1) Clothing Exchange and Bath (CEB).

(a) Augmentation is not available for divisions and ACR.

(b) COSCOM field service companies provide CEB to division ACR separate mechanized brigade, and nondivisional units Priority is to 209th ACR and corps FA and aviation units after completion of phase III.

(2) Mortuary Affairs (MA).

(a) Graves registration subprogram is in effect at D-day.

(b) Emergency burial is authorized at corps level.

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SERVICE SUPPORT PLAN 1-10th (US COSCOM)

(c) 20th Co11 Co (MA) will establish corps collection point vic GRUNDAU (NA070600)

(3) Other

(a) Request EOD support through RAOs

(b) Host nation labor is not available forward of division rear boundaries.

d. Maintenance

(1) DS maintenance companies deploy maintenance support teams with supported ADA, engineer, and FA battalions.

(2) Maintenance Timelines

(a) DS--24 hours

(b) Reinforcing--48 hours

(c) GS-96 hours

(3) Reinforcing priorities. (TBP)

(4) Priority of maintenance evacuation is to MLRS, attack helicopters, tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles (BFVs), and howitzers, in order.

5. MEDICAL EVACUATION AND HOSPITALIZATION

a. Evacuation

(1) Corps evacuation policy is 15 days

(2) Theater evacuation policy is 30 days

(3) Air evacuation is restricted to URGENT priority patients.

(4) The mobile aeromedical staging facility is located at KITZINGEN Army Airfield

b. Hospitalization.

(1) Hospital Locations. (TBP)

(2) Other Services.

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SERVICE SUPPORT PLAN 1-10th (US) COSCOM

(a) Dispensary, dental, veterinary, and psychiatric services are located at CSHs.

(b) 827th Med Bn Log (Fwd) located vic BAD KISSINGEN (NA770630).

6. PERSONNEL

a. Maintenance of Unit Strength.

(1) Submit personnel status reports LAW TSOP.

(2) 110th and 111th Rep1 Cos provide area support to the corps,

b. Personnel Management.

(1) Personnel administration is provided by designated personnel services battalions,

(2) Requirements for civilian labor are submitted through supporting civil affair companies.

(3) Theater stockade is located vic MANNHEIM, and it supports all US personnel confinement.

c. Development and Maintenance of Morale.

(1) Finance support teams are collocated with personnel service battalions.

(2) Postal service is provided on an area basis.

d. Maintenance of Discipline, Law, and Order.

(1) Civilian establishments are off-limits except for official business.

(2) Civilian curfew is 2000 to 0600.

(3) Stragglers are to be reported to the nearest MP element.

7. CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION

Initially, civil affairs companies are provided on a mission-tasking basis through RAOs.

8. MISCELLANEOUS

a. Area Support Boundaries. Annex C.

b. Protection. * * *

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SERVICE SUPPORT PLAN 1--10th (US COSCOM)

- c. Special Reports. None.
- d. Statement, This plan is to be implemented on M-day.

9. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

- a. Command.
 - (1) X(US)Corps s main CP is initially located vic GOTHA (PB 199459).
 - (2) X (US) Corps rear CP is located vic WURZBURG (NA66 1070).
 - (3) X (US) COSCOM CP is located at corps rear CP.
- b. Signal. Current SOI index 1-2 is in effect.

Acknowledge.

MG
GROOM

Official:

/s/ Johnson
JOHNSON
ACofS, SOTI

Annexes: A-CSS Task Organization (Omitted-see appendix 1 to this staff planning book)
B-Supply. Point Locations (TBP)
C-CSS Locations and support boundaries (Omitted-see overlay 4-2)
D-Highway MSRs (See overlay 4-2)
E-Railway MSRs (Omitted-see overlay 4-2)
F-Traffic circulation and control overlay (TBP)

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FUNDAMENTALS OF ECHELONS ABOVE DIVISION COMBAT OPERATIONSChapter 10. X (US) Corps Situation Update and Special Situation and Commander's Guidance

1. X (US) CORPS SITUATION UPDATE AND SPECIAL SITUATION

You are a staff planner with the X (US) Corps, reflecting on events of the past week. The time is 220815A Aug 19. Krasnovian forces launched their attack against X (US) Corps and the LANDCENT area of responsibility (AOR) in the predawn hours of 16 August. X (US) Corps OPLAN DEPUTY DAWG was implemented, and corps units successfully contained the attack of the Krasnovian 2 GTA in the vicinity of PL ROD. However, the corps suffered moderate losses in personnel and equipment in momentarily stopping the Krasnovian TVD supporting attack (2 Krasnovian Front). LANDCENT forces defending the sector to the north were unexpectedly successful in stopping the TVD main attack (1 Krasnovian Front). You begin to realize that this could again the operational pause in the Krasnovian offensive campaign.


You remember that LANDCENT OPLAN CRASHING FIST incorporated a deception plan to deceive the TVD commander into believing the northern portion of the LANDCENT AOR was less well defended than allied dispositions in the south. If the TVD commander committed the 37 GTA as part of the main attack in the north, the LANDCENT operational reserve (I AAG) could counterattack through the 10th (US) Corps and destroy the 37 GTA, causing the defeat of the TVD commander's plan. If the 37 GTA moved south, the allied plan would be in jeopardy. Because of this, you were not surprised when the II AAG commander flew to the X (US) Corps main CP to reinforce the sense of urgency in destroying the remnants of the second-echelon divisions of the 2 GTA and defeating the new threat developing east of Leipzig.

After reviewing the latest intelligence reports, the X Corps commander fully appreciated the importance of foiling the Krasnovian front commander's attempt to penetrate and secure crossings over the Saale. He directed his G3 to issue a warning order canceling the on-order mission to continue the attack north into the 1st (NL) Corps sector and informing units to begin preparing plans immediately to counter and defeat an enemy attack from the direction of Dresden.

When the corps G3 returned from the meeting with the corps commander, he provided a rough sketch showing how the corps commander assessed the current situation (the sketch map SPB-g). He then provided the following additional information.

"The situation in the 4th PzGren zone is still unclear. It seems that the 4th will hold its position but will not have sufficient combat power to move beyond PL FORD (a new phase line established in a earlier FRAGO from corps). Early estimates predict that it will take at least 36 to 48 hours for the 4th to reconstitute sufficient strength to move. It has approximately 50 percent of its artillery assets remaining and is capable of firing missions in support of the corps attack, if required."

The G3 cautioned you to hold the depicted brigade locations of the 4th PzGren suspect until more information arrived. He said, "The divisional SITREP shows the strength of 5th and 34th Bdes at 65 percent, the division cavalry squadron at 75 percent, and the 14th Bde at approximately 50 percent. Most of the losses are in armored fighting systems and engineer equipment. The 4th's ADA systems are less than 30 percent operational."



Sketch map SPB-g. Friendly situation as of 220001A AUG 199.

“Intelligence reports place the 42 TD about 30 to 48 hours out. We have not yet located the 13 IMRR. The corps FSO thinks he can delay it through long-range fires and OAS. Intelligence sources expect the 42 TD to be at approximately 88-percent strength in combat systems and 80-percent strength in artillery systems when it arrives at PL ROD. The 10th Corps ASIC predicts that the remaining two regiments of the 22 TD in a hasty defense astride the Elbe River will remain in place to support the 42 TD attack by fire. This is also true for the two remaining regiments of the 57 GTD. There are also several large moving target indicators from J-STARs indicating a movement of at least a division-sized force east of Berlin moving south and southwest toward Dresden. Our order of battle analysts think this is the 20 GTD from the 1 Krasnovian Front. Based on this information, we could be facing two tank divisions and an IMRR. By my rough calculations, we’re attacking 2:1 to PL ROD, then having to defend 1:1 at PL X-RAY. The key will be to sequence the operation so we can take advantage of our technology in targeting critical elements of the Krasnovian forces.”

As he leaves, the G3 instructs you to review the major events of the last few days, especially since the beginning of phase III of OPORD DEPUTY DAWG.

Corps deep operations failed to shape the Krasnovian approach as desired. Corps intelligence assets did not discover that the 57 TD (in the south) and the 22 TD (in the north) were on line rather than the 22 TD trailing. Consequently, the 4th PzGren attack encountered all four regiments of the southern division. The 4th PzGren survived but was unable to move north and consolidate as called for in OPORD DEPUTY DAWG. For all intents, the division is combat ineffective. It established an area defense along a line that runs generally southeast from Leipzig, along the southern bank of the Mulde River, to the small town of Dobeln.

The inability to see the battlefield was the biggest problem, particularly at corps and II AAG. This is why the corps attack was launched before the 57 GTD was in location. The plan had not accounted for the two divisions of the 2 GTA being on line. Corps accurately tracked the 22 TD (the northern division) as it passed through its named areas of interest and knew exactly when to launch the 25th to catch the 22 TD in the proper engagement areas (EAs). You remember the corps conducted deep operations to delay the 22 TD, thereby providing sufficient time for the 25th Armd Div to defeat the lead regiments of 57 GTD and still get to the northern EAs in time to engage the lead regiments of the 22 TD. You could not account for the corps' incorrect identification of the Krasnovian elements passing through the NAIs. Corps incorrectly identified these units as divisional main force elements. As the picture developed, it became clear that they were simply forward detachments from the 2 GTA and the 57 GTD. In any event, the attack was triggered too early.

The 25th Armd Div was able to make good progress in zone. The two lead brigades of the 25th crossed the line of departure (LD) on time and proceeded to make an orderly march to the north, with the 3d Bde (supporting attack) on the left and the 2d Bde (main attack) on the right. The 1st Bde trailed the 2d Bde in zone with a follow-and-assume mission. The 25th's plan had designated a series of sequential EAs from north to south. The lead brigades cleared each sequential EA as they moved north. The 2d Bde engaged a reinforced reconnaissance detachment in EA GUN and was forced to deploy. This reinforced reconnaissance detachment turned out to be a strong Krasnovian 2 GTA forward detachment. The commander of the 25th Armd Div instructed the 1st Bde to pass to the left and assume the main effort. No other Krasnovian forces were encountered until the 1st Bde made contact with the southernmost regiment of the 22 TD in objective SLAM. Soon after that, the 3d Bde engaged the other first-echelon regiment of the 22 TD in objective HIT. Both engagements went well for the 25th, and the two Krasnovian regiments were destroyed within the confines of the objective area.

Meanwhile, both division and corps leaders became concerned when the 4th PzGren reported heavy contact. By this time, the corps had a better understanding of events. The 4th PzGren was heavily engaged. The 4th PzGren needed corps to delay the second-echelon regiments of the 57 GTD until it had defeated the lead regiments and could reorient to meet the flanking attack from the east. Corps realigned deep fire assets to help the 4th PzGren. This realignment, which included redirecting OAS sorties away from the northern division, allowed the 22 TD to increase its rate of march west.

As you survey the current unit status reports, you see that the 4th PzGren is fixed in place below PL FORD; the 3d Bde, 25th Armd Div (the brigade with the most severe losses), is cleaning up the remaining forces in objective HIT; 1st Bde, 25th Armd Div, is reorganizing in objective SLAM; and 2d Bde, 25th Armd Div, is reducing isolated enemy pockets in EA GUN. The 25th Div's cavalry squadron is screening along PL PROTON from PL BLAST to PL FORD, while the division's remaining aviation assets are engaging isolated pockets of resistance and performing reconnaissance and security missions throughout the zone. The division support command (DISCOM) has not yet started to displace forward and is still in the vicinity of the old concentration camp at Buchenwald (PB5854).


The 52d Mech Div has been relatively unaffected by the events so far. There were some casualties and equipment losses due to Krasnovian deep operations. However, as hostilities continued, the counterfire capabilities of the X (US) Corps, along with the advanced technologies for fire control and target acquisition, significantly degraded several of the Krasnovian capabilities to conduct deep operations against the corps rear area. The corps ability to integrate its intelligence and fires capabilities was a significant factor in its success.

Since the X (US) Corps counterattack did not happen exactly as the corps commander envisioned, he established new control measures and redirected priorities to reflect the current battlefield situation.

2. 2 KRASNOVIAN FRONT SITUATION (SKETCH MAP SPB-H)

The 2 GTA commander instructed the two trailing regiments of the 22 TD to secure crossing sites over the Elbe River and await the commitment of the 2 Krasnovian Front reserve division, the 42 TD. The Krasnovian TVD commander decided to shift the main effort of the Krasnovian attack south and needed the 2 GTA reserve to seize crossings over the Saale River, enabling the 37 GTA to exploit this success. The movement of the 20 GTD from the 1 Krasnovian Front means that the TVD commander is redirecting the TVD main attack from the 1 Krasnovian Front to the 2 Krasnovian Front.

Meanwhile, the liaison elements from the 4 Krasnovian Front arrived at the main command post and the front rear area control post to coordinate the passage of the 4 Krasnovian Front first-echelon armies and divisions beginning 7 Sep 19_.




Sketch map SPB-h. Krasnovian situation as of 220001 A AUG 19.

3. CORPS COMMANDER'S GUIDANCE


After the meeting with the II AAG commander and while on the way back to the corps main CP, the X (US) Corps commander began his estimate of the situation. The II AAG commander expects X (US) Corps to have PL X-RAY secured NLT 260430 Aug 19_. The corps commander decided to review the events of the last couple of days and get a status of the corps. After reviewing his subordinate commander's situation reports, he summarizes the information and concludes the following:

“The 209th ACR has been screening the corps northern flank between Salzgitter and Magdeburg while preparing to conduct an advance cover if the X (US) Corps attacks to the north. The 52d Mech Div, an unbloodied unit to date, is still disposed in a defensive posture north of Erfurt astride avenue of approach E. The 25th Armd Div has just completed its attack and is reorganizing its units. The 4th PzGren Div continues to defend along PL FORD and south of a line between Leipzig and Dobeln; it is still in contact with the Krasnovian 57 TD. The 4th CMBG, the corps reserve, is in AA ELECTRON. The 54th Mech Div will be attached to X (US) Corps, effective 231700 Aug 19_, and is currently moving toward its designated assembly area (AA HAWK) in the vicinity of Gottingen, just east of the Leine River. Estimated closure time in for its lead two brigades is 241200A.

After reviewing this information, the corps commander continues his estimate of the situation. While the 52d and 25th Divs are still effective and can conduct an attack the 209th ACR can also provide additional capabilities for the corps. The commander envisions a couple of possible courses of action (COAs) for this operation. He quickly captures his thoughts by drawing a couple of sketches.



In the first COA, the 209th ACR would attack to secure objective RED, the 25th would secure objective YELLOW, and the 52d would secure objective BLUE. Once these are secured, the 4th CMBG would move to A WHITE so the corps reserve could respond to penetrations in the northern or southern portions of the corps zone. The 54th would be prepared to counterattack and secure objectives along PL ARGON, providing a strong covering force while the corps prepares a fully prepared defense along PL X-RAY.



In his second COA, the corps commander envisions the 25th Armd Div completing its reorganization and attacking to destroy the enemy regiments in the northern portion of the corps sector. The 52d Mech Div would attack the enemy regiments in the southern portion of the corps sector. The 4th CMBG would be the corps reserve, and the ACR would initially conduct security operations along the corps northern boundary, since this will be an exposed flank as the operation begins. After destroying the remaining enemy regiments, the 4th PzGen Div will withdraw and move back to a designated assembly area west of the corps rear boundary, and the 4th CMBG would secure objective WHITE to block any Krasnovian threat from the south.

While the corps commander goes back to the corps main CP to talk to his chief of staff and G3, he quickly analyzes these two courses of action. He realizes time is critical. The attack must begin in a little more than 48 hours, and it must be well synchronized. If the enemy commander gets enough forces forward in time to reinforce the defending regiments, the corps will have to use additional forces to conduct the attack. Another concern is extending the division and the corps main supply routes. It will be critical to ensure that units moving toward PL ROD do not interfere with each other's movement routes during this operation.

The corps commander knows he has been out of the net on some things and will need his staffs full participation to develop this plan. Using his MSE telephone, he calls the chief of staff to assemble the staff. Although he has begun to visualize several ways to plan the corps attack, he is confident that his well-trained staff will look at other COA options before it gives him its coordinated recommendation.

Meanwhile, you are updating the map and the status board when the corps G3 calls and tells you to stand by for instructions. This means that there might be a new mission or a change in the present order that requires your action. You quickly begin gathering facts about the current situation.

The chief of staff walks in and tells you that a II AAG FRAGO is coming in over the tactical facsimile. He continues, "Based on the FRAGO and the current situation, conduct a mission analysis of the upcoming operation. Be prepared to brief the corps commander on your mission analysis when he arrives. I expect him to arrive in about 30 minutes."

You get II AAG's FRAGO 4-1 and the latest periodic intelligence summary (PERINTSUM). You ask the G2 planner and the assistant G3 air for the latest information on possible enemy COAs and critical information from the current air tasking order (ATO).

You begin to gather facts and develop some assumptions about the upcoming operation. You review the FRAGO, the PERINTSUM, and the current situation map to identify specified and implied tasks and any restrictions or constraints. You also determine broad command and control warfare (C²W) and operational risk considerations and then prepare to brief the commander.

FUNDAMENTALS OF ECHELONS ABOVE DIVISION COMBAT OPERATIONS

Chapter 11. X (US) Corps Chronology of Events

<i>T-day, 17 Jul 19__</i>	Phase I of LANDCENT OPLAN CRASHING FIST begins with the Krasnovian violation of the CFE Treaty.
<i>M-day, 17 Jul 19__</i>	Allied forces begin mobilization throughout NATO and CONUS. Deployment begins of US forces from CONUS to reinforce units in Germany.
<i>D-day, 16 Aug 19__</i>	Hostilities begin between NATO and Krasnovian forces. Phase II of CRASHING FIST begins; phase I of X (US) Corps OPLAN DEPUTY DAWG begins.
<i>190530A Aug 19__ (D+3)</i>	Phase II of DEPUTY DAWG begins.
<i>210930A Aug 19__ (D+5)</i>	The 209th ACR and the 4th CMBG complete their delay to PL PROTON, and the 2 GTA commander completes passage of the second-echelon divisions (22 TD and the 57 GTD) just east of Leipzig.
<i>211615A Aug 19__ (D+5)</i>	Phase III of DEPUTY DAWG begins as X (US) Corps counterattacks with the 25th Armd Div and an hour later with the 4th PzGren Div.
<i>220001A Aug 19__ (D+6)</i>	The II AAG issues FRAGO 4-1 to reflect the current situation and plans offensive operations to achieve the operational objectives of the LANDCENT plan. <i>[Your start point for the lesson 4 practical exercise]</i>
<i>220830A Aug 19__ (D+6)</i>	The corps completes phase III of DEPUTY DAWG. Corps elements begin reorganizing and reorienting toward a new mission to attack to the east.
<i>231700A Aug 19__ (D+7)</i>	The effective time the 54th Mech Div will be attached to X (US) Corps. Estimated closure time for its lead two brigades is 241200A Aug 19__.
<i>230430A Aug 19__ (D+8)</i>	Line of departure time for the corps attack.
<i>260001A Aug 19__ (D+10)</i>	II AAG issues FRAGO 4-2 for next mission. <i>[Read-ahead special situation for exam begins]</i>
<i>260430A Aug 19__ (D+10)</i>	Time the corps is to secure PL X-RAY.

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280130A Aug 19_ (D+12)	Corps must establish covering force along PL ARGON securing the German-Polish border @reconditions for terminating conflict on favorable terms to NATO).
071230A Sep 19_(D+22) (estimated)	10th (US) COSCOM completes displacement and prepares to fully support the corps operation.
071830A Sep 19_(D+22) (estimated)	Elements of the 4 Krasnovian <u>Front</u> (second strategic echelon) begin to arrive in the former 2 GTA rear area.
05 to 15 Sep 19_ (D+20 to D+30) (estimated)	Second Krasnovian strategic echelon enters the battle (unless conflict resolution occurs).

FUNDAMENTALS OF ECHELONS ABOVE DIVISION COMBAT OPERATIONSChapter 12. X (US) Corps Staff Planning Worksheet

As a member of the X (US) Corps plans cell, you are to use the tactical decisionmaking process (TDMP) to solve a tactical problem. You are not required to complete an entire OPLAN.

While the focus is on solving the lesson 4 corps tactical problem, use this worksheet to record each of the four basic steps using the deliberate procedures of the TDMP (analyze the mission, develop COAs, analyze and compare COAs, and arrive at a recommendation or decision). Refer to ST 101-5 for additional information about tactical decisionmaking.

PART I. MISSION ANALYSIS

Record the results of some key steps of your mission analysis based on 11 AAG FRAGO 4-1 and the X (US) Corps commander's guidance. This information is provided in chapters 6 and 10 of this staff planning book (SPB).

Intent of higher commanders:

LANDCENT (see SPB chapter 5):

II AAG:

Specified tasks:

Implied tasks:

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The essential X (US) Corps tasks are:

Limitations (restrictions or constraints) on freedom of action:

Critical facts and assumptions:


Analysis of time:

Your proposed restated mission for X (US) Corps: _____

PART II. COA DEVELOPMENT


Having obtained the corps commander's approval for the restated mission and read his guidance for this operation (see SPB, chapter 10), develop several courses of action to accomplish the mission.

COA 1 Sketch



COA 1 Statement

COA 2 Sketch



COA 2 Statement

PART III. COA ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON RESULTS

This important step in the TDMP consists of war gaming each COA, assessing the risks involved, and comparing the COAs to obtain the best COA to recommend to the commander. Review ST 101-5, chapter 4, if you need additional information about COA analysis and comparison.

Select the enemy and friendly COA you wish to war game. Post these COAs to your maps (using “post-it” stickers or some other technique to display units down to regimental or brigade size). Then, war game your COA from start to finish using the action-reaction-counteraction methodology and one of the war-gaming methods described in ST 101-5. After completing your war game, summarize your results below after making any necessary modifications to your COA.

COA 1

What critical events and decision points did you identify?

Assess the results of your war game-

Did you refine your COA as a result of your war game? (YES NO)

List apparent advantages of COA 1:

List apparent disadvantages of COA 1:

Estimated time when PL X-RAY is secured:

Additional remarks:

COA 2

What critical events and decision points did you identify?

Assess the results of your war game-

Did you refine your COA as a result of your war game? (YES NO)

List apparent advantages of COA 2:

List apparent disadvantages of COA 2:

Estimated time when PL X-RAY is secured:

Additional remarks:

Use the additional space or a separate piece of paper to record war-game results from other COAs you may have developed.

RISK ASSESSMENT

Spend a few minutes to consider and assess the risks and potential for fratricide for those critical events identified during war gaming. List below any necessary control measures you would incorporate into each COA to reduce the potential for fratricide.

COA 1:

COA 2:

COA 3:

COA COMPARISON

Collectively consider your COAs using common criteria and judgment. Such criteria could include:

- Specific elements of the commander's guidance.
- Critical events.
- Tenets or principles of war
- Any other significant or decisive factors (configuration for follow-on missions and so on).

There is no magic list of significant factors applicable to all situations. Comparison may follow any technique that will allow a recommendation to be reached. Use one of the comparison tables on the following pages to compare your COAs against the enemy COA of greatest concern. You may use any technique described in ST 101-5, chapter 4, to display your results.

ADVANTAGE/DISADVANTAGE COMPARISON TABLE

Course of Action	Advantages	Disadvantages
-------------------------	-------------------	----------------------

COA 1

COA 2

COA 3

CRITERIA DECISION TABLE

CRITERIA (assign additional criteria)	COA 1	COA 2	COA 3
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1. Flexibility

2. Supportability

3. Simplicity

4.

5.

6.

7.

NOTE: You may use numbers (1, 2, 3), assign pluses or minuses, or use weighted criteria. Make sure you determine several comparison criteria from the corps commander's guidance and write these in the table above before doing your comparison.

PART IV. COMMUNICATING THE TACTICAL DECISION

Use the following worksheet or a separate piece of paper to complete a X (US) Corps FRAGO for the scheme of maneuver that the commander approved for the new corps mission. Simply indicate “no change” for those parts of the five-paragraph order that remain unchanged when X (US) Corps OPLAN DEPUTY DAWG became an operation order. Refer to ST 101-5, chapter 6, if you need additional information about writing a FRAGO.

* * * * *

FRAGO _____

References:

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces.

b. Friendly Forces.

c. Attachments and Detachments,

2. MISSION

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3. EXECUTION

INTENT:

a. Concept of Operation.

b. Tasks to Maneuver Units.

(1) 52d Mech Div.

(2) 54th Mech Div.

(3) 25th Armd Div.

(4) 4th PzGren Div.

(5) 4th CMBG.

(6) 10th Avn Bde.

(7) 209th ACR.

c. Tasks to CS Units.

(1) Fire Support.

d. Coordinating Instructions

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4. SERVICE SUPPORT

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

ACKNOWLEDGE:

* * * * *

ANNEX A (TASK ORGANIZATION) to FRAGMENTARY ORDER - _____ x (US) CORPS



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